The Naval Review

THE

NAVAL REVIEW TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND SPREADING WITHIN THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER ASPECIX OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.

Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had formed a Naval Society: Captain H. W. Richmond R.N. Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N. Commander the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett R.N. Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N. Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N. Lieutenant H. G. Thursfield R.N. Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A. Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor) It is only by the possession of a trained and developed mind that the fullest capacity can, as a rule, be obtained. There are, of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are indeed rare. We are coming more and more to recognise that the best specialist can be produced only after a long training in general learning. The grasp of principle which makes detail easy can only come when innate capacity has been evoked and moulded by high training. Lord Haldane

Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance with the Regulation printed herein, which should be carefully studied. Copyright under Act of 1911 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying. recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Editor in writing.

Vol. 81

No. 1

JANUARY 1993

Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VICE ADMIRAL SIR PETER GRETTON EDITORIAL

ARTICLES: 'AGENDA FOR PEACE'

--

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MILITARY ISSUES

WHAT PROPORTION OF THE ROYAL NAVY'S FUTURE EFFORT SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO PREPARING FOR OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS?-I ...............

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY OR INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE A SMALL POINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ BAUBLES, BANGLES AND MASTER OF ARTS DEGREES GOODBYE MR PEPYS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO'S OUTREACH TO THE EASTERN NATIONS

. ADRIATIC OPS -- NATO AND/OR THE WEU? . THE EFFECT OF PEACE ON PEOPLE . . . . THE PURPOSE OF THE ROYAL NAVY . . . . HMS NORFOLK

--

THE FIRST OF THE DUKES

. . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DEFENCE POLICY 1945-1982-111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE PEACE DIVIDEND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OFTIONS FOR CHANGE OR M = f l ~ ~ - ~+'hls t HURRICANES TO EGYPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BOARDING OFFICER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE CHIEF GI-CIRCA 43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... OPERATION GAMBIT 6 JUNE 1944 - AN EYE WITNESS REPORT STEAM PICKET BOATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IT'S THAT WORD AGAIN (LOGISTICS) RFA BACCHUS IN THE FLEET TRAIN

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MORE 'MAN OVERBOARD'

CORRESPONDENCE RESERVES

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. PRINCIPLES

LOGISTICS-THE RNSTS

OF WAR

. THE

. THE

ENVIRONMENT AND THE MILITARY .

JUST WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE . A MAN FOR

ALL SEASONS -- A WOODEN BOW

--

PORTLAND INCIDENT

-- OTHER

TIMES . . . - - FIVE

MINUTES OF TIME

REVIEWS . I1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

3

Editorial This issue HE usual Editor's Butterflies after a bumper issue in October - hardly anything in the reserve stock and little apparently coming in quickly subsided and we have almost an embarrassment of riches again. There is much variety too, so much that it is impossible to summarise or fully to categorise the contents list. However one can single out three aspects that make this issue distinctive. First, there is a noticeable movement in the strategic articles away from defined and well-known structures towards the more fluid situations that we shall have to become used to. That seems to me to be up to date and realistic. Second, there are several articles and letters on Logistics, including two from RNSTS members that are particularly welcome. Third, the Reserves have - not before time, it may be thought - found voices to support them, and there may be more to come.

T

Dates for Diaries We have had an unprecedented number of notifications of conferences and other events. The following summarises those that happen in the next few months: 23 February 1993: A one day seminar on Microbes in Fuels, LubOil and Bilges in the IME City Conference Centre. Details from The Conference Department, Institute of Marine Engineers, The Memorial Building, 76 Mark Lane, London EC3R 7JN. March 1993: Relaunch of main galleries in the Old Royal Observatory, Greenwich, London SElO 9NF. 31 March - 2 April: International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference on 'Meeting the Challenge: The Changing Naval Defence Scene' at Brighton. Organised by Spearhead Exhibitions Ltd, Rowe House, 55/59 Fife Road, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 ITA. 26-28 May: Conference on the Battle of the Atlantic at the Merseyside Maritime Museum, Liverpool. Contact Derek G.

Law, Librarian, King's College, Strand, London WC2R 2LS.

Appeals There has also been news of several appeals that merit members' attention: The Fieldhouse Appeal: to commemorate Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse at Falklands Gardens, Gosport. Joint sponsors are the Royal Navy and the Gosport Borough Council, Town Hall, Gosport, Hants. Restoration of the Chapel of the Order of the British Empire in the Crypt of St Paul's to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Order. Contact the Central Chancery of the Orders of Knighthood, St James's Palace, London SWlA IBH. Warship Preservation Trust: Plymouth and Onyx are still being kept afloat with, and by, the Trust (Lodge Hill, Liskeard, Cornwall PL14 4EL). The ships are still at Birkenhead and 'go live' - electrical and electronic systems operating - from time to time. A plea A member of advancing years but an abiding interest in naval history is missing Vol. I11 Part 1 of Roskill's The War at Sea. If anyone knows of a spare copy, could they please contact the Secretary-Treasurer? The Navy List (Retired Officers) A vigilant member has brought an interesting fact to light. Observing a small error in the latest (1992) edition of the List, he went on to notice much larger errors and omissions in the case of his contemporaries. Enquiries brought a reply from the authorities as follows: 'In order to minimise cost production the Navy List of Retired Officers is made using information passed from records held by the Paymaster General. Unfortunately a large group of officers were omitted from the information

... Anyone seeking correction of an error should write to the Editor of the Navy List,

2

EDITORIAL

HMS Centurion, Grange Road, Gosport, Hants PO13 9XA.

Back numbers A member has back numbers from 1944- 1953, missing No.4 of Vo1.34 (1946). Bids please to Mr J. B. Wells, Flat 34, Buckingham Gate, London SWlE 6PA.

Annual General Meeting By courtesy of the Commanding Officer, the next Annual General Meeting of 7he Naval Review will be held in HMS President, the shore

HQ of the London Division RNR, at 5.30 pm on Thursday 13 May 1993. The Wardroom Bar will be available after the meeting. Members will be most welcome and will be asked to identify themselves on arrival. For security reasons it would be helpful if they would inform the Secretary-Treasurer beforehand if they plan to attend. HMS President is at St Katharine's Way, just downstream of the entrance lock to St Katharine's Dock. The nearest Underground station is Tower Hill. RICHARDHILL

Subscriptions Those members whose subscriptions are not paid automatically by their banks and who have not yet paid their subscriptions for this year are asked to do so as soon as possible - £ 15 (or £7.50 for Sub-Lieutenants and below).

Changes of Address Please remember to tell the Secretary-Treasurer when you change your address.

Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton KCB, DSO**, OBE, DSC page 384 in Volume I1 of 7he 0PPOSITE War at Sea (Roskill) are two photographs. The caption is 'Famous Escort Group Leaders, 1942-43'. One is of HMS Duncan (Commander P. W. Gretton), B7 Group, and the other is of HMS Starling (Captain F. J. Walker), 2nd Escort Group. Inset are snapshots of these two outstanding naval leaders. The 'relentlessly determined' Gretton faces you squarely; Walker, pipe in mouth, and already muchdecorated, is more relaxed, but this barely conceals the strain that by July 1944 had killed him. How sad it is that Peter Gretton has died just before the commemoration that will take place this year (1993) at Liverpool, of victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. Early in April, 1943, Gretton's B7 Escort Group brought convoy HX 23 1, of 6 1 merchant ships, safely in for the loss of only three of them, against a strong concentration of U-boats, two of which were sunk, and others severely damaged. A couple of weeks later B7 set off westward with ONS 5, of 42 merchant ships. Appalling weather prevailed. In the course of a ten day running battle a total of 41 U-boats were homed in on the convoy, of which seven were destroyed, two lost by collision, and another five badly damaged, for the loss of 12 ships. No escorts were sunk. Before the climax of the action Gretton's ship, the Duncan, ran short of fuel; the weather was too bad for replenishment or transfer to another escort, and Gretton had to make the hard decision to turn the Escort over to Lieutenant-Commander Sherwood RNR, in the Tay, who rose magnificently to the occasion. Despite the fact that the Duncan had only 4% fuel remaining when she reached St. John's, Newfoundland, Gretton said later that the decision had haunted him ever since, and that he had missed the 'golden moment' which comes but once in a lifetime. The fact remains that with all the evidence now to hand there is no doubt that the successful defence of convoy HX 231 had marked, as Gretton said, 'the end of the beginning' of the campaign against the U-boats, with the even more decisive outcome of the ONS5 transit 'the first milestone' towards final victory.

Lord Chesterfield, writing to his son, said 'Pliny gave mankind this only alternative - of doing what deserves to be written, or writing what deserves to be read'. Peter Gretton achieved both. A long-standing member of 7he Naval Review, he joined our Committee in 1956 and served on it until 1975. As a contributor his articles (7), letters (6), and book reviews (24), reflect his intellectual integrity, his professional mastery, and his sustained concern for the good of the Service. In particular, NR of January, 1958, contains 'Why Don't We Learn from History?'; this shows conclusively how failure to act upon readily available antiU-boat experience from World War I brought victory for the U-boats so near in World War 11. In NR of January, 1981, Gretton argues, again convincingly, that the system of seaman officer specialisation into (G), (T), (N) and (C), with (AIS) as the Cinderella, was primarily responsible for the shortcomings of the Navy in 1939, not only in anti-submarine warfare, but in the application of modem technology to every kind of armament and equipment. Pointing out that 'Since the 1920s, there have been only two Salt Horse First Sea Lords, David Beatty and Andrew Cunningham' he went on to say 'This small number of Salt Horses in the list is not surprising in view of the difficulty which faced a young officer with, say, five firsts in Subs courses (N.B. Gretton's own achievement) in dodging conscription as a specialist'. He therefore welcomed the advent of the PWO: and, in response to complaints from senior gunnery officers that he had been too hard on their specialisation, he conceded that 'Gunnery departments of ships were well run, the morale of the branch was high and it contributed much to discipline as a whole'. For all this, Peter Gretton would not, I think, care to be remembered as a Whitehall warrior, even with a book on modern maritime strategy to his credit. For him, and his fellow commanders of escort groups, what mattered above all was victory over the dangers of the sea and the violence of the enemy. It is widely held (cf Roskill) that the main protagonists at the height of the Battle of the Atlantic were Donitz and Horton, the great admirals; Gretton,

41

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR PETER GRETTON

though, after studying all the records, concluded that 'in fact the two chief protagonists were Donitz and Rodger Winn' (N.B. Winn was the genius in charge of the Submarine Tracking Room in the Admiralty). In my view it was Admiral Donitz against each in turn of the 'admirals' (of commander's, or at best captain's, rank), who fought a convoy through, disposing and deploying his ships, with his maritime aircraft in close support, utilising to the best advantage the latest weapons and equipment (without benefit of staff officers)

while all the time training his Group as well as his own ship, then bringing the whole force successfully into action when the chance came. Indeed, Donitz himself virtually acknowledged this when he wrote, concerning the passage of ONS5: Such high losses could not be borne . . . I regarded this convoy battle as a defeat. All honour to the memory of Peter Gretton, one of our greatest and most gallant members.

'Agenda for Peace' United Nations has been involved in THE'peacekeeping', an operation requiring the deployment of armed forces from the international community, for some forty years. It is not a task that was enunciated in the Charter. As the Boutros-Ghali report says (para 46) 'Peacekeeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations'. 'Action with respect of breaches of the peace and acts of aggression' was addressed in Chapter VII of the Charter, and has come to be described as 'peacemaking'. The broad principle that differentiated these two forms of action was that peacekeeping required the consent of all the parties concerned. Peacemaking did not. The world has, however, moved on, and this simple differentiation no longer suffices. The report attempts to define three terms Preventive Diplomacy - Peacemaking - and Peace-keeping (para 20). Significantly, the definition of peacekeeping includes the phrase 'hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned'. However within the report, the use of military forces is envisaged in:preventive diplomacy (para 3 1) peacemaking (para 42) peace-keeping (para 50) peace enforcement (para 44) peace building (para 55). There should now also be added the role of protection of humanitarian assistance. The part that can be played by units of the armed forces in the relief of natural disasters should not be overlooked. Concepts Whilst it can be well argued that there are important theoretical and conceptual differences in the definition of these various roles, the practical complexity of today's issues is such that in operational terms. there will seldom be clear dividing lines between them. Preventive deployments may turn to enforcemnent operations (Desert ShieldIStorm); peace building should be part of peacekeeping (Cambodia); peacekeeping operations of very different natures may proceed in closely proximate areas (CroatiaiBosnia): what is peacekeeping when there is no legitimate

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Military Issues

government to give its consent (Somalia)? These complexities arise not only through the developing nature of conflict itself, in which historical, ethnic, religious, economic and political issues are closely interwoven, but also through change in the perception of the responsibilities of the international community in respect of human rights and the rights of minorities, responsibilities that were in the past, and in many cases still are, considered to be matters 'within the domestic jurisdiction' (Article 2 -7 of the Charter) of a member state. They are further complicated by the impact of modern weapon technology that has put the ability to inflict severe damage on an opponent within the hands of both the professional and amateur warrior alike.

Command and control The result of these complexities is that it is often no longer feasible to give clear political directives to the military commanders; nor is the military commander able to establish a single military aim. Often it will be impossible to determine who is 'the enemy', when clearly there is one, because you are being shot at! To cope successfully with such situations, there needs to be a high degree of professionalism in the operational management of the forces which are engaged, a high degree of flexibility in their use. and the ability to respond rapidly to changing circumstances in their task. None of these characteristics is now evident in the present organisation for either the political direction or the military command and control of UN forces. I believe it is difficult to overstate the importance of early action to achieve improvements in this respect. There is evident reluctance of the public in many countries, including Britain, to send their soldiers to risk their lives in far off regions, in which there is no readily discernible national interest. And yet, there is widespread acknowledgement that, as members of the international community, we all have responsibilities for doing everything that we can to prevent parts of the world sinking into anarchy and chaos. with the attendant misery and suffering that is inflicted on innocent men.

6

'AGENDA FOR PEACE' - MILITARY ISSUES

women and children; and the danger of horizontal escalation. This reluctance is undoubtedly re-enforced when casualties are incurred, as inevitably they will be. If such casualties are seen to be the result of mismanagement, of conditions in which 'our boys' were not given a fair chance to defend themselves, or of situations in which sound military judgment was over-ridden by political expediency, then reluctance is most likely to turn to outright opposition. Such opposition could make the United Nations impotent. The line of political direction from the UN may seem at first glance to be clear and simple. It runs from the Security Council, through the Secretary General, and the Under Secretary for Peace-keeping Affairs to the senior UN representative in the field. But I believe this is misleading. The complexities arise out of the multitude of other agencies, of the UN, of national governments, of regional organisations and of non-governmental organisations that are part of the action. Improvements have been made to try to ensure better co-ordination between civil agencies. But much more needs to be done if full coordination, including coordination with the military, is to be achieved in New York, Geneva, and in the field. A particular facet of such coordination is related to the balance of roles that might be played by regional security organisations. This subject is addressed in Chapter 7 of the Report, in which the importance of the UN maintaining close relationships with the various regional organisations is stressed. However the report deliberately refrains from trying to set forth a formal pattern of relationships (para 64). If the UN is to be successful in the deployment of military forces in support of international peace and security, it is vital that there is a clear understanding of 'who does what', and where authority and responsibility properly lies. A case study of the interaction of the EC, WEU, NATO, CSCE and the UN in the former Yugoslavia might provide useful lessons in this respect. The lines of military command are far from clear. There is no available senior military 'element' in New York to whom UN Field Commanders can be responsible, from whom they can seek advice, to whom they can refer

their military problems or by whom they can expect reasonable coordination of the overall effort. Thus in the former Yugoslavia, the military headquarters in Zagreb, and that in Sarajevo, are reported to find it difficult to acknowledge each others' missions. The tasks in support of the UN military units in the field that require to be carried out in New York can be listed as follows:(a) to give general military advice to the Security Council and to the Secretary General. (b) to provide military advice to UN Commanders in the field. (c) to coordinate inputs from national military intelligence sources relative to potential conflict areas. (d) to maintain records of the status of forces that are earmarked by nations for UN assignments (see under 'Provision of Forces'). (e) to prepare and maintain outline contingency plans for UN deployments. (f) to provide advice to nations on training for UN operations. (g) to advise on the establishment of, and changes in, 'rules of engagement'. (h) to maintain standard operating procedures for UN operations. (i) to coordinate certain logistic planning, control and operational functions including transportation and communications. (j) to act as a repository for the collective experience of the military aspects of UN operations. To fulfil these tasks, it is necessary to set up a military planning cell for the UN in New York. What is to be avoided is for this cell to be seen as some sort of embryo of a 'UN Ministry of Defence'; or yet as an operational military headquarters. What is required is the means to carry out those military tasks that can only be done successfully at the highest level in order to achieve the flexibility and rapid command response at the highest level that are vital to the effectiveness of UN military deployments, in whatever role. The organisation also needs to recognise that every UN operation has its own particular and special characteristics, that require it to be treated on a separate, but

'AGENDA FOR PEACE'

co-ordinated basis. UN operations cannot successfully be forced into a single mould. How this military planning cell (or International Military Support Staff - IMSS) is integrated into the UN's New York headquarters is an important and politically sensitive issue. There is a prima facie case that it should serve the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which would need to be enlarged (probably to include a representative of all the fifteen member states of the Security Council), since the Charter charges the MSC with the 'strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council' (Art. 47-3). However, the military cell could be integrated with the operations staff of the Security Council; or come under the direction of the Deputy Secretary General for International Peacekeeping Affairs. This issue requires further detailed study. Action to set up the IMSS need not, however. await the result of this study.

The provision of Forces The comments in para 42 of 'Agenda for Peace', which call for full implementation of the Article 43 commitments of the Charter, whereby nations are asked to make available armed forces to the Security Council for its use, have given rise to widespread support for what are referred to as 'UN Standing Forces'. Experience in other fields has shown that such .forces are very expensive to maintain; and discourage flexibility. In the UN context, it would also be extremely difficult to agree their size and composition. What is required is for nations to commit themselves to the provision of 'earmarked capabilities'. Such earmarking of general and specialist military capabilities. at various levels of notice, would provide the IMSS with the ability to create 'a la carte forces' rapidly and flexibly to suit various and changing situations. It is important that the IMSS should have good knowledge of the capabilities, the state of training. and the degree of interoperability with forces of other nations (including problems of language) of which they are capable. The deployment of ill equipped, badly disciplined or poorly trained units into the field may well prove a significant handicap to the achievement of the aim. Nor can the need

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MILITARY ISSUES

7

for sophisticated equipments be discounted. Success in UN peace-keeping is unlikely now to be achieved with just a display of sound sense, sensitivity and side arms. However high the standards of the troops in the field, success is unlikely to be achieved without good command, control. communication, co-operation and information. In the UN context, the acknowledged vital importance of C31 in war is replaced by the similarly vital importance of C41 in peacekeeping. This requires a 'worked-up' multinational headquarters, into which all the various military and civil functions can be moulded. It is unrealistic to expect officers and officials, brought together at short notice in unfamiliar circumstances, to function as an efficient and effective command and control team. There is thus a strong case for the provision of a limited number of UN field headquarters units which would be assigned to the UN on a semipermanent basis. They would be available 'on call' to undertake operational assignments on behalf of the UN. Their composition and location would require detailed study. They could be based on existing national military headquarters units that would provide the skeleton structure and appropriate communication support, to which would be attached military and civil staff from other countries and agencies. They would act under the authority of the IMSS. Initially and occasionally, the whole HQ staff would be brought together to conduct a UN staff exercise; and from time to time, if operational requirements permitted, undertake an exercise deployment. The headquarters would, over time, build up its own experience and expertise. The undoubted success of the international nature of the many multi-national NATO headquarters has, to a significant extent, resulted from the foresight of General Eisenhower who, as SACEUR, set up the NATO Defense College (NDC) in order to provide a corps of military and civil officers to fill senior NATO appointments who had been trained in a NATO environment. Facilities of the NDC have now been extended to members of the former Warsaw Pact Countries in order to contribute to overcoming the divisions of Europe. The possibility of further extending the concept of

8

'AGENDA FOR PEACE' - MILITARY ISSUES

the NDC to that of a UNDC, aimed at providing civil and military officers trained for UN headquarters duties, seems to merit further study. Costs There is ample evidence that the present system of UN procurement and of UN field payments requires review. The report's proposal (para 53) that there should be pre-positioned stocks of basic peacekeeping equipment needs to be further studied. A system that all costs should lie where they fall, as is suggested for air and sea lift capacity (para 54), would clearly be the most simple to operate. Unhappily though, it would deter the less well off nations from offering forces for UN operations; and might inhibit the success of an operation in which no nation was readily willing to 'pick up the tab' for an essential provision. There is no simple solution. But a detailed, independent review of present procedures and practices is called for. Conclusions For the above considerations, the following recommendations for action by the British Government, can be drawn. (a) The concept of earmarking appropriate

national and civil 'capabilities' for UN operations should be encouraged. The concept of UN 'standing forces' should not. (b) The possibility of setting up semipermanently assigned multi-national UN field headquarters units, including civil and military functions, should be examined. (c) The means of setting up in New York of an International Military Support Staff (IMSS) should be progressed as a matter of urgency. (d) A study of how the IMSS can be fitted into the UN New York headquarters should be originated. (e) The possible establishment of a UN Defence College for the training of senior civil and military personnel in UN peace-keeping should be investigated. (f) An independent review of the present policy and practice of costing, procurement and payment for UN peace-keeping operations should be initiated. (g) The appropriate balance of roles for regional security organisations with respect to the global security responsibilities of the Security Council should be the subject of further examination. J.H.F.E.

What Proportion of the Royal Navy's Future Effort should be devoted to Preparing for Out of Area Operations?-I ~

'No man is an island, entire of itself;. every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; ifa clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as i f a promontory were, as well as i f a manor of thy fiends or thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.' [John Donne 1573-1631]

Introduction OR over 43 years British defence policy has been committed to the defence of the 'West', and a bipolar balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Christmas Day 1991 marked the end of the Soviet Empire and the demise of that bipolar balance. With ending of the cold war one might assume that there is now 'a new strategic environment with mutifaceted risks which are harder to predict and assess'. ' - but is it totally new? Since 1945 21 million people, 7 million of whom were military, have died in over 90 'out of area' (OOA) conflicts. * Indeed although Britain's main point of effort in defence expenditure has been ostensibly directed towards NATO, in the last four decades (95% in 19903), in practice British armed forces, particularly during the last 10 years, have countered 90% of actual security threats OOA. The loss of bipolarity, therefore, has at least resulted in a relative increase in the importance of OOA challenges, when compared with the declining threat in Europe. The level of OOA challenge has proved neither constant nor predictable, and, as this paper will argue, will probably tend to increase as the moderating brakes of the declining cold war superpowers are released. Britain is thus posed with the dilemma obtaining a 'peace dividend' from reduced defence requirements 'in-area' or countering the probability of increased OOA challenges. Certainly the Government's position in this debate has been clarified by the recent adoption of the '3 Roles of Defence' Strategy,' where greater emphasis is placed on OOA activity.

F

Aim The aim of this paper, following the promulgation of this new defence strategy, is to suggest why, and how, the Royal Navy (RN) should re-orientate its main point of effort to OOA operations, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The scope of discussion The greatest difficulty in planning defence for the 'new world order' (NWO) is that there is no immediately obvious threat to British interests. Thus, to achieve the above aim (after defining where OOA begins), it is first necessary to discuss the new global balance of power, what motivates OOA conflict and where future OOA conflict is likely to arise, before discussing how these conflict sources will affect British interests, and thus future RN roles and composition. Where is OOA? Historically OOA is regarded as the world outside an area defined by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT).' However, since the Rome declaration of November 1961, NATO nations have agreed to expand their operational boundaries in support of certain operations, such as peace-keeping.' Thus NATO OOA operations in support of members' collective security interests, emphasising Article 4 of the NAT, appear more likely in future. OOA boundaries are, therefore, becoming blurred, particularly with the respect to the interaction between the Maghreb and southern NATO nations, and with the position of former Warsaw Pact (WP) countries. such as

10

WHAT PROPORTION SHOULD BE DEVOT'ED TO OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS?-I

Yugoslavia. For the purposes of this paper the historical definition will be assumed, placing the Maghreb OOA and former WP states (questionably) 'in-area'.

The New World Order The cold war ended without getting hot - why? The most simple explanation is that economic, rather than military, power became a greater force for change in the world. Both sides realised that the arms race was ultimately unaffordable; however the USA was the only superpower with sufficient resources to meet the short-term cost of the escalating arms race. America's victory was, however, almost pyrrhic. Rather than emerging as a clear military victor, in a position to sustain a world wide 'Pax Americana: lo she entered the NWO as one of four economic power blocs (North America, Europe, Japan and AustraliaINew Zealand). Indeed America's current domestic shortcomings have the potential to reduce, even further, her military superpower status. Poverty and riots in American cities (for which there appears limited political will to resolve the situation); " a growing budget deficit o f f 100 billion by 1996 l2 (the solution to which requires further cuts into the 'discretionary' 30% of the Federal budget - of which Defence makes up about two-thirds; l 3 coupled with a more introverted American public, l 4 provides strong motivation for further American withdrawal from the world stage. Indicators of this trend are already apparent. For example, from an original 25% cut in the US Navy to 450 ships, announced by President Bush in January 1992, l5 further cuts to a 300 ship Navy l6 are already under discussion. What of the vanquished superpower? Economic catastrophe in the CIS, with 900% inflation1' and a soaring budget deficit £40 billion in 1992, coupled with nationalistic and ethnic rivalry growing throughout the former USSR, means the CIS is incapable of sustaining its superpower status, or acting as a credible short term global threat - although the disintegration of the Soviet empire may, in the short term, produce concerns over the possible spill-over from ethnic or nationalistic conflict within the former WP; Yugoslavia being the

most obvious example to date. Notwithstanding these short-term 'in-area' concerns, military bipolarity, dominated by polarised ideology, is yielding to economic multipolarity, where power blocs are more enmeshed in a collective security and trading system which significantly reduces incentive for both political and military adventurism. As Buzan comments, following the definitive defeat of fascism and communism in the last 50 years, 'Liberal capitalism now commands a broad consensus . . . a difficult formula of political pluralism plus market economies has many critics, but no serious rivals: l 9 Thus the NWO power blocs are woven into a series of interdependent regional economies. Nationalism and ideology in this sytem would tend to be constrained by the pragmatic consideration of promoting an open international trading system to benefit all in this club. As Brzezinski points out, 'average citizen consumption becomes more important than those of territory or doctrine: Intra-economic bloc conflict in this club, which Buzan calls the 'Centre'," becomes increasing more unlikely and undesirable. Thus Europe, in the coming decade, is likely to see a significant reduction of 'in-area' threat. What of Britain in this club? As a medium sized nation, on the geographic fringe of Europe, the Govenunent has long r e c o g n i ~ e d ~ that the country's future lies in greater integration with Europe. Although problems with the 1991 Maastricht agreement have delayed this integration process, progress to a more federated Europe appears almost inevitable. Membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), as a step on the path to European Monetary Union (EMU), 2' coupled with a strong interwoven security structure, and underlaid by an ever expanding network of multinational corporations only serves to reinforce this premise. What of the world outside the 'Centre'? The term 'third world' now encompasses a whole range of economies from the newly industrialised countries (NICs) of ASEAN24 (which, with increasing stability in governments and states, are rapidly approaching a position where they may enter the 'Centre' in the next decade as another economic power bloc), to

WHAT PROPORTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS?-I

countries in the Horn of Africa where poverty, famine and war have reduced them to a collection of feuding fiefdoms. Thus the definitionof a 'third world' country is now more imprecise. This also confuses other convenient divisions, such as the NorthISouth divide ( N I C S ~are ~ developing in both hemispheres). To avoid a large number of subdivisions, therefore, it is easier to classify NWO states as those under the collective security blanket of the 'Centre', and those outside - the 'Periphery: 26 How has the 'Periphery' been affected by the advent of multipolarity? The 'Centre' is increasingly dominating the 'Periphery' through such organisations as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, GATT, G7 and through a dramatic upgrading of the importance, and power, of the UN Security Council. However, this dominance is predominantly economic and is not ideologically based; thus devoid of the traditional EastlWest rivalry. Superpower moderation of the 'Periphery' has therefore vanished, as has its former use as a lever in achieving a particular superpower ideological goal. 'Peripheral' disputes now have diminished global impact; even though it is likely that local conflicts will be fought at a much higher

intensity, may promote regional arms races and encourage the ascendancy of regional 'midipowers'.

The New World Threat In a world no longer conducive to interference by major powers, as it once was, what are the sources of threat in the 'Periphery'? A distinct, potentially immediate and massive threat from a single source has disappeared, leaving less obvious, dispersed, 'Peripheral' concerns. To decide whether these concerns are a threat, one first needs to examine the factors that motivate the development of the capability and intent to use 'Peripheral' ~ i l i t a r yforce. Capability motivators International Arms Trade/Proliferation. The Gulf War (1991), yet again, reminded the 'Centre' that arms sales are potentially damaging to long term collective security interests. However, despite attempts to stem the flow, through organisations such as CSCE, CFE and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), arms continue to pour into the 'Periphery' - 80% of the international arms trade consists of purchases made by developing countries 27 (Figure 1).

T w l apcm Iron each caunw In LS S m 60 199

53 1111

13 7113

7

7-

I

LSSR

USA

11

PILhVCE

CK

OiIS.4

To ~nduvlrliscdr & d

Figure 1. Comparison of Arms Exports 1986-1990 (Source: Harvey M., in RUSI Journal, Feb. 1992)

12

WHAT PROPORTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS?-I

Five main factors maintain this trade: a. Arms deals are big business. The arms trade represents some £30-50 billion in new defence agreements and actual sales each year. Arms exporting countries cannot afford the loss of income by stopping the flow; especially countries like Russia who desperately need hard currency to sustain their crumbling economies. b. The EastIWest 'peace dividend' has produced a surfeit of old cold war arms; thus placing cheap, technically advanced arms, into the market. c. Regulation of movement of arms across borders, particularly from the former USSR, has decreased. d. Most domestic arms procurement is at levels too low to sustain an indigenous defence industry. Thus exports are the only means of ensuring firms' viability. e. Arms, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WOMD), confer influence on the possessor. Imbalance caused by attaining that influence, now that superpower influence has declined, is leading to regional arms races; for example between India and Pakistan or Iraq and Iran. It is probable, therefore, that in the next 10 years 'Peripheral' armed forces will achieve a significant increase in both quality and quantity of their orders of battle. Of particular concern to the 'Centre' will be the 'Periphery's' increasing access to WOMD and their delivery systems2', coupled with the apparent willingness to use them - as demonstrated in the IranIIraq war. Peripheral Wealth. Rapid increases in 'Peripheral' nations' wealth, primarily as a result of oil, has resulted in one of two effects. Either the shock to a primitive socio-economic systemg0is so great that it leads to the toppling of regimes with subsequent internal unrest, like Iran and its Shah, or, like Iraq, it allows an authoritarian regime to build huge armed forces (even though the country has an undeveloped manufacturing base) which enables suppression of internal dissent whilst presenting a significant regional threat. Intent motivators One dominating principle that appears to drive

the governments of the 'Periphery', particularly the least developed countries, is that of 'Realpolitik'. These governments invariably have no choice in their actions, other than in insuring their own short term interests. They do not have the benefits of the 'Centre's' wealth to 'spend to save'. Without the benefit of long term planning, pressures are increasing which might be termed 'intent motivators'. Poverty and economic inequalities. Developing countries' share in world trade has fallen to less than 20% in the last 20 years. 32 This, coupled with a rise in oil prices (since 1974), increased protectionism in the 'Centre' (for example the lifting of cross border trade tariffs within the EC from 1992), and the collapse of raw material commodity prices (many 'Peripheral' governments rely on unique resources as a country's main source of income), has led to a rapidly increasing debt burden in the 'Periphery' (£700 billion in 1990g3 of which some 20-30% was accounted for by arms trading). 'Periphery'/'Centre' inequalities have led to increasing socio-economic degradation in the 'Periphery'. Deprivation, and envy of the 'Centre's' life-style, has increasingly led to political conflict, civil strife and division of countries along ethnic or tribal lines. The lure of 'easy money' from narcotics, terrorism or crime, to rectify some of these inequalities, only further aggravates this human misery, as corruption and intimidation undermines ' ~ e r i ~ h e r asocieties l' and their governments. Population pressures. Man reflects the common ecological principle that populations under stress tend to breed. In 1990 the United Nations (UN) forecasts that the world's population will increase by 1 billion by the end of the centuryg4 (Figure 2). By that time the 'Periphery' will constitute 80% of the world's population, of which the young will become an ever increasing proportion (50-60% are aged 15 or less). Improved education and communications will raise the aspirations of this group, whilst poverty and economic stagnation ensures these expectations are unrealised. Frustration and bitterness will inevitably increase, as demonstrated in Algeria today, " with potentially explosive consequences which would affect not only the individual state but

WHAT PROPORTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS?-I

13

North America L a t i n America

Figure 2. Total Wor.Id Population Prediction could spill over borders in the form of refugees or competition for 'living room' or resources. Migration. As a result of political instability, conflict, poverty, population growth and environmental degradation there are, today, over 25 million refugees world wide. The sheer size of this problem generates xenophobic reactions in the countries on which the refugees alight, as competition for those countries' resources increases. This xenophobia tends to violence more readily in poorer countries, who become rapidly swamped by refugees - the Horn of Africa demonstrates this most clearly. 36 In Europe, the failure to deal effectively with the relatively modest refugee problem from Yugoslavia, does not bode well for the problem of coping with the likely influx of economic refugees from the Maghreb in the near future (where the population is expanding by 5 million annually "). Natural/Ecological disasters. The above intent motivators exacerbate the effect of natural disasters. Deforestation and desertification had led to the increase in intensity of natural disasters such as drought (for example East Africa) and floods (for example Bangladesh). This in turn increases the pressure on populations (leading to increased breeding), increased migration (leading to an expansion of the crisis area) and increasing debt burdens as

'Peripheral' governments attempt to provide the required resources. Natural resource scarcity. In its most basic form 'Peripheral' resource competition can be divided in four: a. Water - Approximately 40% of the world's population depends on fresh water from rivers shared by two or more 'Peripheral' population countries. 38 expansion has increased demand for water for irrigation, drinking and hydroelectric power. Thus the possibility of upstreamdownstream conflicts has grown - such as the IndianIBangladeshi dispute over the Ganges. b. Food - Food production in the 'Periphery' has failed to keep pace with population growth, particularly in South Asian and sub-Saharan countries where over 700 million people suffer from chronic food shortages. 39 c. Oil - Those 'Peripheral' countries without oil or gas reserves continue to be damaged by the world recession, that was initiated by OPEC price rises in 1974. Without affordable energy to develop, their economies have stagnated. d. Non renewable resources Declining world commodity prices have led to increased utilisation of non renewable

14

WHAT PROPORTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS?-I

resources to help 'Peripheral' countries stave off bankruptcy. This undermines long-term economic prospects and thus the future stability of those countries. Territory. Although associated with all aspects of the above motivators, border disputes can motivate intent based purely on historic rivalries. As earlier colonial division of the world did not consider ethnic or tribal groupings in establishing boundaries, with the removal of Cold War superpower moderation, post-colonial border disputes are now more prevalent. The new arc of crisis The demise of superpower hegemony has, therefore, re-orientated what has been called the 'Arc of Crisis' (AOC). 'O No longer is the world security agenda dominated by the possibility of a Eurocentric world war. Although the CIS retains military capability, and thus represents a possible adversary, economic decline and a lack of political or public intent to use that military machine, means that the probability of attack is markedly diminished. In addition it is probable that that capability will be reduced in future as resources are switched to more pressing social needs. This reduction, together with a probable growth in CIS economic integration with Europe, means the threat from the North East can now be considered negligible. The reverse can be argued about the East and South. On 2 August 1991 as President Bush heralded in the NWO of increasing international peace, stability and prosperity, Iraq invaded Kuwait, totally surprising the 'Centre'. This demonstrated the problem now facing the 'Centre's' security system - identifying where capability matches intent, in the 'Periphery', to present a threat. As outlined earlier the motivators for such a threat are diverse and as such do not lend themselves to the 'indicators and warning' systems developed to counter the Soviet threat. Warning is therefore likely to be limited at best and imprecise, or non existent, at worst. One can, therefore, only assess risk to European security in this new AOC (stretching along the southern coast of the Mediterranean through the Middle East to Asia). Thus the quality and quantity of 'Centre' forces maintained in being,

to counter the 'Periipheral' risk, is a matter of balancing the risk to one's interests, or concept of what you are trying to defend, rather than just adjusting the balance of forces to match a specific threat. B. N. B. WILLIAMS LIEUT.CDR.R N (to be concluded)

References

' 'A Rationale for Maritime Forces in the New Strategic Environment,' DNSD Paper, 19 May 1992. Segal, G., The World Affairs Companion (Simon & Schuster, 1991) p.6. Dunn, D. H., 'Defence Planning and the New Parliament,' RUSI Journal, June 1992, p.59. UK OOA Defence Strategy - Role 1: To Ensure the protection and security of our . . . dependent territories even where there is no major external threat. Role 3: To contribute to promoting the UK's wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992, HMSO, p.6. ' NAT area: The North Atlantic (North of the Tropic of Cancer), Mediterranean and member states' territories within that boundary. See NATO Handbook (NATO Information Service) p. 14. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (NATO Information Service, Nov. 91). ' Independent, 22 May 92, p. 10. 'Undermining the Pillars of an Alliance.' Op. cit. Supra n.5, p. 14. ' Guardian, 12 May 92. p.8. 'US Seeks FireFighting Role for Revamped NATO'. European, 28 May 92, p.2, 'NATO Ready to Police Global Trouble Spots'. l o Brzezinski, Z., Consequences of the End of Cold War. Adelphi Paper, No.265, pp.15-16. " America's Cities - Doomed to Burn' (The Economist, 9 May 1992, pp.23-26). 'I 'United States - Fourth Quarter 1991 ' (Economist Intelligence Unit

-

Global Forecasting Services).

'American Survey - The Entitlement Cuckoo in the Congressional Nest' (The Economist, 30 May 1992, pp.49-50). Huntington, S. P., 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', Survival, Jan-Feb 1991, p. 16. ' Truver, S. C., 'Tomorrow's Fleet,' US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1992, p.43. l 6 Barnett, R. W., 'Regional Conflict Requires Naval Forces,' US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1992, p.33. '' 'CIS - First Quarter 1992' (Economist Intelligence I'

Unit - Global Forecasting Service). '' Guardian, I1 Jul92, p.21. 'CISDeeper inDebt'.

WHAT PROPORTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS?-I l 9 Buzan, B., 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century,' International Affairs, June 1991, p.436. ' O Op. cit. Supra n. 10, p.6. '' Op. cit. Supra n. 19, p.432. " 'Foreign Policy ,' FCO Survey of Current Affairs, Nov. 1991, p.400. '' Op. cit. Supra n. 22, p.420; Britain 1992, HMSO Official Handbook, pp.2 12-213. " ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei): loc cit. Supra n. 2, p.198. '' Sayigh, Y., 'Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries ', Adelphi Paper No.25 1, p.9. l 6 Buzan, Op. cit. Supra n. 19, p.433. l 7 Harvey, M., 'Arms Export Control: an Analysis of Developments since the Gulf War,' RUSIJournal, Feb. 1992, p.35. Cordesman, A. H., 'After the Gulf War: The World Arms Trade and its Arms Races in the 1990s,' Brassey 's Year Book 1992, p.20. '' Independent, 22 May 92, p. 10. 'Survey Warns of Global Build-up of Nuclear Arms'.

15

Op. cit. Supra n. 25, p.23. Realpolitik - Politics based on realities and material needs, rather than on morals or ideals. Ravenhill, J., 'The North-South Balance of Power, ' International Affairs, Oct. 1990, p.740. " 'International Debt,' FCO Background Brief, Nov. 1990. " 'World Population Issues,' FCO Background Brief, Aug. 1990. " 'Fear of Fundies,' Economist, 15 Feb. 1992, pp.69-70. 3 6 'East Africa Swamped,' Economist, 6 June 1992, p.72. Widgren, J., 'International Immigration and Regional Stability,' International Affairs, Oct. 1990, p.760. Prins, G., 'Politics and the Environment,' International Affairs, Oct. 1990, p.714. j9 'World Food Supplies,' FCO Background Brief, Feb. 1990. Gasteyger, C., 'European Security and the New Arc of Crisis, Paper I,' Adelphi Paper No.265, pp.69-81; and Joffe, G., Paper I in the same, pp.53-68. 'O

I'

''

"

NATO's Outreach to the Eastern Nations down to the Moskva river from LOOKING the Kremlin, you see a dark, wide and slow moving artery. As you muse on the progress made by your nation, your eye will be drawn to a large imposing house - on the other side of the river - which has a fine view (looking up) at the golden turrets all over your castle. Your castle now has red walls, because it became too difficult to maintain them in their previous white plastered state; your empire now has fewer adherents than hitherto; your wealth seems to be ebbing away with the flow of the river. Again your eye will wander to the large building on the other side of the river and you will wonder how to make the transition even as well as the owners of that fine mansion - which is the British Embassy. The break up of an empire is bound to be a difficult period for those involved. It varies from the near farce of the so-called Central African Empire under Bokassa, to the ending of the British Empire, long drawn out; very painful for those concerned and economically still affecting daily life in the UK as we still struggle to adjust to the reality of the world market place. This struggle has been going on for over 100 years and we are only now beginning to come to terms with the many losses which came with the change: of cheap sources of raw materials, the plentiful supply of poorly paid labour, the ready market place available when manufactured goods were sold back at high profit to the providers of the raw materials. There are interesting parallels with the former Soviet Empire, even if the political systems were somewhat different. Concepts and language Immense effort is being devoted to the reintroduction of the Russians and others into the world community in all its different aspects. It means introducing the concepts of democracy; freedom; personal responsibility and accountability. Visitors from the West have no difficulty in telling the Eastern Partners what they should be doing. There is a need for such a large change to be made that the menu from which advice can be chosen is simply endless. One great difficulty, however, is the

fundamental one of language and its meaning. The concepts of freedom and democracy are well appreciated in the West. We all understand that the application of these concepts has produced many different solutions, but the fundamental concepts are largely maintained. They are almost meaningless words to many in the East. At a recent meeting in Brussels, Marshal Shaposhnikov, the Chief of Defence Staff of the CIS, quoted a Russian saying: 'the higher the fence, the better the neighbour'. Immediately the concepts of openness, trust, cooperation and general friendliness take on a totally different meaning. How can a Westerner have a constructive debate about co-operation when the split in meaning is so large? At the same meeting, Shaposhnikov went on to say that he had, for the first time, seen how a debate can be conducted. 'In Russia, we just shout louder to get our way.' On a recent visit to Moscow, it &k two French professors and myself to persuade the Chairman of the seminar group to allow any kind of discussion - and then it only lasted a matter of minutes. Their concept of debate was diatribe followed by further statements unrelated to what had gone before. Difficult. Objections With such a background, the West must ask itself what the aim and expectation for all the assistance can realistically be. There should be a clear purpose, a series of milestones by which progress can be measured and a realistic assessment of the point at which we will say that the current ideas are not working, that the money is being wasted and that the programme will need to be redirected. It is too easy to assume that the Russians have the same view of the target as we have, but that cannot be the case. Their telescope has been looking in such a dramatically different direction for so many years that they have no measure of what freedom has meant for us - nor would they recognise the pain in the West at present over the recession which is causing a reduction of standard of living for so many people - people who still live with a lifestyle unimaginable to most of the Russians. They have never had a

NAVY'S OUTREACH T O T H E EASTERN NATIONS

middle class on the Western model. There is no strength of purpose as we know it; there is no mobility, or history of mobility, there is little ambition because there is no hope.

Material standards To visit the flat of a Major in Moscow is a rare privilege and is utterly humbling. His ambition was to be a Colonel because that would give him a flat to himself. On the sixteenth floor of the block, the entry hall was 8 foot square; there was a crude loo, which worked but had no seat; the bathroom was adequate with a very old bath and a single source of water while the walls were thin plywood and did not fit at the edges. The kitchen had two fridges, one basin and two plate racks and a very old cooker with two hot plates. Those three rooms were shared with another family and the only privacy was in the living room, some 15 feet by 8. There was a sofa bed, a further bed for the 10 year old son, a wardrobe and a table with two chairs. By contrast, on the fourteenth floor of a block in a better part of town, the Colonel had a kitchen, bathroom, loo, living room - with sofa bed for himself and his wife - and bedroom for his daughter. The rooms are much the same size as the Major's, with the whole area being about 30 feet by 15. This small space is lived in by the couple, their 17 year old daughter, who is studying at University, and two dogs one of wbich is a pit-bull terrier lookalike. Security in these housing areas is a serious problem, but bared teeth do helo. In the country there were scenes which really hadn't changed for hundreds of years. The Peasants, for that is surely what they are, living in small wooden houses, in the middle of nowhere; no plumbing or electricity comes anywhere near many of them as they run their smallholdings. Mud and standing water is all around the house and poverty is on a scale which the West shed long ago. The clothes are coarse and poorly made, the faces show signs of life having been hard but their generosity is on a remarkable scale. When that way of life is the norm, while some will ache for change, for the majority it is surely impossible to have a driving ambition to be free, or to be rich as others are said to be rich. Survival is the daily diet and the effort required

17

saps the energy for other ideas. If that is the background to the vast majority of the Russian population - be they peasants in the country or urban dwellers, then NATO has to have a programme to take account of that. One of the most difficult problems facing anyone who operates with the Russian hierarchy is to decide who the people are who are worth dealing with: do they have authority; do they have longevity; do they have the ear of the President, and so on.

Political factors What is going on in Moscow at present is a most complicated juggling act. Yeltsin, in particular, is having to accommodate the different wings of the political spectrum, keeping the Army happy while trying to force at least some realism upon the spending plans of the different parties. The entire structure has woodworm, some due to corruption and some being a systemic problem dating from the days of the communist system. Many of the same people are in the same places and are exercising the same power - but this time for their own profit. The black market is thriving - to the great loss of the state. The vested interests in all areas are so deeply embedded that it becomes ever more difficult to generate change. Change can all too easily mean the loss of privilege, of houses, cars, dachas and a very fine way of life which, hitherto, has been the preserve of the senior Communist Party members of society. Yeltsin has to allow the powerful people to continue to operate as otherwise the economy would stop in its tracks. There is substantial evidence of a very powerful and rich mafia, not only in Moscow and the surrounds, but also in other great cities - in Siberia and elsewhere. NATO therefore has to find the best compromise between the idealistic - of dealing only with those who are whiter than white - and the pragmatic, where anyone who looks to have some influence, crooked or not, should be paid some attention. Such a network is being established by numerous contacts and visitors being brought to Brussels, other headquarters and NATO schools in order to see how the West operates. The Russians are establishing many new bodies as various interested Military Groups become more apparent. They all have the idea of

18

NAVY'S OUTREACH TO THE EASTERN NATIONS

Military and Political Democracy, but very few have much understanding of what this really means. The common thread appears to be that NATO has been seen as an oasis of stability and success. Many of the Eastern Partners know that they want to join the NATO club because the wealth of the West is assumed to have come from NATO's strength, while no connection is made with the immense potential wealth of Russia, in particular, were the Siberian raw materials to be exploited sensibly. The connection is not made that the wealth of the West and Japan comes primarily from invention and hard work as much as it does from a successful defensive system. The concept of having to develop a working economy over many years is very difficult for them to grasp. They expect results immediately and the idea of a 50 year wait to achieve what the developed world has already achieved is utterly alien to them all. So NATO has to educate Russians at every level. The programme of contacts is designed to spread the word as widely and as deeply as possible. If NATO continues to spread the word and to encourage democratic methods, then we are clearly expecting to see some change. I have already suggested that we should be developing some method of auditing our efforts; of ensuring that we are getting out of the effort what we intended to produce.

Defence suff~ciency In the political/military world at present, there is an expressed desire that defence should be based on the concept of 'sufficiency'. Broadly, this means that the forces should be adequate for the job; be not excessive and be clearly related to the threat and therefore be a source of confidence to those who monitor the potential of nations. However, one of the great difficulties of the sufficiency equation is to define what it really implies. A given level of armaments may well produce peace: would a lower level have had the same effect? A level of armed potential has been entirely satisfactory for years. There is a change of government - and with it a change of intention; the nation is attacked after years of peace. Why? Because the intention of governments is a vital part of the sufficiency equation. In other words. to define sufficiency

may be possible for a snapshot in the life of a nation, but if any parameter is changed, then the analysis can become unsafe. If forces have been reduced, they can not be increased instantly. In a similar way, then, we have a problem over the achievement of an effective Outreach contacts programme. It is not possible to measure whether men's hearts have been changed although it may be possible to observe that changes have been made, and then rate those on a scale of satisfaction. But even that may not work well, especially in a country in the turmoil that is Russia. The forces at work there are particularly strong and dangerous. With the increasing reduction in freedom of action available to Yeltsin as the traditionalists tighten their grip, perhaps the chances of seeing anything really change deep in the system are minimal. Time and again there are hopes which then are lost when a further tightening is required to keep a particular faction on line. On this basis, it is difficult to see how we can measure the changes and assess whether the NATO investment is paying off. This is not only a NATO problem, of course. it is just as much a national problem for all who are involved in the search for a better Eastern picture.

The best we can do Perhaps in the end the best we can do is to keep on trying to change the system from without. We should continue to visit, give seminars, provide workshops and information. We need to continue to develop personal contacts and therebv have a steadv bench mark. We want to be seeing increasing benign political control of the armed forces - surely one of the key aims of the cooperation programme - and to see that the many arms control treaties are being adhered to. We want to see some acknowledgen~entof the sufficiency idea, even if details are vague. This may not really satisfy the ideal of measuring progress in an absolute sense. but NATO and the nations will be able to see the developments and an improving internal control and balance. If that is not seen, even on a subjective view, then we will have to change and develop a different sort of carrot. However. as progress is made it should be acknowledged. not in a patronising way. but by increasing the quality of cooperation. We should be hoping to

NAVY'S OUTREACH TO THE EASTERN NATIONS

get to a stage one day when some of the nations could become serious candidates to become members of NATO and to be able to do so with as seamless a join as possible. For this they need to understand the levels of achievement required. Their organisation must broadly match the NATO average and the political stability and orientation must be suitable to be in this grouping of democratic states. As these improvements are made, so NATO should step up the quality of assistance. The politicalldemocratic controls will not be the same as the West's; the method of financing the forces will be different for many years to come as the economies emerge from the dark

19

ages but the really key question will be whether there is a movement for change in the right direction. Some nations will move much faster than others; Russia is certain to be slow as the scale of the problems they face is so large, and they have to do it with a geographical and ethnic picture which is difficult to comprehend. Other new states may be much quicker, but such is the instability in almost all the new republics that even the quickest is most unlikely to achieve membership of NATO until well into the next century - whatever NATO may mean by then.

HMS Nogolk

- The

of 1991 HMS Norfolk, the INfirsttheofAutumn the new Duke class Type 23, joined the Operational Fleet after extensive trials. She then progressed through Basic Operational Sea Training, achieving a creditable overall assessment of Very Satisfactory with many Good aspects (in Flag Officer Sea Training speak), before participating in Area Continuation Training and a Joint Maritime Course in the North Atlantic in January and February 1992. The work-up over, Norfolk then sailed as part of the On Call United Kingdom Task Group on the deployment known as Orient '92. We are now over half way through this deployment and your readers may be interested to hear our news from sea (After all, Ricochet in his letter from Orient, NR July '92, trailed a few doubts as to Norfolk's capabilities). Evolution of the Type 23 Well over 10 years ago the Naval Staff embarked on a project to build a small cheap frigate that could deploy the towed array in the North Atlantic. Its cost was pegged to that of a long-refit for a 'Leander' - some f67m. It was to have been an unsophisticated, lightly armed ship, with a flight deck to operate the new Merlin EHlOl helicopter but with no hangar or helicopter maintenance facilities. These were to be in the attendant AOR of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The ship's company was to be 145 and the endurance was expected to be just 30 days. Great emphasis was put on the shore support to be given to this class of ship when it returned alongside. The Falklands war of 1982 did much to alter the design of the Type 23. Considerable extra weaponry was added and survivability was re-assessed and much improved. Over the years the ship grew in size and tonnage. Fully laden, HMS Norfolk is a 5,000 tonne General Purpose frigate of very considerable ability. Armament Norfolk has an impressive weapon fit that serves her well in every role. The 8 harpoon missiles give her a long range anti-ship capability, backed up by the 4.5 inch gun for short range engagements and Naval Gunfire support. There

First of The Dukes are two 30mm guns together with GPMGs for close range work. Perhaps the most interesting and spectacular weapon system is the Vertical Launch Seawolf (VLSW). Norfolk has carried out extensive trial firings with this new system with excellent results. VLSW is certainly a step forward from the previous Sea Wolf systems and is a superb self defence system. On the anti-submarine side the helicopter, currently a Lynx, is the long range weapon carrier armed with her Stingray torpedo. For close range engagements torpedoes are fired from tubes mounted in the air weapons magazine - a new system called Magazine Torpedo Launch System. No longer do the tubes have to be reloaded on the exposed upper deck. The Merlin helicopter EHlOl has already flown from Norfolk for deck trials. When it arrives in operational service it will much enhance the Duke's ASW area of operations, giving a particularly long range detection and attack capability.

Propulsion A novel form of propulsion has been developed for the Dukes. The combined Diesel Electric and Gas Turbine System (CODLAG) allows a quiet economical propulsion at normal operational needs. Two Spey Gas turbines can be clutched in through the gear box for boost speeds, but our experience to date has shown that they are used only occasionally. On electric propulsion Norfolk has shown staggeringly good fuel consumption giving her an excellent endurance. Of interest to some, the only steam onboard is the steam iron in the laundry! Water is made through the Reverse Osmosis plant. Ship's company Today's complement is 186 and involves a very small training margin. This number has increased from the original 145 because of the embarked flight personnel and some extra maintainers. It is the smallest ships's company ever known in the RN for a ship of this size and sophistication. It has meant a radical review of the way in which manpower is used onboard, and many innovative ideas have been introduced.

HMS NORFOLK

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THE FIRST OF THE DUKES

Rumours - not all favourable - abound about the manning of these ships. I believe we have got it just about right. Undoubtedly the ship's company works harder to a man than in other surface warships. But they do so cheerfully for a number of reasons. Delegation is a key: everyone takes on responsibilities well beyond those of their contemporaries in other ships. They work largely unsupervised and get good job satisfaction. Departmental barriers have been broken down and there is considerable work across the specialisations. This is healthy and creates an understanding of each others' problems. Further, all junior rates' messes are mixed. No longer is there a stokers' mess, a chefs' mess and so on. All are in together and know each other well. Finally, with fewer people, communication is easier and a sense of purpose is invariably present. Some WRNS will join Norfolk's ships company early next year. The concept of lean manning depends upon support from ashore and to date this has been largely successful. Extra personnel are available (albeit in small numbers) from the shore bases to assist the ships when they return from sea. A major advance is in the contract cleaning that is organised to help the ships alongside. The squadron controls a budget to hire civilian cleaners and painters to keep the ship smart. This relieves the ship's company of some dreary work and is a popular concept that has worked well on deployment as well as in base port. To make the point there is no paint store onboard. So in manning terms we are settling down, still finding ways to improve our lot, but generally content. I have to report that the atmosphere and morale onboard is the best I have encountered in 25 years' service.

Operations The key to a warship's effectiveness is its ability to fight. Norjblk has now undergone the full rigours of Operational Sea Training, and of national, bi-national and NATO exercises. She has invariably acquitted herself with distinction. Her excellent sensors - many new to naval service - allow her to compile a compehensive picture to use her weapons to maximum benefit. Her stealth qualitie\. quiet below water and hard to detect on radar because of her reduced

21

signature, have been shown to be first class. Much has been achieved to date with an interim fit in the Operations Room to assist the command to fight the ship. The Combat System Highway is fitted and connects most weapons and sensors. The Surface Ship Command System, currently under development, will soon be fitted to new 'Dukes' in build and refitted to the 'Dukes' currently at sea without it. Once fitted I have no doubt that the class will be amongst the very best warships in the world; meanwhile its capabilities make it entirely capable of carrying out a cross section of Fleet directed tasks.

Deployment A far cry from the 30 day patrols in the North Atlantic, Norfolk has (at the time of writing) completed 20 weeks away from home port at a particularly high degree of operational readiness throughout. She has had a considerable amount of sea time and has steamed 24,600 miles since May. Noflolk has shown the flag in Crete, Alexandria, Mauritius, Diego Garcia, Lumut (Malaysia), Pusan (Korea), and Brunei. A twoweek Self Maintenance Period in Penang was sufficient to get the ship and her people into first class shape. In previous deployments Fleet Maintenance Units have deployed to assist ships mid deployment. A conscious decision was taken not to do this for ORIENT. Contract cleaning (and some painting) has been achieved during port visits, generally to a very high standard - and at prices very much lower than in the UK (Thought: Dukes should always deploy, in order to lower running costs!) Should Ricochet care to visit Norfolk at any time I believe he would be highly impressed with how she sparkles internally. After all, fewer people means less mess! Exercises have been a regular feature. Exercise Dragon Hammer, the first NATO exercise for a Duke, allowed Norfolk to display her potential, especially in the Anti-Surface Warfare role. Most recently she has spent two weeks in a busy Exercise Starfish - the Annual Five Powers Defence Agreement exercise off Malaysia. 36 ships and 47 aircraft participated and Norfolk acted as CTG for the majority of the exercise, further proving her capabilities in

22

HMS NORFOLK - THE FIRST OF THE DUKES

a multi threat scenario. Much interest has been generated in the RN's latest warship and many have visited us to see our latest technology. All have been highly impressed and British Industry stands to gain much from our presence. Defence Industry Days have so far been held in three countries and have been declared great successes both by our industrialists and the host nations. Conclusion Visit Norfolk and talk to anyone in her ship's

company and you will quickly realise how intensely proud we are of this fine ship. With 60%equipment new to Naval Service, we are manned at 60%of an equivalent ship (much the same capability of a batch I11 Type 22), use only 60% of the fuel, and cost only 60% of the previous class in the first place. Yet the capability is 100%, as is the enthusiasm. This makes value for money the key word; that cannot be bad for the RN or UK! JOHN LIPPIETT CAPTAIN, RN

Adriatic Ops

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NATO and/or the WEU?

the moment there are two separate, but AT identical, embargo enforcement operations in progress in the Adriatic - MARITIME GUARD, a NATO operation utilising Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (SNFM) run by COMNAVSOUTH from Naples, and SHARP FENCE, a WEU operation run by CINCNAV (the Italian CinCFleet) from Santa Rosa near Rome. Each operation is supported by its own Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) force, although their patrols are co-ordinated to provide 24-hour cover and the on-task MPA supports both operations equally. There is also daylight hours AEW cover provided by the NAEW force with British E-3D and French E-3F augmentation. To late November. the total number of units involved since the embargo surveillance operations started last July has varied from 11-16 DDIFF. up to 22 MPA and 415 AEW. These are not 'asset poor' operations! Reductions were imminent - probably accelerated by the approach of Christmas leave periods rather than a breath of reality. but the change to enforcement in early November has delayed. if not cancelled. their implementation. What are all these forces doing? Until 22 November they were rnonitoring - and only monitoring. because until 15 November no UN Mandate existed to stop and search compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. These UNSCRs tbrhid the import of arnis into all of 'ex-Yugoslavia' and the import or export of all goods (except for food and medical supplies) intolfrom Serbia and Montenegro. Traffic levels are not high: about 20-25 vessels a day (excluding ferries and other scheduled traffic) are passing north or south through the Otranto Channel and the area of the Adriatic off Bar and Kotor. Why have so many assets been devoted to these two operations'? Why indeed are there two operations at all'? The answer appears to lie in the political relationship between NATO and the WEU. At a Ministerial meeting in Helsinki on 10 July. the WEU -- no doubt driven. in part. by the widespread feeling that 'Europe' should be seen to be doing something about Yugoslavia - decided to mount a maritime patrol in support of thc UNSCR\. 1-utcl-tlic \:uiie da) . NATO

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seeming not to want to be seen to be doing nothing - followed suit and in a 20 minute meeting decided to mount a parallel operation. I would suggest that a WEU naval operation. supported by NATO with MPA, AEW and all the necessary communications/logistic infrastructure would have been a much more cost-effective military solution and could have been publicised as an example of how well the WEU and NATO can work together. Has not the WEU been touted as the 'European Pillar' of NATO'? Here we had an ideal opportunity to show this idea in action. so why did the Nations feel that the expense of a second operation was justified? It is almost as if NATO sees the WEU as a threat, but as many of the Ministers at the two Helsinki meetings were the same people. . . ? I suspect that the answer lies in the differing political perceptions of, and aspirations for, the futures of NATO and the WEU. The present membership of the WEU is restricted to those countries that are both members of NATO and the European Community. There are clear indications in the fog surrounding the Maastricht Treaty that the EC federalists see the WEU as the beginning of a 'European SecuritylDefence Identity'. However. the WEU has no communications systems. no doctrines or procedures, no logistics back-up - in fact no military infrastructure at all. It only exists a\ it viable military organisation by courtesy of NATO (and is therefore partially funded by the non-WEU members of NATO, particularly the USA). Provided its aim is to provide a strengthened 'European Pillar' of NATO, thi\ wems to me to be all hell and good, bur if nations wish the WEU to have an independent existence, to be 'The Defence Pillar of the European Community'. then surely they must expect to have to pa) for its infrastructure. unless their aim is to destroy NATO. so that the Wt:U can ariw cheaply from the wreckage. This latter alarming possibility certainly seems to he on the agenda in certain parts of Europe. Having said all the above. it is only fair to the WEU to point out that LieutenantCommander DaLenport is in error in his article t,n 'the New Ei~l.opcctc.' OYR. Oct. '92). The ~

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24

ADRIATIC OPS

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NATO AND/OR THE WEU?

WEU, represented by Italy, was on task in the Adriatic monitoring the UNSCRs on 13 July, 3 days before SNFM arrived on the scene; whilst NATO did 'act quickly', in fact the WEU took the initiative and was there first using, initially, solely Italian national resources until joined on 15 July by a French frigate, with other members following rapidly thereafter. Despite my earlier comments, the WEU can run a limited military operation without using NATOfunded infrastructure.

I realise that the above raises many questions and only partly answers some of them, but I cannot be the only one who is quite unclear as to the direction in which we seem to be drifting. It will be refreshing if the Government's perceptions of the future roles of NATO and the WEU are spelled out in full in the next annual Defence White Paper. Most Members will have spent their entire service within NATO. Are we being taken (willingly or not? - knowingly or not?) into a new Alliance? AUTOLYCUS

The Effect of Peace on People the last paragraph of his published 1962 ICollege Lees Knowles Lectures, delivered at Trinity Cambridge, General Sir John Hackett N

ended thus: The profession of arms is an essential institution offering an orderly way of life, set a little apart, not without elegance. 'The performance of public duty is not all that makes a good life,' said Bertrand Russell in language that would have pleased Cicero; 'there is also the pursuit of private excellence'. Both are to be found in the military life. It gives much and takes more, enriching freely anyone prepared to give more than he gets. It will remain with us for as long as man continues to be what he is, too clever and not good enough. This looks like being a long time yet. The Editor, about a year ago, rightly drew to a close articles concerning 'The Effect of War on People' so this article purports, in a military context, to discuss the effect of peace on people who may have to sustain the first shock of war. The article is triggered by three events. A considerable correspondence in the newspapers about the sacking from 'Headships' of several innovative and indeed well known men and women due to parental pressure; consideration by the European court of the infliction of three strokes of a gym shoe on the bottom of a 7 year old; and the sentences in Pablo's War (Squadron Leader Mason, Bloomsbury Press) about Desert Storm which read as follows: 'We were all reluctant to carry on delivering these lethal weapons. A few crews and individuals had already refused ro go to war (This writer's italics). Others were fast approaching breaking point. In the Second World War they would have been branded as lacking in moral fibre and would probably have lived a life of misery, shunned by their Service comrades for the rest of their days. In the First World War they would simply have been taken out and shot. ' In Chapter 10 of my book From Fisher to the Falklands I wrote about my year at Birmingham University: 'Here I found myself one of a mob of

(mostly) ex RAF officers studying for their degrees on Forces Educational Grants; young men with old faces from bomber command, whose record of courage has never been properly acknowledged but who, amongst the many kindnesses they showed me, gave me an abiding respect and admiration for their Service.' That was 45 years ago and nothing I have seen or learnt since, including close friendship with a number of RAF officers, serving and retired, has caused me, in the slightest, to alter that opinion. And who could forget that paragraph in a letter to his mother written by a young bomber pilot before a sortie and to be delivered to her only if he did not return, as he failed to do: 'You must not grieve for me, for if you really believe in religion and all that it entails that would be hypocrisy. I have no fear of death; only a queer elation. . . I would have it no other way. The universe is so vast and so ageless that the life of one man can only be justified by the measure of his sacrifice. We are sent into this world to acquire a personality and a character to take with us that can never be taken from us. Those who just eat and sleep, prosper and procreate, are no better than animals if all their lives they are at peace.' Three times in my father's lifetime and twice in mine the Germans have brought down France or Europe in flames. In 1948 I was a small cog in Western Union working from a bomb damaged 36, Whitehall when the tentative decision, Operation Dunkirk, was taken to evacuate all the Allied occupation forces from Western Europe should the Soviets attack. I saw the assault on merchant ships bound for Spain in 1936137; I was made aware, almost before anyone, of Gadhaffi's attempt in the early seventies to torpedo the QE2 full of Jews on the way to Haifa. Littoral States are already purchasing ships of the Soviet Navy to give them restrictive power on their adjacent sea routes and choke points; China ferociously hates Japan, covets the oil in the South China sea (as does Japan) and is buying an aircraft carrier to add to her fleet already building. The USA has

26

T H E E F F E C T OF P E A C E O N P E O P L E

supplied Japan with sufficient hardware to build 6 Aegis Class cruisers and has supplied 150 F116s to Taiwan. Maritime war and trade denial of the most difficult sort to overcome, from many causes, is likely in the near future. Intensive farming in Britain uses 10 joules of fossil fuel energy brought from overseas for every joule of edible energy produced. Gas supplies are easily interrupted. We are killing off our mining industry. Under EC rules much land is going out of cultivation. If the supply of fossil fuel lapses for more than ninety days we should quickly starve, while our armed forces were 'grounded'. Even Germany, as a result of trying to swallow her Eastern element at one gulp is in trouble again. It took 28 Italian, 8 Rumanian and I I crack German Divisions to oversee the Balkan peninsula. War not peace is in the air. Between the first and second world wars the Germans carried out a virtual spring cleaning of the minds of their younger generation. There was a calculated (and largely successful) policy to inculcate the whole German nation with the prized qualities of a soldier. I met some of the wandemogel in the Thirties and the 'Strength through Joy' movement had much to impress anyone who had seen the squalor of Jarrow and In different Britain's mass unem~lovment. , forms and under different guises the same process used by the Germans (and for the same reasons) is being carried out in a dozen countries today. No democracy can attempt anything like this yet, demonstrably, as General Hackett asserts, 'war will remain with us for as long as man continues to be what he is, too clever and not good enough. This looks like being a long time yet.' Today with our accelerating science applied to war we, in the industrialised world, face a dilemma particularly in our small increasingly overcrowded island. Should our officers in the Services (as I have always held) be well above the intellectual median of the nation, innovative, imaginative, and deeply thoughtful? Have we, over the last 5 0 years in our preoccupation over a major conflict with a nation no less ideologically motivated towards war than was Germany, sought to avoid the difficulties of training democracies in peace to accept the trials of war as a natural feature of our national life,

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by turning too much towards the development of weapons operable only by the brainy? Crudely put, in our officer recruiting, have we gone too much for brains to the exclusion of brawn? In our search for the former, are we in danger of soft pedalling the search for that quality so much more difficult to discuss at an early age - character? Has our educational system, under the influence of parents, particularly single parents, started to become too soft? 'More life', Thomas Hardy has written, 'may trickle out of men through thought than through a gaping wound.' And does this policy into which, in peacetime, we have (quite necessarily) been forced, affect the fighting qualities of men (and women) in the sea-going fleet? A fleet that can be said in general to be the most sophisticated battle apparatus yet devised and so needing the highest academic calibre officers and ratings to operate it; and similarly has this 'softening' of our society affected also the almost incredibly skilled RAF pilot in his cockpit, alone with his highly complicated battle apparatus and the elements, in particular? 'The man of character in peace is the man of courage in war': so writes Lord Moran with his experience as a doctor in the trenches in World War I and as Churchill's shadow in World War 11. Admiral Woodward's book with its references to men who 'cracked' even before the Falklands were reached and Squadron Leader Mason's paragraph quoted above would seem, if Thomas Hardy was right, to suggest that the softening policy has gone too far and search for character, in the true sense of the word, not far enough. Bartlett's Psychology and the Soldier, The Rev Norman Copeland's book of the same name, MacCurdy's The Structure of Morale and, in the context of World War I, Trotter's The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War,deal mainly with the soldier's morale and leadership problems. And to some extent these are quite different as regards the detailed application of technological expertise in the crash and din of battle than (say) that of the young officer seeing a missile approaching on his screen, in an air conditioned operations room below the waterline, or a lonely pilot intent on a bombing run hearing the squawk indicating the same

THE EFFECT OF PEACE ON PEOPLE

danger. But peacetime training has to ensure that all three possess equal courage however differently, as the crisis approaches, such courage needs to be demonstrated. Janowitz defines 'ascription' as meaning that an individual's position in the military depends on social characteristics and not on personal achievement. Until the beginning of this century, certainly in general, men were only born into the officer class or they were excluded. Now personnel records of both academic and leadership qualities have supplanted social pedigree. At the beginning of this century in the Army and Navy and since World War I1 particularly in the Navy and pilotlnavigator element of the RAF, technical skills have inevitably undermined the impact of ascribed authority. And between 1914 and 1945 many of the genes which made the hereditary and almost feudal skills of leadership in the British Army so particularly effective on the field of battle, despite the benign drawbacks of peacetime democracy, have been left in the mud of Flanders, on the beaches of Italy, Normandy and Gallipoli, in North Africa and the Middle East; never to return. Some too would hold that the Royal Navy's heavy casualties in World War I1 and those of the RAF also contributed to the lost-for-ever national gene bank. In the second paragraph of this article I mentioned the sacking of school 'Heads' and the extraordinary case of a small boy lightly 'slippered', now under advisement by the European Court. It has been my delight since retiring, to be for five years (until I was to be relieved by the late Admiral Sir Richard Clayton) the Chairman of Governors of a smallish Independent School founded some 70 years ago by a far-sighted and extremely rich man, who had been desperately unhappy at his Public School, but was still big enough to appreciate the benefits he had absorbed there. So he devoted a large part of his fortune to instilling the best of those benefits into the sons of his estate workers by purchasing (initially) a large house with 200 acres and setting up a (free) school which in a few years reached 90 pupils. There was to be be no corporal punishment; no marks; a school parliament known as the General Meeting was to be largely responsible for good order and internal

27

discipline without bullying; lovely playing fields; beautiful pictures and a musical tradition extending to this day were all provided for. A bunch of sojiies I thought and how wrong I was. The founder's aim he enshrined in one short sentence: The true aristocracy is an arisrocracy of bruins und charucrer. To someone who had undergone the sadistic discipline at Dartmouth, which I have described in The Man Around rhe Engine, and who had accepted the post of Chairman of Governors rather reluctantly and only at the instigation of a childhood friend, the son of the founder, the whole ambience was a revelation. There could be no doubt of the success of the experiment. From the original roll of 90, up to the war mostly from the Estate, 24 went to Oxbridge and the same number during the 6 years of war. In the 25 post war years by which time the roll was rising to 150, there were over 100 scholarships to Oxbridge and with the roll now at about 270 a proportionate increase since has taken place, together with many going to other universities and polytechnics and a steady stream into the Services. An Editor of the Financial Times, a partner in one of the great PR firms, a highly placed Foreign Office official, the Keeper of Bodleian, the Keeper of the British Collection at the Tate. a member of the Council of Lloyds, 15 authors with 42 books ranging from novels, through woodland ecology to Chinese Art, were some of the achievements of only a few of that early 'vintage'. In the post war era when even the very rich were feeling the pinch the arrangement was amended. Twenty Boys (and now girls) from Primary Schools largely paid for by the Founder's Trust, or by 'Friends' and Old Boys of the school and, until Labour gained a majority, by the County Council, were merged in their third year with another twenty 13 yearolds, the children of fully fee-paying parents from independent preparatory schools. And so, to quote just four rather different instances personally known to me, a pigman's son who, while at the school and paid for by the original Trust, climbed the Eiger, became a brilliant pianist and gained a scholarship to Oxford; another, with fees also provided by the Trust has just won his cricket blue at Cambridge; yet another wrote from the gun turret of a

28

THE EFFECT OF PEACE ON PEOPLE

Challenger main battle tank on a quiet evening in the Arabian desert just before Operation Desert Storm, while another boy with 10 0-levels under his belt who chose to defy the Head and his parents and leave at 16, has become one of the two bravest National Hunt jockeys of the present era. I came to believe in those five years that desperate though the loss of natural leadership genes may have been in two world wars there are still plenty about if we, in the Services, look for them widely enough and somehow manage to recognise them, both abundantly difficult problems which we have to solve in peacetime if our Services are to give of their best in any conflict. I have been impressed too by the names on the gravestones in the churchyard by.our home. Apart from Captain Bligh who was born here in St Tudy but buried in Lambeth, the same names appear century after century, as well as on the war memorial for the two wars, on the photographs of those who went to World War I and amongst the sterling yeomen fanners in the neighbourhood and on the parish council. In the Navy of today, it seems to me, the intellectual gap between the best of the artificer entry and the (academically) worst of the officer candidates is virtually non existent; and this is borne out by the fact that 30%of the engineering branch, weapons, propulsion and air, who graduate with an Honours degree are exapprentices. Quite often the two types of candidate were separated only by their immediately preceding social status, which initially or by chance tended to aim them at one type of entry or the other by their maturity (or lack of it) at school and as seen by the recruiter, and the success or otherwise of their school teachers in giving them the necessary numeracy , literacy and savoir faire to pass one or other of the Selection Boards. I surmise that the same differences may well exist between some of the new entry rating recruits, who might always remain a rating and those who might develop petty officer or even officer intellectual and leadership potential. And what of discipline? I have written elsewhere (From Fisher to the Falklandr) of how between the mutiny at Invergordon and 1939, the leadership of Chatfield, Kelly, James,W. W. Fisher, D'Oyly Lyon, A. B. Cunningham and

many others, produced a Navy once more spiritually, if not technologically, ready for battle. Lord Moran writes of the survivors of HMS Glorious: What is it in the spirit of the Navy that kept from quarrelling these tormented sailors whose reason had nearly gone after 65 hours adrift in the Arctic circle?' would answer I think, in the words of AF Lord Jellicoe: 'Discipline engenders a spirit of calmness in emergency. The same spirit which keeps a disciplined man at his post when all his comrades have fallen, will keep a man brave and cool in the midst of emergency, panic and disaster. In other words discipline renders a man more capable of facing the changes and chances of human existence. ' I treasure a letter from a young stoker in my ship who, as the water rose around him, described how he concluded that his mother's last words to him when we sailed six months before, Remember, never desert your post, Harry, were perhaps no longer entirely applicable to the situation he faced. So where do we go from here now that 'ascription' has disappeared, that the fee-paying preparatory schools and public schools (today rather the prerogative only of the very moneyed), have largely ceased to provide the officer corps of all three Services, that brains and technical expertise are in danger of becoming the main criteria of leadership in an increasingly secular society, where (to quote the Dean of Peterhouse) . . . 'the priest in his sanctuary no longer speaks to (people) of the evidences of the unseen world, discovered amongst the rubble of the present one'. . .? And in particular, for that is the purpose of The Naval Review, how in the case of the Royal Navy should we solve the equation? How should we attempt, in our diminishing Navy, in a rapidly changing type of society, to select officer candidates, who will be accepted by those peers they will be trained to lead, who will understand comradeship, and who, in critical and dangerous moments will spread fortitude rather than put on their survival suits and curl up in the foetal position under a table as Admiral Woodward records?

THE EFFECT OF PEACE ON PEOPLE

Would it be better to emulate the school I have mentioned where, during 5-7 years, regardless of social background (a factor during that period almost entirely forgotten and anyway discounted), the real aristocracy, the aristocracy of brains and character, is seen amongst some, slowly to emerge and to be identified? The Navy could not spare all that time of course for such a selection process and anyway the entry ages are greater and therefore perhaps the characters more recognisable; but should we perhaps revert to something on the lines of HMS King Alfred which, from an always young and sometimes rather motley crew entering the Navy as sailors gave us that vast and, on the whole, outstanding supply of reserve officers without whose help the war would never have been won. Who, with any knowledge of Coastal Forces, almost entirely RNVR, could deny the quality of its young officers selected straight from civil life? My five years on the civil service and police selection boards convinced me that the two or three days 'Wosbee' type selection procedures, effective though in some cases they might be, were really no substitute for a far longer observation and selection procedure. I believe there is a lesson here which we should not neglect. I visualise an entry examination based, as at present, on about three broad levels of academic ability and whatever age ranges for each might be considered appropriate. The first academic standard would constitute the lowest level acceptable for the rating recruit and might have a wider age range than the other two; the second the lowest level acceptable for the apprentice entry and the third and highest for officers, to be of university standard preferably with some maths and physics. Both the last two batches of candidates having fairly low ceiling age ranges. All candidates for service in the Royal Navy would have the choice of which of the three academic examinations they wished to opt for; and, on passing at whichever grade, would be offered (say) 12 weeks (what might be called) 'pupillage' while dressed and living as sailors in HMS Raleigh. HMS Raleigh itself would contain, besides the necessary training staff, a greatly enlarged Selection Board watching for officer potential in all three entries. Clearly the

29

third and second types of entry would need the closest observation; but the chase for academic potential (as opposed to achievement) should cover all three ate developers are often the best in these fast moving times. Prima facie such a change suggests the abandoning of Dartmouth. And it well may ultimately come to that. But if, after selection, and (say) a year's seatime still as sailors, there is obvious officer material in a candidate, then some additional academic 'cramming' may be needed provided the maximum age limits are not exceeded and, for a time this might be Dartmouth's role. All officer selectees would anyway finish their training at Manadon (now allied to Plymouth University) by taking courses, some leading to Honours degrees, tailored to their ultimate specialisation in one or other of the appropriate 'schools'. Experience in the Fifties when the officer academic standard of entry was similar to that of a Post Office clerk demonstrated that Manadon and Dartmouth were both hamstrung in their endeavours to produce good officers, by the need to 'cram' a small proportion of entrants to achieve the minimal academic standards required, too often to the neglect of the brightest. And in many cases where even the 'cramming7 failed with its accompanying drag on those not needing it, the officer concerned who failed his exams was discharged from the Navy with no hope of being downgraded perhaps to Special Duties Officer or petty officer, where his adequate leadership qualities would have served the Navy well. If such cramming could also be accomplished at Manadon or Raleigh rather than Dartmouth. then the latter would indeed have to be abandoned as a naval training establishment. Such an arrangement, the writer holds, would greatly enhance the early and (by reason of the much longer period for the selection process the full 12 weeks for officers) more certain spotting of those with officer potential whatever their social background. It would also enhance the all of one company philosophy by making clear, at the earliest stage, and amongst their peers, who should lead and who, however clever, would be more likely fated only to follow; those who welcomed and overcame stress and those who seemed to succumb too early.

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THE EFFECT OF PEACE ON PEOPLE

The abandoning of Dartmouth with its chapel and books of Remembrance for the multitude of naval officers who gave their lives in two world wars would be an unbearable wrench. But in the last 25 years this country, despite the wonders of the North Sea oil exploration, has fallen far behind the United States and France in the exploration and development of the seabed beyond the Continental Shelf. There needs to be one centre of applied scientific research. The 'undersea-men' trained at Dartmouth could well add lustre to the seamen who once made that little Port so famous. Sir Edward Heath, when joining the European Community, is said to have given away 80% of British fish stocks to our continental rivals and once remarked to me that shipbuilding was a purely 'Third World Activity'. Pressure, constantly exerted on the government may one day restore to British fishermen what is rightly theirs; and as for shipbuilding being a 'Third World' activity tell that to the Finns, the Koreans, the Japanese, the Norwegians, the Germans, the French, the Italians and they will surely dispose of such a gross misjudgement. If, as many hope, the UK distances itself from

the more bizarre of the Brussels lawmakers, (what British sailor requires a Delors approved standard sized condom as defined in one of the latest orders from Brussels?) then training in all types of construction of (once more) British seagoing merchant ships and those deck officers who will man them (the Treasury refused in 1956 to contemplate training merchant navy engineers at Manadon although no extra overheads would have been needed) could well also be concentrated at Dartmouth. There could be training too in more up to date fishing techniques, training in the properly organised harvesting of the oceans, training in seabed exploration. In a world dying because of the 200 extra mouths to be fed and 200 extra aspirations (never to be satisfied) for every minute of every day, Dartmouth could become in time one of the most important centres by which our planet might be saved. ,For those who recall the Georgics, Sedfugit interea, fugit inreparabile tempus. For those who don't - 'Meanwhile time is flying flying, never to return'.

The Purpose of the Royal Navy T should not be necessary to ask the INavy'?; question 'what is the purpose of the Royal it should be possible to go to some publication and find an official definition. From time to time Defence White Papers come up with what can only be described as rather 'bland' statements on this subject, but no formal standing official definition is available. The aim of this short article is, therefore, to discuss and then define the primary purpose of the Royal Navy. The position of both the nation and NATO is that their intent and therefore that of their armed forces is defensive and that their aim is to deter aggression. In order for deterrence to work one's enemy must be convinced that he is facing forces which are effective and efficient; armed forces must therefore exercise and be seen to be able to do their job. Accordingly it is necessary for the armed forces to promote and publicise their capabilities. The fundamental task of armed forces is to be able to apply force where and when directed by legitimate authority (the Government of the day) as necessary to achieve a required aim. Hence it is the task of the Royal Air Force to apply force in the air and the army on land. It is the task of the Royal Navy (including the Royal Marines) to apply force as directed at, below, above and from the sea. The armed forces are, by definition, in the business of applying armed force, or, in more simple terms, in the business of 'waging war'; if this were not so then all that would be required would be an unarmed coast guard and merchant service, and that is not what the Royal Navy is about. Lastly, it is not enough to be able to apply force; to be successful in one's purpose, one must be able to win. If one fights (uses force) only to lose, it would be better not to waste money (and lives!) on armed forces in the first place. Everything should be done to achieve a clearly defined aim. The armed forces should only ever be used in their fighting role to defend the nation's vital interests; that is to say those interests, as decided by the Government, which are so important to the nation that they are worth

the loss of life to protect. In a word they must be 'vital' interests; if they are not 'vital' - then the use of armed force in their fighting role should not be contemplated because otherwise involving them becomes a bluff which the enemy could well call. It is clear that, in 1982, the government decided that the Falklands were part of the vital interests of the United Kingdom because they were prepared to use force and, in the last resort, accept the death of some of our personnel. (As an aside - Is this the case in Bosnia?) From the above it follows that the primary purpose of the Royal Navy, acting always as an instrument of government policy, is: To be seen to be able to wage war at, below, above and from the sea - and win - in order to defend the vital interests of the nation. This, surely, is a precise and accurate statement of the Royal Navy's primary purpose. Disaster relief, lifesaving, fishery protection, and other roles are secondary and must never be confused with the primary purpose, particularly when deciding where limited resources should be applied. Without such a precise statement, officially promulgated, how can the Navy or our political masters when resourcing the Service ever act with clarity of purpose - itself a fundamental principle of war. The statement of primary purpose proposed here is not contentious, but nowhere is it or anything remotely like it officially promulgated. I contend that this or some very similar definition should be in the forefront of every naval officer's mind, and everything that he does in his career should be directed towards assisting in achieving this purpose - otherwise his efforts are misapplied. Such a definition should be formally and conspicuously promulgated at paragraph one, page one of the Navy's premier book - namely BR 2 - the Queen's Regulations for the Royal Navy. There's a lot in the new QRRN - pages of preamble with statements by the Defence Council with even its letters patent from the Queen; but where is the purpose of the Navy stated? I can't find it. In the preamble to the 1652 version of the

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THE PURPOSE OF THE ROYAL NAVY

Articles of War King Charles I1 rightly stated: 'It is upon the navy under the Rovidence of God that the safety, honour and welfare of this realm do chiefly attend.' Have the British people really forgotten that fundamental truth? I doubt it. Have the

politicians? Perhaps. Let us help remind them, and perhaps even ourselves, with a clearly stated primary purpose.

J . L. MUXWORTHY COMMANDER, RN

Defence and Industry or Industry and Defence Note: R e following article was completed at the end of 1991 and the3gures and some terms used reflect that dating. H m e r it is clear that the principles involved still apply - Editor. Introduction RITISH Aerospace (BAe) and VSEL shipbuilders announced the combined loss of 15,000 Defence related jobs in the same week that it was revealed that the Social Services budget had exceeded £63 bn. With two-thirds of that devoted to servicing pensions and a single year's increase of 20% the country can not afford to bail out Health, Education, Local Government and Defence or, with 20%-30% cut in the latter post the 'Options for Change' rationalisation, its ailing industry. The numerical increase and longevity of the elderly and the reduction of the taxpaying workforce will exacerbate this mismatch of expenditure indicating that Government collective management is required. This paper questions the survivability of Britain's Defence Industrial Base and ultimately, with its possible demise, the capability of Government to discharge Foreign Policy with the aid or back up of appropriate military power. In both the retaking of Kuwait and the relief effort for the Kurds no-one can gainsay the usefulness of effective armed forces and the credibility that they impart to participating Governments.

B

Aim The aim of this paper is to expose the need for an Industrial Policy that safeguards production for Defence so that national aspirations may continue to be supported by effective Armed Forces. ' scope After examining some historical aspects and discussing various security organisations as they may appear to Industry the paper will look into a few procurement philosophies before identifying some weaknesses in the UK's Defence Industrial Base (DIB).

prevailed in the 1920s when Winston Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer. The economic climate was broadly similar with promises of a better life after World War I. Then as now the choice was between Economy and Strategy with concern for the optimum allocation of scarce resources. Industry was helped by lowering taxation and socialism was countered by increased expenditure on social services. The budget still had to be balanced, the Gold standard maintained and interest rates kept down so that industry and unemployment would not be adversely affected. Ipso facto the defence budget was reduced, held at a flat rate for 10 years and predicated with the assumption 'that there would be no major war for ten years'.' The map of Europe was almost identical to today's new order. The table below shows the rate of increase of Defence expenditure that was necessary from 1932 to prepare for World War I1 at which point Lend-Lease took over and there was no attempt to control the economy. The aircraft industry was in poor condition with few experts around after the stagnant years and the eventual readiness of all arms in 1939 was remarkable but still questionable. With so many similarities today it must not be forgotten that the expertise to produce modem weaponry is far more at a premium and the lead time much longer. Summary The 1923-45 period encapsulated a major industrial recession and terminated with a six year war. It is not a recipe to repeat. Modem conflict depends on forces in-being and any acceleration in the production train requires the minimum infrastructure to remain in place even if, in peacetime, it is less than competitively economical. The problem is that with the key skills now in private hands they will wither unless Governments take steps to preserve the strategic minimum. Industry has no long-term incentive to stay in the defence business privately.

Historical Much of what Britain is experiencing today Defence Expenditure per annum 1923-1938 1923 24 25 26 27 28 29 32 33 34 35 105 115 119 117 117 114 113 103 108 114 137

36 186

37 265

1938 400

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DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY (IR INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

Security policies International scene What is the defence industry to make of today's international scene? First, it recognises the loss of business emanating from the breakdown in disciplines associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). When the threat was numerically assessable, poised and just over there the military cohesion of nations was evident in determining and providing for the response. With 3% growth per annum politicians were keen to be seen achieving the material commitments of the Defence Planning Goals. Industry had a remit and guaranteed business. Now that the introduction of buffer states from the former Warsaw Pact countries has opened up the warning time from 36 hours to a perhaps exaggerated two years the heat is off, the urgency for solutions to military problems has gone and politicians promise their voters 'peace dividends'. Industry lies exposed. NATO The greatest single military threat still emanates from the Soviet Union. NATO will remain the principal forum for setting out nuclear policy issues on an allied basis and for providing the command and control in any large scale European conflict. What is not so clear is the scale or positioning of defensive resources when warning time allows for both regeneration of forces and their redeployment, or reinforcement, when necessary. This is the bad news for industry. Whereas NATO remains a central plank in British Defence Policy and while NATO thinkers rekindle a new Strategy nations will nonetheless unilaterally, if not collectively, reduce their current commitments on a significant scale (the USA and UK already talk of 25 % ,20%respectively). Economics may be the principal driver, as it has been in the USSR, so there is little chance of the reduction being coordinated or gradual under the auspices of CFE (The Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) which presupposed a modest 10%-15% reduction overall. Largescale reductions will herald a period of defence stagnation for industry which will span several years and make survival of the defence industry more difficult. All 16 NATO nations,

particularly those who find conscription harder to justify, will also be keen to reduce to a similar if not greater degree. Military integration and commitment depends on having a common threat; NATO could not adapt to take on other contingencies in a wider area and retain its military framework. It is not a political club. The Nuclear issue is important and although Europe might doubt the commitment of the USA if troop withdrawals are too fast or uncoordinated, it must remember that the USA cannot leave Europe to Europe with the possibility that French or British nuclear responses could somehow expose America to an unattributable Armageddon. Burden-sharing takes on a new meaning if everyone reduces but the residue must necessarily become more European. The promotion of collaboration has unleashed a dynamic process between com~aniesthemselves to ensure survival and this is emerging as a competition, if not an economic war, between Europe, America and Japan. United Nations The recent Gulf conflict has apparently given the United Nations (UN) teeth as an enforcement agency. Will such an undertaking be repeated; is the UN taking on the role as the world's policeman? Basically, this comes down to asking if the USA will underpin any UN military action and the answer must be 'only if American interests are sufficiently at stake' or the Security Council (USSR) again lets it. There is insufficient unanimity within the UN to generate a sort of global NATO to face unknown eventualities and hence no prospect that industrialists can expect a sustained military commitment to any reserve UN force. UN peace-keeping forces are certainly a growth industry but, the Gulf apart, they have seldom been effective when coercive. As observer forces they enhance stability but do not prevent conflict. Their numbers and associated equipment do not represent a lifeline to their suppliers, industry. Western European Union (WEU) The nine WEU nations may be just the forum for showing common purpose and providing the burden sharing that the USA often seeks but if

DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY (3R INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

it is to be an executive group then the USA needs to be part of it. It cannot be a competitor to NATO or even a select executive arm of the larger but less coordinated 35 nation CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). The WEU has demonstrated its cohesion twice in the Gulf, principally as an amalgam of naval forces, operating outside the NATO area. It has as yet no infrastructure nor funding to present itself as anything other than a political grouping sanctioning the common operating of authorised national commanders in set piece scenarios. The WEU will not evolve as a duplicated expansion of the NATO defence case to the added benefit of industry. Neither the WEU nor the CSCE nor even the Common Market (EEC) are for a executive European security governance nor is this ever likely. The expansion of the market economies to include Turkey, Austria and perhaps Cyprus and Malta or even Norway, Sweden, Morocco, Hungary, Lithuania and Finland, long before any serious integration of government could occur, dictates that agreement on security policy could not be TurkeyIGreece or achieved (viz. Austria/Germany). Even France's perception of the WEU, as a step to EC security post political union, runs counter to UK's view of it as a subset of NATO. British defence policy Of greater concern to British industry is the future of Britain's defences and it is reasonable to assume that Defence Policy as a whole will not change; what will change is scale and priority. It is tempting to suppose that Out-ofArea operations, so clearly seen in both the Falklands and the Middle East, will assume greater ascendancy but it is extremely difficult to predict scenarios and then match resources. In essence what can be done with available resources will be done, as both campaigns showed, but such events are not quantifiable causes for retaining or justifying the inventory. Flexible, highly-trained, well-armed mobile forces are certainly in vogue but by scaling down and retaining a more expensive 'quality' one is then confronted with the 'quantity' issue whereby token contribution to the allied cause is not enough. The use of a heavy armoured

35

brigade as was seen in Kuwait may satisfy American desires within NATO for such an UK led ACE-wide rapid reinforcement force (RRF) of multinational dimension, but it will have confounded the 'Options for Change' assumptions on affordability . If national role specialisation appears inevitable but is as yet politically unacceptable then the current trend of salami-slicing to retain capability will continue6 if for no other reason than that at least a nucleus on which to build will have been preserved. Two things are clear: there will be no increase in Defence expenditure and decisions will be slow in coming. The upshot is that the Defence programme remains overextended and short-term measures to slow down running costs or reduce future commitment will continue to bedevil industry. Worse still, the longer the delay in biting the bullet the more that is expended on residual upkeep, the greater the enforced change that is required and the higher the expenditure in carrying out that change. Stop-go and Go-slow all in an era of defence stagnation at home and abroad cause another word to be added to the in-house vocabulary: Diversification, ' as industry seeks to adapt its military techniques for civil purpose. Special Relationship Industry might wonder, from the Westland saga, exactly what strength there was to the 'special relationship' with the USA. The military know that nkarly all major operational capability hinges on US assistance and that means especially Trident. There is US dependence to support it, service the missile and to coordinate operating techniques and targeting. The UK could use its relationship as a Eurocommunication means to maintain faith in NATO or it could independently exercise leadership within Europe on the assumption that the WEU-pillar is industrially inevitable. The danger is that without decisions and being seen as 'in' but not 'of' Europe then UK loses influence in both camps and becomes marginalised. Politicians may hedge bets but most of the defence industry sees only a oneway street with America and must necessarily, along with its civil business, collaborate within Europe. Some, most recently BAe and the

36

DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY (I R INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

Patriot option, could be biasing West. Summary The immediate prospects for the British defence industry look bleak and diversification out of the defence sector would appear to be justified. The issues of NATO, WEU and security within the EEC will take a long time to evolve in any form that gives a clear purpose for defence forces, the responsibility for which unquestionably remains with National Governments. Common foreign policy, security policy and defence seems an unachievable goal in an expanding EEC which is not constituted to become a federation of nation states9 and currently excludes the NATO flank countries. If collapse of the DIB seems likely then it is right to expect that Government will recognise the strategic vulnerability of some industries and manage change carefully in order to preserve national capability. Even America can see that defence spending in the UK finances much of the life-blood of the country and defence issues must be intensely political. The 'special relationship' is a tool that can keep the USA involved in the multilateral integration of Euro-defence but the UK must not consider itself or its industry as 'special' or the relationship will become a myth that leaves Britain isolated; the power in the USA is money and that is what drives politicians; the economic competitor is Europe. The UK's current military deoendence must colour its future industrial policy; if defence dependence stays left (West) but industry leans right (East) the UK's DIB will crash.

The management of procurement SDE-90 stated that the best recipe for an efficient and healthy industrial base remains the open market competitive principles. l o It reported progress with collaboration and competition and expressed faith in the Independent European Group (IEPG). The thrust is that cheaper procurement is attainable by ever more efficient management and there are optimistic competition chances for British industry in Europe. A plethora of National Audit Office (NAO) reports indicates that there is still room for improvement in both management initiatives1' and procedures but they do

recognise the progress that has been made while being more sanguine about the scale of savings envisaged. Collaboration About 15%of the 90191 procurement budget was spent in collaborative projects which are predominantly aviation based. The savings on development costs are a key objective but the growth factor here has been alarmingly high and firms are progressively less competitive as international industries merge. Economies of scale with larger production runs should show unit savings but the delays in the negotiating machinery tend to offset most of this, especially when through-life support permits duplicate national facilities to emerge (Harrier). NAO concluded that they could not prove value for money because, usually, projects undertaken collaboratively are too advanced for any single nation and hence there were few comparators. '' The IEPG has difficult issues to resolve including apportionment of the work share, 'juste retour ', for developing industries in lesser partners. This is anything but competitive. There is no short cut to high performance quality equipment other than spending ever more money amongst the fewer experts who have themselves retained or put in the R&D, not all of which can be contained within the ESPRITIEUREKA collaborative research projects. The IEPG's Action Plan, difficult enough in normal times, seems set to founder. With the commitment level of all participating nations now on the wane it will be harder and more expensive to sustain programme as nations are now less likely to have either common requirements or timeframe or priority for reduced funds. Collaboration seems to be expending itself as a cost-cutting cause cPIPbre but it will necessarily continue. competition The exposure of defence business to the open market has made the battle for contracts more keen but unless losers gain somewhere then competition next time is eroded and is anyway bogus if the loser is artificially protected. Also, the regular supplier who has tooled up and proved himself efficient and reliable stands to

DEFENCE A N D INDUSTRY 0IR INDUSTRY A N D DEFENCE

lose out to the cheaper competitor. This militates against a new found aim to achieve reliability and maintainability because of the diversity that builds into repeated or renegotiated long-term contracts. There is also a balance to be made between the expenditure in time and administration that a tender demands against the possible but unproven additional costs that a direct contract from a known supplier might cause; the value of the purchase is relevant but all too frequently management does not have the authority to use his judgement particularly when moratoria on spendingraise the decision point, add to the time lost, the administration, and reduce bulk orders. This is inefficient. The entry into Europe will bring civil practice into much of the defence sector but that does not necessarily mean that there will be greater opportunities for competition. Nations, especially when squeezed, can be very protective of their defence industries and will cite exemptions in the law as it pertains to defence to justify any political support that may be given to ensure that their man gains the contract. Not all European nations are sold on the competition idiom and many industries remain state owned. Britain's privatised DIB must not be held hostage to Euro-procedures. It is. however, possible that an era of realistic 'Cooperation' will transpire as industries merge by market force or otherwise pool resources in a bid to survive. Bilateralism may boom, as seen in the Anglo-French bid for a frigate replacement for the collapsed NFR90. Free market If the IEPG is effective in managing the defence handouts in a free Euro-market the natural development will be the creation of national monopolies of expertise. If role specialisation finds favour then the right industries must be kept in the right countries; an uncontrolled erosion must not be allowed to dictate future policy. Off-the-shelf purchases will increase and expose a very contracted (and insular) market in which over-capacity will have been competitively removed. l 3 Scope for rapid regeneration will be curtailed and there is bound to be much politicising and blood-letting along the way. National aspirations will surely cause governments to intervene and sidetrack any

37

natural process. Such interventions will be temporary setbacks; the inescapable push forward towards European unity, after implementation of the Single Act, will bring economic, social, and political changes. The evolution has taken 40 years since Churchill's speech in Zurich (19 September 1946) and may take another 20 years to complete. Pan-European management is required to oversee a European defence industry of fewer and larger firms serving a larger and more uniform market. " United Kingdom Before examining some issues concerning the UK's DIB itself it is worth considering the British Government's approach to DIB management. The 'value for money' ethic, earnest in proving public responsibility for money, has also become a significant element in the campaign to keep costs down so that defence policies can be upheld within resources without recourse to a Defence Review. This even as industry has been depressed, diversified out of the defence sector, or lost out abroad. There has been and is no long-term strategy for sustaining a DIB and policy statements through the years have been contradictory. l 6 Even in 1990 the Ministry of Defence espoused a policy of letting market forces run their course so long as 'the needs of national security' and 'protection of [ its] interests' ' ' were in place but did not state what these were, in the industrial sense, or how they would be managed. Some indicators showed in: the Westland issue which was a public choice concerning alignment of the helicopter DIB, towards America rather than Europe; the necessity to give the SSBN contract to the one and only remaining national submarine builder (VSEL); the decision to preserve some UK electronics competition by forbidding GEC's takeover of Plessey. Case-by-case political expediency prevailed and this is likely to continue as long as policy direction is undefined and social considerations come to the fore.

The defence industrial base Scale SDE 90 reported the 90191 procurement

38

DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY (I R INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

budged as some £8,296 million of which 75 % is to UK industry direct and 15% is collaborative with over 40 UK participants. 115 companies are in receipt of contracts worth over £5mL8 with five in the big league at over f250m; the whole makes the Ministry of Defence British industry's largest single customer. Defence literature indicates that there are over 800 firms that make equipment for military use and some 10,000 in total if you include the service industries. It is estimated that over 515,000 people work in an £8 bn industry. Add to this the domestic support that surrounds such large scale involvement country-wide: then it is easy to see that a 30% reduction in defence over a few years will hit industry and the supporting cast equally. The minds of politicians will be concentrated wonderfully but piecemeal ad hoc decisions will not leave a coordinated industry that can sustain defence that conforms to any recognised policy. Domestic politics will drive the issue unless Government puts down a realistic blueprint. 'Over-capacity' Privatised industry that is not working at full competitive efficiency has over-capacity. Market forces may shortly bring the country to monopolies in submarine building and tank factories and near single figures of major aviation, electronics and warship yards. These are still inefficient and unlikely to survive unless there are sufficient orders to bring them to full capacity. Then there is no reserve when threats drive up the demand: a. Vickers (Defence Systems) await the order to produce the now accredited Challenger I1 tank and have two new factories employing 1,600 men surviving on not much else than throughput of one Challenger recovery vehicle per month. b. VSEL (Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering Ltd) have closed down their Cammell Laird Birkenhead yard (for the conventional Type 2400 'Upholder' class) leaving Barrow as the sole venue of submarine building in the UK. Without follow on orders, eg the SSN 20 class, expertise to support the Trident SSBNs for the next 20 years will be at a premium. Compromises with the former royal yards

must emerge. c. British Aerospace has trimmed the privatised Royal Ordnance factories (ROF) from 16 to 1 1 sites producing about 45 % of Britain's ammunition needs. Now more efficientthey did not have the spare capacity to produce 155mm artillery shells' for the Gulf war which occasioned an embarrassing scrounge around the market. Discontinued production runs are not easy to resurrect even with 6 months' warning. 'Over capacity' should no longer be used as an expression of wastage; there are strategic security issues at stake here and controlled management is called for and perfectly possible if the pace is not forced. Sustainability Westlands, the 'UK-based' helicopter concern is a major partner in the EHlOl collaborative project which runs serious risk of being rendered unaffordable. 2 0 Reducing the buy or elongating the period will not solve the cost overruns being encountered but the real damage of allowing the company to go to the wall is not just a loss to the Royal Navy's anti-submarine capability but the inability to remanufacture spare parts to service existing aircraft. Replication of this sort of production requirement to stand still for longer costs big money. A specialised British CHAFF producer making false radar echoing material, one of three world-wide, has a corner in the United States space market but without the business to fill countless rockets, shells and pods he is diversifying from a 70130 defence heavy base to a 30170 proportion. The scope for accelerated production is disappearing fast. The management of the former ROF is another post Gulf lesson in sustainability. Mobility Critical to mobility is the availability of air and sea lift capacity. Soviet freightliners cannot be relied upon any more than can the response of the fourth arm of defence: Britain's merchant fleet whose companies are contractors in the DIB. Whereas there was sufficient British element to set up the Falklands sealift that for the Gulf was less satisfactory. 142 merchant

DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY (3 R INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

ships were chartered to provide a sea-train of 14 vessels to transport 300,000 tons of stores, including 55,000 tons ammunition and 12,000 vehicles, which represented 90% of the total required to move and support UK forces. This time only eight were British flagged and six foreign ships had to be off-loaded when their crews refused to enter a war zone. It is easy to imagine what a difference it would have made to British participation if ships had been interdicted en route or had had to join an amphibious force in the threat waters of the Northern Gulf. Of the UK's 600 ship fleet P&O now threatens to reflag 142 of its ships in order to halve crew costs to offset its 31 % drop in trading profits. International market forces ensure that shareholder's interests take precedence over national concerns and it does appear a false economy to refuse tax concessions when the migration of those concerned, either abroad or to the dole queue, results in a similar loss of govenunent income anyway. In recalling 'success in the Gulf remember that our partners were not competing in the same depressed ship market and there was little threat. The USA also found scarcity of sealift to be an Achilles heel as it transported 85% of requirements in a sea-train twelve times the size of UK's. Some high capacity SL7 ships had problems and reserve ships were difficult to mobilise, principally because crews and expertise had vanished. Building indigenous sealift or air-freight vehicles can only meet part of the requirement, and as their peace-time use is both uneconomic and unfair competition to civil industry, projects do not find favour with local politicians. However, as mobility and rapid reinforcement are key military objectives in all future defence scenarios then some managed solution, short of a command economy, has to be found. Cooperation between government departments and industry is essential for this national purpose. Electronics This paper is not a catalogue of the DIB nor is it a precis of textbooks which have been written on a very complicated subject. The most expensive R&D and production corner of the whole is the Electronics sector which is a

39

managing base for many subcontractors and even a source of prime contractors for some ship and aircraft projects. Smart weaponry, stealth technology and satellite support for all things from ICBMs, logistic management to the soldier on the ground contribute to that sustained technology that is vital for continued deterrence not forgetting that adequate production in peacetime is equally important so that manufacturing skills keep pace with ideas. The British electronics sector is dominated by GEC who alone gain nearly one-fifth of the defence procurement budget. They are backed up by Plessey and others while BAe is developing its own electronic section to support its aero and missile production. All are heavily dependent on MOD contracts with their attendant R&D support and are not very competitive in the civil market. This is an inherent weakness in the Euro electronics industry; the IEPG have noted the American and Japanese ability to accelerate development and convert to marketable systems. Euro electronics are under threat such that the 'value for money' approach of short-term savings is to the detriment of long-term strategic thinking and undermines rather than strengthens national security." State of the art development programmes are necessarily long-term (at 15 years plus) for the heavy investment to realise marketable return and profit-making. Even the civil sector requires a reappraisal of industrial policy. Defence sales Recall the then Prime Minister's words when the Royal Navy jibbed at selling its ships to further defence sales:- 'Tell the Navy that without sales there will be no Navy'. 2 2 Defence export sales are vital to its industry and fast becoming a dirty word. The home market is not sufficient to sustain competitive industry and from whatever gains British industry may make in Europe, 1992 will ensure that Europe inflicts corresponding compromises at hoke, even assumingu that subsidised state-owned firms are sold to make the field equitable." Further abroad, the well intentioned support for Iraq in its struggle with Iran will be seen to have been a mistake and Western governments will wish to show themselves more responsible, and to

40

DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY OR INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

industry more restrictive, than they already are. Sales to the Third World will present even more serious security and moral dilemmas to the Western democracies just at a time when the USSR needs foreign currency and has massive stocks of suitable material. China, Brazil and Korea have established industries that meet the demand more competitively and with less restriction and are unlikely to be held back by any UN overtures. European competitors will be affected similarly which constrains a EuroDIB to the Euro-market; role specialisation seems inescapable.

Summary It is unrealistic to demand self-sufficiency in the UK alone or even Europe. The bottom line is that whatever forces are deemed appropriate must at least be sustainable or transportable under one's own auspices with minimal risk dependence on others (foreign purchase or commercial hire). Simultaneous exterior demand or embargo must not remove operating capability. A few examples have been given above to illustrate that the defence industry is fragile in many areas and that issues of sufficient importance need careful management which is not the responsibility of the industry itself. It is highly unlikely that any WEU member could sustain a major campaign without the connivance of the USA who alone has the capacity to embrace all the skills and production required. Conclusions The manufacturing sector of British Industry is down to 23% of GDP instead of an erstwhile healthy 32%. It is overtaxed, underpopulated, undertrained, underfunded and a basic wealth source of the country. 2 4 The Defence sector is 3 % of GDP alone with a high export take (25 %) and, from the influences above, about to take a dive as demand drops (Options for Change) and markets shrivel (Defence Sales). Competitive rationalisation will continue but fro111the opening paragraphs it must be apparent that supporting the casualties on a bludgeoning social security is not the answer. If the Government fails to compensate for the loss of defence GDP by corresponding reinvestment in Industry there could be 500,000 additional

unemployed by the year 2000. 2 5 The title suggests that with a clear foreign policy together with the defence forces to support it then industry will be found to make it possible. The reality is that without industry, without wealth, there is little defence, insufficient base to support it and less credibility for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. On the world stage the challenge at the United Nations might not be that membership of the Security Council should be widened (who and why) but whether the UK and France deserve to remain permanent members? The contribution in the Gulf may have shown France under-committed or the UK over-extended but if either are to maintain top-table positions then each has to sustain the capability to go on acting proportionately, albeit collectively, when necessary. Cooperation is required. The central message is that the UK DIB needs explicit attention beyond cries of inefficiency and over-capacity or disorganised attrition through local piecemeal politics. Not least for the sake of healthy cooperation with the United States, the UK DIB needs to be considered as one very significant element in the European defence industrial capacity and a creator of wealth in this country. The circumstances of 1926-39 must not be allowed to recur and some capacity to regenerate essentials must be earmarked. The long-term proposition is that even the defence industry will become integrated within Europe but that could take at prudent least another 20 years;'%eanwhile, management of constituent parts is called for.

Recommendations The British Government as a whole (not just the Ministry of Defence) should: a. acknowledge that defence exports, Euro or world-wide, are set to suffer and that critical production, admittedly at a reduced total, has to be maintained, b. consider careful management of the defence sector before strategic - concerns or regeneration capacity are unnecessarily unhinged by regional domestic pressures. c. recognise that a fast high-percentage reduction is not manageable especially if it is unbalanced across the sector or frightens its supporters out of the business,

DEFENCE AND INDUSTRY OR INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

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d. think explicitly through the types of 91an Gambles: Prospect of Western European Security defence industrial capability which it wants Cooperation: Adelphi Paper 244: Autumn 1989. 10Statementon the Defence Estimates: April 1990: Vol. to maintain within the EEC or in parallel 1, p.43. with the United States and evaluate the "Initiatives in Defence Procurement: NAO Report capacity for defence production in security Ministry of Defence: 6 Feb. 1991. as well as economic terms. Role- "Collaborative Projects: NAO Report Ministry of specialisation within Europe could become Defence: 26 Feb. 1991. M. Bittleston: Cooperation or Competition? Defence a necessity. Procurement Optionsfor the 19POs: Adelphi Paper 250: An immediate industrial policy based on Spring 1990. European economic imperatives is more urgent "Down, Down and Campbell: A Single European Arms than a definitive defence statement which cannot Industry?: Brassey's: 1990. hope to address all the security imponderables "Sir Peter Levene KBE (Chief of Defence Pmurement): Future Defence and Security: Military and Industrial in the short-term. Needs in the 1990s: RUSI Journal Summer 1990. T. M. MASTERMAN 16T.Taylor and K. Hayward: The UKDefence Industrial CAPTAIN,RN

References 'King faces several defence options but no big political design: The Times: 28 May 1991: p.2. 'George Peden: The Limitations of Military Power Churchill, Neville Chamberlain and the Defence of Ernpire: Macmillan: 1990. IG.C. Peden: British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932-1939: Edinburgh Scottish Academic Press: 1979: p.7. 'Admiral Sir Peter Stanford: NATO Must Go: USNI Proceedings: March '9 1 . 'Euro-buzz on Defence: The Economist: 18 May 1991: p.61. Philip Sabin: British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s: Adelphi Paper 254: Winter 1990. 'Counting the Ploughshares: The Economist: 2 June 1990. SM.Clarke and R. Hague: European defence cooperation -America, Britain and NATO: Fulbright Papers (No.7): Manchester University Press: 1990.

Base - Development and Future Policy Options 1989. "Op. cit. supra n.10 p.13 para 20. lSSDE90 Vol. 2 Table 2.10. 19DrawingBlueprints for Defence: The Economist: 26 Jan. '91. mM.Evans: Future of Navy helicopter is still in doubt: The Times: 28 March 1991. 2 1 0 p cit. . supra n. 16 p. 19 para 27. nSale of SRMHlHunt Class Minecountermeasures Vessels to Saudi Arabia: Minute from No. 10 Downing Street: 1988. "Sell by 1992: The Economist: 2 March 1991: p. 16. "I. R. Yates CBE FENG: Innovation. Investment and Survival of the UK Economy. 2'P. Dunne and R. Smith: The Peace Dividend and the UK Economy: Supplement to the Cambridge Econometrics Spring Report 1990. "Op. cit. supra n. 16 p. 19 para 27.

A Small Point SMALL point occurred to me as I was A standing on the Flight Deck on a grey and miserable day at Portland, waiting to meet, if not to greet, some grey and miserable men from FOST coming to make my life . . . well, grey and miserable. It was reinforced when I finally sloped off down below and read the signals, and coincidentally came across one that made me think about it again. Now, don't laugh - I am serious. All the ship's sailors working part of ship that day were wearing full foulies, and on a grey, dull and overcast day that most days at sea are for us, what would happen if someone fell overboard? Of course, the organisation would swing into action, but life ain't quite so simple as that. As a bridge watchkeeper, I know how very difficult it is to see a man in the water. To be more precise, if a sailor overboard is not wearing any high visibility clothing and if he is lost from sight, to all intents and purposes he is dead. Now I know that the Navy being what it is, we would do everything we could to find him (or her!), but the chances are slim. In the chilly waters of the Channel, how long would someone last? Probably not long enough when you're trying to manoeuvre a ship, organise a search and perhaps action a helicopter, and that is assuming the alarm was raised promptly. Make it dark and the factors multiply horribly. My personal thought as an OOW was that in anything other than good conditions, especially above sea state 3, I would cut my losses and go for a Williamson. These uncomfortable thoughts were wallowing in my mind when I came across this signal from a Type 23, also working up, who shall remain nameless, though I suspect they are feeling pretty sheepish, which said that they had lost their man overboard dummy, poor old 'Oscar', in such and such a position. If a bright orange, made to be visible, marker could not be found in what were relatively mild conditions, when the organisation is worked up and half expecting a MOBEX, what hope has Jack, or far more importantly me, if I ever drop off the boot topping? Let's think about it for a moment. Chances are the person falling over the side will be wearing blue, making him difficult to find, and

also won't be spotted going; already, it's looking shaky. Now that, to an extent, I can live with as an occupational hazard, though these fools that jump over the side deliberately to test the organisation need their heads read. But what about a sailor who, wearing foulies during a seamanship evolution, falls overboard? The Navy has kitted him out, and not allowed him to wear anything different, in foul weather protection gear that is no better as a survival aid than a mackintosh. No thermal insulation, no proper waterproofing, no high visibility markings, not even a sensible colour or reflective patch for visual identification. He may well be wearing a lifejacket, though sod's law says that he won't, but, as that Type 23 can tell you, that is no guarantee of being seen. Wouldn't the Navy be liable under the Health and Safety Act for not taking proper and reasonable precautions for its men working in exposed conditions? What we should be providing is a decent, multi-layer dayglo orange two piece foul weather suit, like the RNLI have. They are readily available off the shelf from companies like Henri Lloyd or Musto & Hyde. Make it out of Goretex so that it is comfortable and practicable to wear and actually keeps out the water (which would be a welcome change over the Mk3 foulie) with proper braces so that the trouser length is not a problem, and with an integral safety harness. It would also need some sort of integral head insulation/protection, again available on commercial suits. I noticed that a Dutch ship also at Portland had its upperdeck personnel dressed in orange suits, apparently the multi-fab type, though I would have thought that a two piece is probably better given the circumstances that our sailors are likely to require it for. Above all, it needs to be suitable for the needs of a practical, working seafarer; sadly, it seems that Musto & Hyde and Henri Lloyd can do it, but not our own organisation. But what are the drawbacks of this idea? Well, someone is bound to say that orange would stick out a mile for the upperdeck weapon crews. Indeed it would, so keep the old blue foulies to issue to wear over the top in wartime. Not ideal, but a perfectly workable solution. What about

A SMALL POINT

the issue of these new foulies? Issue them individually at some stage at Raleigh and BRNC, with some form of establishment stocks for the new joiners to avoid excessive wastage from the early volrets. They go in your kit record book with a serial number and you take them around with you for the rest of your career, to be produced for an inspection at some interval or other. It would then be your responsibility to keep them in good repair, for your own benefit, with a NILE rating trained to do proper repairs. Generate some Internal Public Relations (IPR) to get across the idea that these spanking new foulies are not a freebie, but something that could save a life. Some gnome somewhere is bound to raise the question of cost. I am not an expert in these things, but I think one of these suits from a chandler costs about £200, roughly 4 times the cost of the standard issue foulies. But then add in the economies of scale, for the Navy would need tens of thousands, and why not let the manufacturer have his logo on the suit and use the kudos of the RN buying his suits in his advertisements, all for a discount. Of course, there is bound to be some retired admiral out there, who claims to have had ten commands or whatever, exploding with the thought of men dressed in orange suits running around on the upperdeck of one of Her Majesty's warships. To him, I would say we have changed and other more practical priorities are, and quite rightly should be, pre-eminent nowadays. I would wager a fair sum that anyone with a fair amount of sea experience, and even those, like me, who have not, have winced at the thought of falling overboard, and worked out that the likely chances of being recovered entire and whole and perfect are close to zip. There is no reason why the orange suits should not be smart, and though I accept that keeping them clean will not be easy, nowadays most suits are made of impregnated stain resistant materials. When, through fair wear and tear, they get too crabby, one for one exchange them.

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Of course it wouldn't be cheap - nothing worthwhile in life ever is, but what price a life? Compared to the potential cost of liabilities if the Navy was ever found negligent in Health and Safety terms over our existing foulies, perhaps very little. As I said earlier, an orange suit is no guarantee that a man overboard will be picked up, but at least the Service has provided the very best it can for its most valuable assets. In these days, that is becoming an ever more critical aspect. A good quality suit, with clever IPR, could substantially increase the Navy's esteem amongst its personnel at the sharp end, and believe me, such apparently small things as this do matter, because they all blob up into making a man decide to leave the Service. Now, I am not naive enough to suggest that high quality orange foul weather gear will lower PVR rates, but sadly, it is symptomatic of the Navy's approach in many areas that something known to be inadequate will do unless or until forced to the fore (witness foam mattresses). Moreover, the RN should be in the van of using such clothing, working in company with industry to develop new products, in a similar fashion to yacht race crews. On the face of it, I accept that foul weather gear is probably not at present a priority for the Admiralty Board, and that if I was ever to be accused of being a Single Issue Fanatic, foulies are not the most glamorous of subjects to have picked. But I did say that it was a small point. As I said, as an OOW, I known how difficult it is to spot a man in the water in anything other than ideal conditions, so it does slightly jar a nerve. As for the masses, ignorance is probably bliss, and the slick man overboard routine that ships have is reassurance enough to Jack that the ship and their fellow sailors will do the very best they can. In these sort of circumstances, our sailors are worth their weight in gold. It is time, in one small way, that we started treating them as such. A. H. TALBOTT SUB-LIEUTENANT, RN

Baubles, Bangles and Master of Arts Degrees OME in the Royal Navy have long been S ambivalent as to the benefit of Staff Training. Certainly it has never been afforded the respect that the other Services grant it, neither is it a necessary hurdle on the route to fast-path promotion. Nevertheless supporters have been encouraged in recent years by the Centre's hardening line in demanding Stafftrained matelots, and the growing appreciation of the benefits of Staff Training within the Service itself; overall things were on the up. So it is of concern to see the Staff Course indulge in the vainglorious quest for a qualification of dubious value and, arguably, for the sake of keeping up with the light Blue Jones. I refer to the decision by RNSC to re-align the Staff Course in order to qualify for a Master's Degree in Defence Studies. The purpose of Staff Training, as defined by BR 8374, is to 'give Naval staff training and associated higher education'. It presupposes that the 'associated higher education' will be relevant to the Staff officer's future career. The need to broaden the minds of the officers so that they are equipped intellectually to develop policies in a changing world, rather than be mere apparatchiks in the system, is agreed; but should the emphasis be on Defence Studies, or are there more pertinent skills for today's staff officer? And what lessons does an examination of the value of past Staff Training have for us? Ask any gathering of officers employed on the Naval or Central Staffs what aspects of their job they feel least well trained for, and most will deplore their lack of financial and resource management training; ask DNETS where the demand for extra-curricular training is greatest, and the answer will be about the thirst for MDAs, MBAs and Management Options on OU Courses or the like. The Officer corps is alert to the demands of NMS, the ever tightening strings on the Defence purse and the need for financial and resource management skills. Trenchard stated '. . . the one great thing to which you should at all times apply your thoughts and brains is the expansion of the power of material and personnel without increasing either'. RNSC should be following his lead and pursuing Business Skills, rather

than lamely mimicking Bracknell in the pursuit of academic Post Nominal Letters, and if any re-alignment is necessary then it should be towards an MBA, utilising the resources of RMCSICranfield, or a London business school as necessary. Consequently there is dismay at the stance of RNSC, enthroned Canute-like on the Chair of Academia, gazing out to sea at an MA in Defence Studies whilst awash in the tide of financial change. And what of those officers who for years past have studied cold war centred international affairs under the guiding hand of the Department of History and International Affairs (DHIA)? Certainly most found it an interesting intellectual exercise, but few will claim that it has in any way equipped them for today's challenges. Similarly a Master's Degree in Defence Studies will prove interesting, but hardly provide officers with the skills for the year 2000. Let us not forget that for those with an academic bent, and for the few who may be employed in true defence policy desks, there is already the opportunity to study for a Defence Fellowship, or a Master of Philosophy degree in International Affairs at Cambridge. The existence of the DHIA might just have led RNSC to have ignored their own teaching and to have 'situated the appreciation'. No other Staff College finds it necessary to employ directly such an illustrious body of academics. Re-alignment of the Staff Course to an MA however does guarantee full ultilisation of the DHIA for the foreseeable future - or at least until the phrase 'Market Testing' is heard at Greenwich, if such heresy is permitted! Will future generations look back at 1993 in much the same way as today we regard those who resisted the introduction of steam propulsion? 'How could they have been so blind as to ignore the obvious demand for financial and resource management skills?' In the meantime the Pelican, once renowned for feeding its young from its own flesh, is in danger of gorging itself on a diet of junk food whilst tomorrow's staff officers are starved of relevant skills.

Goodbye Mr Pepys? RNR Economics HE Fleet can now look forward to a period of less constraint on spending due to the effects of one aspect of 'Options for Change' that was very swiftly implemented a couple of months ago. I refer of course to the quite far reaching cuts that have been applied to the RNR. If you are reading this at sea and are wondering what cuts and what beneficial effects you would have got my point precisely. The exercise of implementing these reductions took up the full time efforts of several regular and reserve senior officers and I would conservatively estimate the cost (in terms of capitation rate etc) for the regulars alone at about a million pounds (and that excludes the human costs in stress etc) taken up in making what were very hard and difficult decisions courageously pressed for by the Treasury (I presume). This has abolished a few branches, retired early or curtailed service of about 800 or so which should save about a million a year over the next three years in which timescale most would have gone anyway. The total savings will be reduced a little because many will be recalled to fill exercise billets for a couple of years but the annual bounties that will no longer be paid will save about £3,000,000. Overall not a lot of return for a f l m investment of resources, a performance that would not impress managing directors out here in real life! As you may imagine the cuts have caused an awful lot of short term pain and grief, particularly for those whose service was very abruptly terminated. The RNR pyramid has been rightly lopped however in the upper reaches to what is a more appropriate size because augmented effort in the staffs and squadrons at working level is what is required, not more 'management'; however the perceived 'downgrading' of local Commanding Officer ranks (Commanders instead of Captains) has not been that well received in some cases, 'their' Navy has been cut. No one would have disagreed that the RNR was due for some comprehensive review - we live in the real world and know the winds of change that are about out here. Some weeding out of the 30 or so who had been employed on

T

a semi full-time basis in the divisions writing training packages and doing the admin was also accepted. A lot of cuts however fell upon sacrificial lambs of small specialist branches that did not have anyone really senior to fight their corner and where like many of the decisions taken over the last 300 years weight of historical precedence held sway over logic. Some of the operational implications of the RNR cuts will not be realised by those unaware of what the RNR actually does. In effect they removed the only specialist Signature Reduction and half the Intelligence expertise the RN had (notwithstanding so called civilian 'specialists) as well as spare dentists, divers and postmen (I didn't know they existed either so there couldn't have been that many of them to cut!). The chopping of the handful of Chaplains caused the biggest storm, well out of proportion to their numbers and therefore importance in earthly terms but perhaps not so in the light of the influence they wield elsewhere! The cost of dealing with the wrangling however in terms of time and effort probably outweighed the savings their demise has provided tenfold! Beneficat! Brilliant economics and bearing in mind how much of the Andrew runs on a wing and a prayer sometimes, methinks not so wise a move all round. We haven't all turned pagan or bought a job lot of Harry Secombe videos by the way - some loyalties continue even if the cash stops. It was almost as if the irony was to be pressed home when a defence firm exhibition brochure showed their system (a portable measurement range) being operated by a young female officer from a branch that had just been ditched a few weeks earlier! I know the requirement has not gone away and the equipment is brand new so who is going to use it or is some RN branch going to expand by stealth (sorry about the pun)? These cuts, in themselves hardly in line with current trends, are more worrying as they were seemingly finalised before any considerations from the Gulf War permeated down, thus smacking of economic considerations alone. The severing of these supporting arms may have helped to preserve (temporarily?) the RNR's sea going capability but it has detracted from the

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overall capability of the Service as a whole. Just who is going to do all the essential back room and less glamorous things when the balloon goes up? Sorry lads (and lasses now) mail is orf and so is degaussing - best of luck and hope you don't meet any mines. You may be asking where were the RNR eighteen months ago? The answer is lots were there and here doing the 'unseen' bits and that many more were champing at the bit to do the 'seen' bits when called. You would be wise to remember that it was the political will and means that were sadly lacking - not the capability and willingness of the volunteer. Many however will not be around next time so be prepared for some instant learning curves in obscure subjects. Notwithstanding all this the RNR is bearing up despite having lost much of the general admin effort that was perceived as 'fat'. Please remember that all the S2061264, CB musters and dreaded audits etc. etc. is just the same in scope and frequency in the RNR as the RN and we have to do it all in two hours a week average - after, not instead of, a day's work. Not complaining -just stating a point, but we will carry on because we have a long term motivation which is not in any way dominated by finance, in fact quite a few of us lose out substantially in financial terms or have to overcome considerable employer hostility by doing our Reserve time. It is not the emotional aspects of the effects on the RNR's morale that spurred this second tome from the bilge however. It is the cost effectiveness of this whole 'cost reduction ' exercise from the point of effective deployment of the RN's overall resources that I wish to take issue with.

Penny wise Pound foolish? A few months ago (about the time that we were told that we were to have all our allowances cut to the bone (ie pay yer own fare, audits in yer own time etc)) we were told via the national media that the new AOR was three years late and £60,000,000 over budget - no real reason given but I imagine that a lot of the trouble arises over the traditional pragmatic RFA design tradition having to come to terms with the intransigent dictates from the prima donnas of the weapons systems brigade. Another I suspect

is that problems were 'dealt with' at meetings, rather than someone actually taking responsibility: no doubt well structured and reported but seemingly ineffectual at preventing the appalling results. Whatever the reasons, in project engineering terms that is quite abysmal and totally unnecessary and yet I see no heads impaled on the Great Gate of Foxhill or rivers of blood running down Prior Park, just this merciless savaging of the volunteers instead. In company with a very significant number of other ex RN and RNR people I do a lot of work in the offshore design industry. At the time the AOR announcement was made I completed some work on a fast track North Sea Platform design that will be pumping oil within three years of completing the conceptual design - and I venture to suggest left to the RFA alone so would the AOR have been. If an offshore platform installation does not meet its dates, 'windows' for weather and heavy lift will be missed and losses due to lost production and second attempts will be massive. The very much reduced margins in the North Sea do not allow sloppy economics either; the oil industry does not throw money around any more. Offshore design and project management is a hard, uncompromising environment to work in; however it is also rewarding, not just financially but in terms of professional achievement too. That £60,000,000 thrown down the drain with the AOR would keep most of the RNR going for two years or more, including the dozen and a half ships. Indeed the most expensive bit is the cost of them and the permanent staff 'instructors'; we do not actually cost a lot at all and the figure above would keep us going for about 10 years. If you wanted to save real money on the RNR let us use the RN ships during the 6-8 weeks a year those very expensive assets are sitting in base ports to let the ship's company go to Butlins. Why is it that we have got one group of British engineers who can get oil platforms delivered to time and cost (better than anyone else I might add) and another who cannot get it done with ships for the RN? After all we have been building ships for longer than 30 years (the 'age' of the North Sea Industry). I am sure that the intelligence, motivation and loyalty of both

GOODBYE MR PEPYS?

groups is equal - indeed I would suggest that the RN's design agencies have on balance better qualified people, so why oh why such a mess? The Pepys legend I think the causes have their roots in history. Our friend Mr Nott said recently that the RN was the least cerebral of the three services the reason for axing the couple of dozen intelligence officers to preserve the couple of hundred seamen? Going to sea is seen, quite rightly up to a point, as the prime function of all the RN and RNR but we have to recognise that there is a lot of effort involved in getting there, much of which goes unrecognised especially by the Seaman branch ever since they no longer had to get several hundred square furlongs of bedlinen to hang out to achieve it. We have traditionally handed most of the support functions to others. Belatedly I have been reading Pepys. This burst into wordprocessing was spurred when I discovered his sudden and quite amazing progress from being a landowner's PO Writer to Controller and Chief of Fleet Support in one virtually overnight, so quickly that I thought at first I had missed a few chapters! I think the way in which he achieved this was:a. Being in the right place at the right time, his boss was on the right side at the Restoration. b. The 'officer corps' were quite happy to let him do it as it was boring non operational work while they got on with the Yo Ho bits. c. The Navy was then just starting to achieve respectability and was eager to enhance its organisation and hence respectability. Not much has changed. The system Pepys initiated took the burdens of the minutae of procurement and support off the shoulders of those at the 'sharp end' in return for a steady remuneration and the comfortable feeling that the likelihood of finding themselves in a wood or tin floating bath or sewer pipe with some ungentlemanly person shooting at them was very small. The problem is that this produces two diametrically opposite and mutually exclusive

47

cultures. One wants to go off and operate, freed from the burden of the costing and organisation and the other is quite happy to sit in the background and do that bit as long as they are out of range of the nasties. Mr Pepys concentrates on his administration, committees, costings plans and accounting while everyone goes off to sea (or Gosport). He has developed a finely tuned system of management information so that parliament knows exactly what has been spent that year and on what. Apportioning, reviewing and fighting over slices of financial cake takes up a great deal of time in Pepysland to make sure that everything is properly accounted for. Time for real accounting Before the so called end of the Cold War much of the raison d'etre for the Services went unsaid (protection of trade, defence of the realm etc). While enthusiasm for the Services is still prevalent in the media and public emotion, especially post Corporate, so is the expectation for the peace dividend. The historical justifications for expensive development projects cuts less and less ice with the purse holders and Joe Public who thinks that the balance of world peace can be held with River Gunboats, Enfield 303s and Tiger Moths. This is made worse by the passing on of the generation of people in politics and the civil service with war experience who 'understand'. With no perceived threat the current young turks see no reason for most of what we see as contingency for what could happen. They simply have to balance books for this year and by the time next year comes they have moved on and in any case are not the ones likely to be shot at. This is not only true in the Treasury but throughout the Ministry. Financial restraints, applied according to the perception of those with control of the budgets, reign supreme. 'But we have now got accounting' you say, and I am sure it is causing maximum nausea everywhere (it had better be - if it's only the RNR that is getting it then watch out on my next tome!). However the accounting that the RN has seems to be split up to ensure that only the trivia is able to be addressed; after all does the Flotilla Commander have control over what he buys in terms of new vessels and aircraft or is it just

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fuel and stationery? All the big decisions go on in Pepysland. Apparently from now on all non essential spending has to go and the axe is poised in all sorts of places. I always thought that if spending is not essential then it should not have been authorised in the first place and if it was essential then but not now, then have the through life effects of postponing maintenance, rebuilding and investment been properly costed? No one likes to see money wasted but applied negatively, financial accountability can be the greatest excuse for not doing anything ever invented - and I detect that sort of ethic is being imposed upon us. One oil company had a rush of blood to the head when the oil price collapsed four years ago and stopped all upgrade investment, planned maintenance and refurbishment offshore. Within two years their platforms had virtually stopped producing and it has cost mega bucks to get it all going again. That is the sort of thing accountants, if left unchecked, come up with. It seems a stupid thing to do now, and to a lot of the engineers in the oil company at the time it seemed stupid, but no-one listened. We seem to account year by year by capital expenditure alone in Pepysland. The budgets are apportioned out largely following the patterns of the past. This means that the system grinds on, everyone fighting their corner for money for capital expenditure (R&D, procurement, baked beans etc) largely divorced from any assessment of the relative necessity with respect to the threat or the through life costs, not because of any intention to avoid it but because of the constraints of the annual costings and the time it takes to get a slot on the estimates for future spends. Some degree of stability is required, 1 grant, but I think things have become distorted. What actually happens in Pepysland is that the squeaky wheels get the grease and historical big spenders being first in line hoover up the money. Long Term Costings take a long time to change and if you were down for big whacks you will still get relative big whacks after the cuts. Yet if we had done our homework we would know what was necessary to improve the Fleet's capability (through procurement or modification) and have a ready made list of

priorities. I don't see any evidence that we do yet, and those working hard to introduce such methods are having to push hard and uphill. By the system of voting money by Type of Pepysland Function (R&D, Procurement, Training, Clothing etc) rather than by Operational function (eg Area defence requirement) or even by Type (SurfaceISubmarinelFAA) Mr Pepys can keep a weather eye on things all the better but the person in the front line with an appreciation of the requirements and more importantly an appreciation of the shortfalls cannot divert funds where they are most needed; and those in the parts of Pepysland that are trying to do their best have a misty view of the front line problems. The operational commander cannot personally fund a programme to get rid of a stupid problem that he knows that stops his squadron of shipslaircraft for 30 days a year but as a consolation he can do something about excessive wastage on oranges for the sports teams or some other minor expenditure of the Parkinson's Law variety. Other things have to wait for the cries of help to be heeded by someone else quite remote and not under any real obligation to anything about it! Often replies to heartfelt agonies are that there is no money to do anything about the problem. That is simply not true; what they mean is there is money (no MOD department has no money), but it is being spent on something that they from their perspective genuinely think is more important. Frankly too many people have a say in what priorities are and the wide variety of perspective and accountabilitiesmake it unlikely that what is needed appears. The fog is enough to prevent any blame being attached to anyone if a real crumbles happens because no single person has responsibility for it all. The 'system' has too long a chain of people increasingly remote from the experience of staying up all night trying to fix things and getting it in the neck from 'Father' and therefore the motivation to make sure it never happens again. To take as an example of the result of all this, the Commanding Officer in an RNR unit cannot choose whether to send people to training or to tarmac the car park and the latter happens because those people in the tarmac division of

GOODBYE MR PEPYS?

Pepysland put in their long term costings for it and they still have their funds, even though 'across the board' there has been a notional cut. As an M E 0 I had no money to sort out the stupid little things on my machinery; after all I lived with it for 24 hours a day. Yet I could have gone to that design authority section on leaving the ship and written submissions for something to be done; and then it probably would have been. As an M E 0 I was on the wrong side of the tracks; Mr Pepys thinks he knows best but in many cases he does not. It is not all Mr Pepys' fault however. The 'system' until now has also not allowed those who have been users to see just how much it all costs, after all we have all 'proffed' something at some stage and a culture of the magic self-replenishing stores and the morning watch bacon sandwich creation device in the galley has grown up at sea. Frankly we have had it easy until now and we must become aware of how much everything costs and not just the bits we have to account for either. If we really knew just how much things cost we would soon learn to live without the nice to have. Consider conventional boats on frigates for an example. I think that if the user had actually to pay for them - and associated equipment and manpower - out of a budget and was faced with a choice of buying and maintaining or hiring locally only when needed we would have lost them and used the money for extra weapons before Suez rather than as a result of Corporate! What we need is a system that looks at the total cost of providing all operational and non operational functions. If unreliable equipment is a big cost driver then the 'cost effective' apportionment of R&D to fixing it can be identified and implemented by one organisation - not a whole host of committees. Sometimes however costs perceived at the front end as being exhorbitant shrink into insignificance alongside others in the wider picture. Perhaps prohibitive development costs for an alternative to save operating costs make it easier to put up with what you have (when you are told). In this way we would get at the big 'uns first and leave the little 'uns to later. But at least everyone would know and understand. In the current organisation all is

49

relative and all is confusion. If the philosophy of true cost effectiveness had been in place then one thing is for certain: we would not have wasted so much effort hacking the 'soft target' of the RNR to save a relative pittance. No one seemed to be overly concerned at wasting millions over the years constantly repairing Leander frigate generators probably because it was a bit technical and we preferred to listen to the man in Pepysland who said it couldn't be made better rather than giving him the money to 'fix it' and strict instructions not to come back until it was.

Engineering standards I think another aspect of the problem is that we have become 'adjusted' to low expectations from our equipment and systems. Engineering has undergone a fundamental revolution over the last 25 years. The old heavy and inefficient generation of machinery and equipments have gone. Lovely to look at but prohibitive in costs, old steam engines were limited by the fatigue limits of the poor blighters who had shovel the coal or, even when that was replaced, by boiler cleans and leaking joints. If we get design and manufacture right it works for far longer than our grandfathers would have believed possible with minimal attention and servicing. Cars with 20,000 miles service intervals are now coming on to the market yet it was not that long ago that 1,000 miles was the limit before the grease gun (grease gun?!?) was reached for. Materials are lighter and yet stronger and large scale engineering has been able to take advantages of scaled up techniques previously limited to small ones. For example, railway coaches are made from half a dozen extruded sheets welded to form a very strong tube in a fraction of the time it took to make them 15 years ago using methods little changed from the stage coaches of the 1800s. ~ h e s eadvances offer superb prospects but also require much more investment in R&D and care in design. Put in other words it means that much more effort has to be put in the thinking stage. Preconceptions must be challenged and techniques developed to ensure that reliability, maintainability and quality are assured not just assumed will happen. New materials and technology must be explored; we must not let

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Mr Pepys play safe all the time. Some would say that the defence budget cannot afford all that detailed R&D - that is rubbish. Much of the costs in the automotive industries is in tooling for large scale production and the whims of boy racers. We do not have that problem - well, not the first bit. We cannot afford not do do the R&D properly and must never sacrifice quality for timescale to please Mr Pepys. Changes at the concept stage can cost f 1, at the design stage f 10, at manufacturing f 100 and £1000 when in service, and we can all think of instances where things have had to be sorted out in service. Car manufacturers need to get it right or it does not sell and they go bust and don't eat - we need to get it right too. Mr Pepys' ordered system gave birth to the old Admiralty engineering standards which, when properly established engineering standards were rare, stood supreme as examples of good engineering practice. Defined engineering standards however are no longer the preserve of the Admiralty and indeed we should not be reinventing them with defence numbers except for areas that are specifically unique and actually there are not that many of them. I am talking about quality engineering not quality documentation. The need for a full time organisation to write and be custodians of engineering standards purely for us has diminished save in those few unique areas. Yet we still have a large effort deployed in developing 'specialist' equipment designs some of which are designated 'for future fleet' without any specific real requirement and many are just adaptations of commercial equipment. We can specify the duty, the environment and let the manufacturer demonstrate he has done it, not sit on his shoulder while he is trying to think. We should be putting our effort in to getting that specification right and realistic. I remember placating an irate manager who made several tens of thousand parts for the automotive industry per week and had received a pompous delegation from Pepysland who told him how he was to make their 200. We should flow with this river and redeploy our design resources into an important thinking process that recycles informed experience at a faster rate than at present whereby it has to

overcome the hurdles of ship-squadron-base port-fleet staff-CFS-Ship Section-Specialist Section-DRA-manufacturer chains. This leads to engineers being meeting attenders and too busy to address the critical technical detail of the subjects. How much simpler it would be if each flotillaltype commander was in charge of all aspects of his area of responsibility from beans and bullets to conceptual designs for the future. He (or she) would be responsible (and accountable) for providing a capability at a stated readiness and reliability and left to get on with it. If this smacks of privatisation to you then I remind you of our roots pre Pepys - it was not my idea to suggest that this might develop into a 'franchise' system when I set out but it seems a logical step! In fact not so very different from the ship project I served in - no one understood us because everything was smaller and used different materials and we were left to get on with it! Ordered administration has the aura of authority and respect. The problem is that that has become a bigger priority than sorting out the detail of getting the engineering right. It was not really a problem in Pepys' day because what passed for engineering remained the pure black arts of the bosun and shipwright and they were left to it (and one suspects they were fully exposed to the wrath of any dissatisfied customers on their return). There must have been a very short feedback loop - QA was swift and brutal no doubt!! NASA have recognised that there has been no single successful mission that took over seven years to conceive and deliver. Apollo took five from inception to landing on the moon. Those taking longer get bogged down in their own inertia. We are in that state of inertia now and have been for some time. We need a cultural change and accounting for travel and light bulbs is not it. When a large problem arises the action taken is usually to instigate a well structured research and development and get well programme and that sets in motion a process that itself becomes the prime mover and not the aim. I was very lucky to serve with the last of the wartime generation in Bath and in a project that was one

GOODBYE MR PEPYS?

of the last to have authority for all the aspects of the ships and the R&D facilities (and hence a grip on priorities) and not merely tasked with co-ordinating the dictates of all the 'specialists'. We had a few major problems, one of which had been going on for seven years and this had resulted in a (well minuted) 'get well' programme, R&D for alternatives (very nice for the equipment specialists) and the nightmare scenario of shoehorning a completely different equipment in. Believing that all engineering problems are due either to lack of lubrication, adhesion or supervision (or all three) and digging up of all the available literature on the subject, doing a few sums to see if the system could be adapted, a morning's trials in the shore test facility run by an old carrier watchkeeping partner in creative feedwater accounting was all that was needed to solve the problem and it all died away. In fact it was the 'three turns of a nut' solution that I referred to in my last dit. The modification procedure however took two years! Mr Pepys must have time to do things right. I ask the question - is it the result or the procedure we need?

Sorting it out The Pepys approach to that problem did not work but getting the books out and getting down to detail did. OK we were lucky but another class did a complete redesign to solve the same symptoms (did they have to?). I think that a fundamental culture change is due. We should be concentrating efforts in solving problems we have that are costing us dear and not stopping until the answer is found, and not breaking off for writing minutes. Tackle the engineering problems at the detailed level and let Mr Pepys wait for once. Instead of concentrating on budgets for each department in Pepysland in isolation we must cost the provision of functions and all the aspects of achieving them. We must find what is expensive, how much it is costing and how much it is cost effective to spend on stopping

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the rot and then spend to stop it rotting. We may not get instant savings but unless we get a handle on this we will never get it right. Mr Pepys may worry that he doesn't know what is going on but engineering common sense suggests it will not be any worse. Hacking insignificancies like the RNR travel budget was easy and visible and in the grander scheme of things totally ineffectual. It may have got somebody some brownie points but in the overall scheme of things achieved absolutely nothing at all and, worse, used resources that could have made real savings if deployed properly. I may be out of touch but soft targets were never in the tradition of the Royal Navy. Any system that perceives that concentrating on one tiny part of the service costing relative peanuts would have any noticeable effect on the efficiency of the whole must surely now be totally discredited. It is akin to worrying about the coffee machine in the living quarters of an oil platform when the main process system is not-working. So goodbye Mr Pepys, your overwhelming neurosis for balancing books above all other considerations is only part of the story and while you have served us well in the past the methods applicable to a 17th century landowner are a little out of date for us now. When we have the new order we shall need some form of independent (commercially minded) body to vet occasionally what is going on - people qualified in the professions and experienced in industry to audit the whole process on an occasional basis. It already exists - it is called the RNR. To give an example of the talent we attract (discounting near geriatrics like me) a fleetboard recently for Sub Lt counted bamsters (including one near to becoming QC), PhDs, and other dedicated people with sound professional careers. Would they not be a useful auditing capability? I have also just read Machiavelli -watch this space! STEAMTRAP

It's that Word Again (Logistics) OMMODORE Craig's judgment (NR, C Jan. '92) that logistics took 50% of his command attention in the Gulf and Falkland conflicts and his inclusion of logistics as a principle of war, intimates that this function of war must be high on the agenda of any commander who seeks success at sea. The recent notification that a Naval Support Command is to be constituted from Departments and Directorates that traditionally resided in different Board areas of responsibility suggests that logistics in its widest sense - the practical art of moving and sustaining a naval force is moving to the forefront of current naval strategic thinking as the fallout from economic and political change arising from the cessation of the Soviet Empire forces a fundamental reappraisal of our future defensive posture. Perhaps it is thus opportune to attempt to emulate Commodore Craig and to delineate what I believe are the relevant logistic principles in an endeavour to show the inter-action that is necessary to provide successful logistic support to a Fleet.

Continuity The ideal logistic support activity that must be in situ is that the procurement chain for materiel should be a constant process of order and reorder to produce a high level of support to all equipments to ensure meeting eventualities, planned or otherwise. Maximising this aspect enables the logistic pipeline to be effective and cost efficient. Disruption in this area of supply will if permitted, penetrate into all facets of support activities and will be detrimental to the Fleet's capability. A rolling programme of continual replenishment of the Inventory to sustain future requirements (known or unforeseen) provides a secure foundation to develop Fleet initiatives. The present financial limitations inhibit the provisioning parameters from being maximised and increasingly necessitate random judgments being made to tailor purchases to cash limits. These expedients that are currently enforced upon provisioning calculations will be reflected in declining availability of many ranges of items in the future and no other indicator is necessary to illustrate

the need for continuity in this sphere of logistics. Continuity - a long term planned procurement loop based upon accurate expenditure and forward analysis of future needs - is absolutely critical to Fleet operational capabilities.

Timing The fog of war will invariably produce uncertainty and an inability to plan for every contingency, but logistic resources must be controlled to produce the maximum gain from their issue to meet tactical or strategic aims. Of all the ingredients needed to ensure success, timing is probably the most complex to attain, especially when attempting to determine future requirements and their distribution, but this activity is vital as it is this that produces flexibility to the Commander's short and medium term intentions. Timing embraces all aspects of the logistic support chain judgments from when to buy, to issue, to provide outfits, to move forward, to collect, etc. Effort spent determining the control of time in the logistic loop will always produce dividends that will enable a Commander to exploit situations. Economy No military leader has ever been supplied with the amount of materiel he deemed adequate for success. Resources are finite and it is essential that materiel is concentratedlhusbanded to achieve success. Economy matters as the increasing sophistication of weapon systems or hull equipments necessitate long lead manufacture that, irrespective of manufacturing performance, can rarely reduce lead times significantly to produce more in less time than standard, unless radical innovation in build can be introduced. The German initiative in the construction of U-Boats is a prime example. There is a direct linkage between timing, continuity and economy in the successful supply of stores to the Fleet, which if not achieved. are very likely to constrain a Commander. The least expensive, but equally the most effective and efficient in resource terms, means of sustaining a military force must be chosen, irrespective of how attractive an alternative solution might appear. For Desert Storm, it would have been

IT'S THAT WORD PiGAIN (LOGISTICS)

far better if the pre-stored and pre-positioned merchant ships in the Indian Ocean had had a strength twice as large as they did, with a commensurate growth in capacity to produce far more immediate on station reinforcement rather than the extremely costly airbridge that had to be enacted to make good the deficiencies. Presumably budgetary constraints determined the size of this pre-deployed reserve, but whatever the calculation it seemingly did not take into account the resultant costs of having to produce a huge airlift to make good the eqJipment shortcomings. There seems to be a correlation between short term expediency that appears fiscally attractive, and the consequential penalty that costs far more to rectify matters in later years. Dare I mention the RAF and its trials and tribulations with its airborne radar aircraft procurement when a political judgment intervened. or indeed the industrial/~olitical judgment seemingly made on the placiAg of the initial order for the AOR?

Distribution Naval warfare demands distribution of its forces with a subsequent concentration of force at a crucial point to achieve success. To sustain such forces, logistic support must be as flexible as the units it maintains. While allocation of materiel into distinct stockpiles overseas or at sea is costly, it has to be balanced by the factor such distribution produces to the preparedness and efficiency of the force it supports and the flexibility such immediate support provides to the Commander. With onboard outfits in the Fleet valued at something approaching £180m, they are an easy target for achieving immediate stock reductions to meet arbitrary Treasury stock reduction targets. Irrespective of their consun~ption(or otherwise) whilst deployed. such assets ensure immediate availability and should enable the hull to remain at sea for 'x' days in a war scenario and meet anticipated war consumption rates. However, where the movement of such materiel is slow or even dormant, economy demands a reappraisal of the technical judgments that placed them onboard. Consumption rates, based on a unit. batch and class. need to be scrutinised and any trend acknowledged. More emphasis on analysis is needed to avoid arbitrary removal that could be

53

detrimental to the operational status of the ship or submarine, especially when the consumption was based upon peace time deployments and expenditure and possibly totally unlike its envisaged operational profile. Control of dispersed assets is essential but it is a moot point how far to the rear the operational Commander's remit should run. Whilst control of their immediate logistic organisation is paramount to any operational Commander. command should be relieved of all possible logistic details without prejudicing their control of it. Subsequent replenishment of forward units should ideally be by automatic resupply of bulk loads tailored by experience (and cost!) to the needs of the unit or units concerned, to reduce the strain on SO(S) personnel. Where the logistic support necessitates tri-service supply, that logistic avenue should be rationalised as a single channel for supplies to provide ease of control and management. Correct dispersal of assets provides two important adjuncts to a Commander: flexibility, in that it can provide opportunity to a force whilst an incorrect disposition will prejudice operations by its reduction of options, whilst another factor provided by correct stock distribution, is feasibility, and the provision it imposes on alternative tactical options. It is thus imperative that the constitution of bulk RFA or STUFT loads be tailored to reflect the supporting force in all respects and that the outfit can provide an extra dimension by carrying additional items that could well enhance the effectiveness of the deployed force, but again. within the bounds of a specific budget for that purpose.

Summary It is suggested that the constituents required to conduct successful logistic support at sea are continuity in provisioning replacement materiel. timing (that embraces planning), economy allied to efficiency, distribution (producing flexibility and feasibility). These are the basic principles that need to be present so that they can combine to produce the mechanics whereby 'logistics' enables a Fleet to deliver potential or actual force to critical points at crucial moments to achieve tactical or strategical objectives. The

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IT'S THAT WORD AGAIN (LOGISTICS)

identification of the place of contact resides elsewhere, outside the ambit of logistic management, and should be based upon intelligence and strategic considerations. However, before that judgment can be accurately determined the third prong of the trident, logistic capability, needs to be evaluated to ensure the success of any mission.

L'envoi In a letter to Lady Hamilton, 13 March 1801, Nelson wrote, 'I hate your pen and ink men: a fleet of British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe: they always speak to be understood and generally gain their point: their arguments carry conviction to the breasts of our enemies.' That voice has on occasions been weakened by political and financial considerations, which when allied to constant technological change, has left the Royal Navy under strength and underequipped to face its enemies. With an evolutionary change under preparation that in scope is akin to the demise

of the Navy Board in June 1832, the onus will reside with the Naval Support Command to delineate logistic principles within its organisation and its software. However, if that organisation is crippled by acute, even arbitrary, financial limitations imposed by the Treasury (another 10 year no war rule?) then the majority of the Fleet in being will become no more than a motley collection of hulls, swinging around buoys denuded of capability with equipments and outfits missing from constant storerob activities to sustain a diminishing number of hulls on high priority missions. This in war, becomes the Price of Admiralty, a penalty traditionally paid by Sailors for the inadequate funding of a peace time Navy by politicians who studiously ignore the dictates of history and the penalties it imposes upon the innocent. Enough blood has been paid in this century alone into that particular ledger to ensure that the consequence should never be repeated.

RFA Bacchus in the Fleet Train FA Fort Grange, 30,000 tonnes Persian R Gulf 1991; RFA Bacchus, 3,000 tons Leyte Gulf 1945. Different gulf, different scale, -

-

same task - support of RN ships. The modern concept of logistic support of Out-of-Area operations is for large, multipurpose replenishment ships moving in company with Task Groups. RFAs Fort Grange and Fort Austin carry stocks of drummed oils, ammunition, food, water, stores and machinery spares for supply simultaneously to front-line warships at sea. They have a complement of 280 of whom some are RN personnel for operation and maintenance of embarked helicopters and the rest are RFA officers and seamen and some 34 or so civilians for the store and supply activities. For internal stores handling they have fork lift trucks, lifts and cranes, and for transferat-sea operations they have high-performance jackstay rigs and helicopters. For self-defence of these valuable naval units, albeit that they are registered as merchant ships, they are provided with air surface radars, 20 mm guns and decoy systems. Their sophisticated communications systems conform with both naval requirements and with international merchant shipping legislation, and include a satellite system. By comparison with these sophisticated units the arrangements in supply ships of the British Pacific Fleet Train in 1945 now appear inordinately crude and simple. Yet for their day they were quite effective.

The British Pacific Fleet The scale of operations then was completely different. The British Pacific Fleet, the largest fleet of RN ships ever assembled, consisted of 150 ships from battleships and aircraft carriers to submarines and minesweepers, all of which had to be supported some 4,000 miles from the nearest shore base. And it was there and then that the concept of a Fleet Train was developed. John Winton in The Forgotten Fleet (1969) has written 'the story of the British Pacific Fleet 1944-45' and he included a chapter on the assembly and role of the fleet train which by the end of the war consisted of 60 ships tankers, naval. victualling. armament and air store issuing ships, repair ships, water carriers,

salvage vessels, hospital ships and a headquarters flagship, all under the command of Admiral Douglas Fisher, Rear Admiral Fleet Train (RAFT) (who later became Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Supplies). One of these ships, RFA Bacchus, a Naval Store Issuing Ship (NSIS) and water distilling ship, was the only ship of that specialisation to be present during the whole operation, from 1944 when support ships were being gathered on the East Indies Station right through to the assembly of the Pacific Fleet Train in March 1945 and to the end of the war in August 1945. Some detail of how she was equipped and how she carried out her task may be a useful contribution to the history of that unique event in the annals of the Royal Navy, to complement and augment the overall account given by John Winton. Here then are personal recollections from the Naval Store Officer of Bacchus which may serve also to bring out the contrast with the huge ultra-modern multi-purpose replenishment ships which accompany the modern naval task forces.

Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands 'Undine, we've finished your storing, will you leave now please'. First Lieutenant of Undine: 'We expected to be alongside you for an hour and it's been only 15 minutes; I can't tell the Captain, he's only just gone below for lunch'. Barchus: 'I'm sorry but I need the side for my next storing'. In that 15 minutes ten tons of naval stores had been passed across, a replenishment storing for a ship which had not seen a port for several months. Before the destroyer Undine had come alongside at 1300 on 23 April 1945 the foredeck of Bacchus had been completely covered with a mass of stores assembled ready for immediate transfer. There were coils of cordage and steel wire rope with strops through and ends seized together, drums of oil with drum hooks ready rigged, drums of paint on cargo trays, cargo nets bulging with crates and boxes, wicker hampers full of flags, rags, cotton waste, coir fenders, gas cylinders; all had strops and slings and eyes prepared completely ready to receive the hook of the ship's derrick as it swung down for

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RFA BACCHUS IN THE FLEET TRAIN

the next lift. Everything possible had been done in advance to make the transfer from ship to ship in the shortest time. The supply rating had climbed over immediately the ship was secured; he had settled down in the deck office to sign the thick batch of receipt notes and had subsequently emerged on deck saying he had to 'check the stores' and was disconcerted to find they had all gone; he was told he had better get back on board his own ship as she was just about to cast off. A similar load of stores had been assembled on the 'tween deck ready for the hatch covers to be removed and the stores hoisted over the side. A third ship's replenishment load was ready again in the lower hold. We told Undine's First Lieutenant that we needed the ship's side cleared so that we could bring our two boats alongside to load the second ship's stores and take them to her as she lay alongside a tanker, and then we should be ready for the third ship we were due to store that afternoon to come alongside when she in turn was free. This operation has been described in some detail as it epitomised the sort of activity in the fleet train at that time. Compared with modern replenishment methods there were no neat unit loads, no pallets, no fork lift trucks, no inboard lifts, no electric high-speed winches, no cranes, no helicopters. The assembly of these replenishment loads had taken many hours' work in advance - selecting small items from drawers and racks, weighing, counting, parcelling, labelling; hand-carrying from no. 3 hold over the deck to no.2 as there was no through passage below decks; screws, nails, split pins, shackles, radio and radar valves and components, signal flags, inflammable liquids, oils, paints, electric cable, cordage large and small - the myriad of items listed by ships' supply staffs on their demand notes over a threeor four-month period at sea. Main replenishment period The context of this particular activity was a main replenishment of the entire task force of the British Pacific Fleet. They had returned to Leyte Gulf in the Philippine Islands on 23 April after a long period of operations with the American fleet in the forward area against the Japaneseheld island of Okinawa, In the words of John

Winton, 'TF57 had been continuously at sea for thirty-two days, longer than any other British fleet since Nelson's day'. Careful plans had been made in the fleet train for their arrival. Each ship of the task force as it arrived at 1300 on that auspicious day was to proceed to an appointed anchorage or alongside an oil tanker or armament, victualling or naval store supply ship or repair ship. After one hour designated ships were to complete their initial replenishment and move to their next operation, and again after a further hour. All storing and fuelling operations were to be finished in five days and then there was to be a complete shut down for the fleet to rest and recuperate for a further two days before they were due to leave for further operations in the forward area with the American fleet. At preliminary planning meetings Bacchus had been given the task of storing all destroyers and below; cruisers and above here allocated to City of Dieppe, a combined naval and victualling store ship. As Naval Store Officer Bacchus I had been called over to HMS Tyne, the destroyer depot ship and flagship of Rear Admiral Destroyers, to work out detailed plans with RAD's staff, from which it appeared Bacchus would be required to store up to 25 destroyers and escorts during the five-day period. This was a tall order and would be possible only if we could have the bulk of the ships' demands several days in advance in view of the time required to assemble each ship's requirements. The detailed timing and order of the operation was worked out with SO(Plans) with Undine named as the first ship to be done. and arrangements were made for a destroyer to be detached from the fleet a few days in advance and bring all the ships' demands ahead of the main force's arrival. It was this that enabled Bacchus, working flat out, to be completely ready for Undine and the next few ships in the plan. (It was only later that we learned that SO (Plans) and Undine's first lieutenant were brothers, Baillie-Grohman). Fresh water The supply of fresh water was a major problem at Leyte. Bacchus had been fitted with two distilling plants from the old Resolution of the First World War. She could distil water and

RFA BACCHUS IN THE FLEET TRAIN

store a thousand tons. During the main replenishment period at Leyte she was constantly required to move around the fleet, programmed in with her naval store replenishment activities, to supply much-needed distilled water. For this reason she tended to be better known as a water boat or distilling ship than a naval store issuing ship.

Special tasks Throughout the seven weeks from 26 March to 13 May that the fleet train remained in Leyte Gulf there were frigates and sloops continually arriving and sailing as they escorted fuel tankers to and from the forward area. Bacchus looked after these ships as well. One evening a frigate 'new' to us dropped anchor a couple of miles away. I went across by boat and asked the Warrant Engineer who acted as Supply Officer whether he needed any naval stores. 'Naval Stores here? We haven't seen a port for three months. But where are they?' I explained that I was 'the local NSO'; the supply assistant was sent for and told to bring his demands; he produced a thick batch of demand notes he had been preparing over the months. I glanced through them and said I could do most of that, but the engineer said, 'That would be fine, but we are leaving at first light'. I said I would bring the stores alongside at two in the morning if he could take them on board then. After some feverish activity back in Bacchus and with our young store assistants thoroughly exhausted we took the boat alongside again filled with their stores. They woke the crane driver from his sleep on the deck and hoisted the tons of stores on board with surprise and gratitude. One destroyer, Ulster, had come in with the task force with a hole in her side from a suicideplan attack. When they had removed several bodies from the engine room for burial at sea, the repair ship HMS Resource was given the job of shoring up the side. The Warrant Shipwright came over to ask about timber. He was somewhat distraught because it would take his whole stock of timber, and asked whether we could let him have some. He was shown below where the timber rack in the 'tween deck had been filled to capacity in Sydney, well over Bacchus's proper 'allowance'. He said half of it would do, and could he have that much? He

57

was told that we had brought it all this way for an emergency and this was surely the emergency. He could scarcely believe we meant it until he saw it loaded into his LCM alongside. The fleet was very short of a particular electronic valve or 'tube', called a magnetron, for an American radar set, which we had been unable to get flown out from Sydney or the UK. We made unofficial contact with an American supply ship and when we went the ten miles across the harbour which separated the British and American supply trains we were welcomed and given suppl& of that and other essential shortages most generously. An incident on the return trip across the huge harbour of San Pedro Bay demonstrated one of the dangers of that vast Pacific Ocean. We saw from our motor cutter a water spout from only a few miles away when a black ominous cloud descended in a great swirl and sucked up the sea from a wide circle to form a tall dark column of water joining sea and cloud, twisting and writhing and weaving about for several minutes until it split in the middle, the top half being sucked up right into the cloud itself and the bottom half splashing back into the sea in a huge widespread spray. It was a frightening prospect to realise that if our puny boat had been closer it too would have been sucked into the air and dashed into small pieces.

Air freight DC3 Dakotas, flown by RAAF officers fresh back from bombing raids over Berlin, and still fitted with parachute-dropping rails in the cabin and canvas bucket seats against the sides, were ferrying supplies up from Sydney at a peak rate of seven a day. They called at Manus and the Palau Islands (which still, we were told, contained Japanese snipers in the hills who shot at these planes if they flew too near) on their way to and from Leyte. They landed and disembarked their loads at a US air strip at the local village of Tacloban from where shore working parties distributed the stores around the fleet train by LCM. Bacchus was occasionally called upon to act as 'inward shipper' for stores for ships of the fleet not at the time in harbour. One Dakota arrived filled with buoyant rubber hose for fuelling-at-sea operations by the fleet tankers, and another full of foam compound

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RFA BACCHUS IN THE FLEET TRAIN

for the aircraft carriers to put out fires on flight decks resulting from kamikaze attacks.

Kamikaze We heard that when the Japanese kamikaze suicide aircraft landed on the wooden flight decks of US aircraft carriers the decks were burned and destroyed and the carriers had to return to America for repair; on British carriers with their armoured steel flight decks the crew hosed the deck with foam compound, pushed the remains of the aircraft over the side with jeeps and carried on flying their aircraft on and off. Foam compound became scarce and at one stage Bacchus had to collect all the foam compound in ships of the fleet train and load it on the next tanker going to the forward area. Radio silence Radio silence was maintained and all signal traffic was by 10-inch signalling projector or aldis lamp. GXYB, the call-sign of Bacchus, was frequently observed across the harbour as ships signalled additional requirements. On one occasion a US Navy supply ship passing our anchorage signalled, 'Shoot ya breeze' which we surmised meant that the signalman just wanted to chat with our signalman. RAFT'S message While at Leyte RAFT sent a message to the fleet: Replenishment This paper is of no interest to anyone who is not anxious to avoid wasting men and time, or getting the fleet to sea quickly, after a replenishment period. 2. It is very dry reading, and deals with such things as 'demands', which many of you know as little about as I do (or did). 3. But this logistic business, which affects us all, has got to be faced - and if Flag and Commanding Officers will give a few minutes to reading what I've got to say their time will not be entirely wasted. 4. Don't read the appendix to this; I didn't write it and I don't expect you'll understand it either. Hand it, therefore, with befitting ceremony, to your technical officers.

5. Have you heard this one? HMS Undine went alongside the Bacchus and received three months' replenishment of Naval Stores (about 10 tons weight) in 15 minutes. The assembling of this represented some 15 hours' work, but her demands had been received well in advance and everything was ready to slap on board her when she came alongside. See what cooperation by the customer will do. 6. This one is not so hot though: One big ship with two big funnels sent in 49 demands in l 1 different batches; and one slightly smaller vessel, who also should have known better, sent in 78 demands in 11 different batches. And didn't they complain about the shocking service they received. 7. If you see some snappy American gadget, don't say, 'Please RAFT buy me that'. I am only allowed to get spare parts for things made in the USA, or whatnots 'otherwise unobtainable which are of operational necessity'. (I've already had one large bottle from Admiral Nimitz for asking for a pretty toy - not for myself, but for one of you.) 8. I know you sympathise with oilers, water boats, ammunition ships, etc., trying to come alongside in their (and your) dinner hour. But why on earth can't you all show it practically? The complaints I have had from these wretched ships who are only trying to help - you'd be surprised. 9. And fuelling, too. We can fuel all the fleet some of the time, or some of the fleet all of the time - but we can't fuel all the fleet all the time though we'd love to. 10. We crave your custom - but we need your help - and please don't get the idea that the customer is always right. (Signed) Douglas Fisher Rear Admiral

Bacchus A description of the resources available in Bacchus to carry out her activities may be appropriate here. She was the smallest of the store issuing ships, smaller than City of Dieppe, Fort Colville the air store issuing ship or the armament store

RFA BACCHUS IN THE FLEET TRAIN

issuing ships. She was 3,000 tons with a tripleexpansion steam engine which gave her a speed of 12 knots. The three holds of which number 2 was the main store operations centre had no direct access from one to another. Apart from the ship's derricks with steam-operated winches all humping and carrying below and on deck was done by hand. The crew of 69 included the captain and officers of the RFA service, lascar seamen, Goanese stewards, and five naval store staff headed by a deputy naval store officer who held a temporary commission as Lieutenant Commander RNVR (Special Branch). There were 12 DEMs gunners (for Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships) led by a Leading Seaman, and at times a naval signal rating for lamp work. The defensive armament consisted of an old 4-inch breech-loading gun on the poop, a 12-pounder HAILA gun mounted amidships above the engine room, and four oerlikon guns. For defence against mines she could stream four paravanes from the bow. As the DEMs gunners were insufficient to man all the guns at the same time the ship's Second Officer and the naval store officer volunteered to join the guns' crews, and it was interesting to hear the leading seaman giving crisp orders to these two officers during training and practice shoots on the 4-inch gun and receiving a respectful acknowledgement 'aye aye'. Apart from emergency carley floats and the ship's own lifeboats, only an old open motor lifeboat and a 32-foot motor cutter were carried for store work. She had no specific equipment for transferat-sea operations but was sometimes required to pass emergency stores to escorting vessels while on passage in convoy. On one occasion a cruiser's refrigerating plant had failed and she needed a supply of carbon dioxide to replenish the cooling system. As the convoy and escorts were re-arranged and the cruiser steamed close a line was fired across and a seaman climbed to the foremasthead to carry the line up and secure a snatch block there. As ten C 0 2 cylinders were swung across half a dozen lascar seamen held the heavy line on deck taking it in and paying it out as the ships rolled towards and away from each other. There were no modern

59

jackstay rigs with self-tensioning winches then. This Bacchus was the second of three of that name. She was taken over on the slip at the Caledon Shipbuilding Company, Dundee, in 1936 and modified by shortening the stem which gave her a cut-off appearance and made her sensitive to side winds acting on her high forepeak, particularly as she w a s relatively lightly loaded in her role as an NSIS. Initially a store carrier on the UK-Mediterranean run she was converted to an NSIS in 1941.

Manus, Admiralty Islands After the sevenday main storing period at Leyte the task force sailed again for the forward area on 1 May and City of Dieppe withdrew to Sydney to replenish her victualling stores. Bacchus stayed with the fleet train until she returned to Manus in the Admiralty Islands on 21 May. She had originally arrived at Manus on 13 March when the first elements of the fleet train were being assembled there, and was immediately required to do a 'rush storing' of four flotillas, one destroyer from each flotilla collecting the stores for all, two hours alongside each and taking all they could in the time. During this second period at Manus stocks were replenished by Dakota loads of supplies from Sydney and notably by a chartered merchant fleet auxiliary (MFA) Slesvig which carried among other things a hold-full of grey paint which had to be transferred to Bacchus in one day to enable Slesvig to join a convoy leaving for Sydney. Eniwetok, Marshall Islands The distances from Manus to the fleet's operating area off Japan were so great that a number of oil tankers and supply ships, including Bacchus for her water distilling capacity particularly, were sent forward on 12 July to Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands, to support the fleet with shorter supply lines. They sailed from there for return to Manus on 6 August, the day the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the war virtually came to an end. Soon after that the fleet train - the greatest gathering of supply and support ships in the history of the Royal Navy - began to disperse.

60

RFA BACCHUS IN THE FLEET TRAIN

Exmouth Gulf, Australia More than a year before the Eniwetok exercise a similar forward deployment of supply ships took place on the East Indies station, a forerunner to the fleet train and perhaps an exemplar of it. HMS Illustrious and the American carrier Sararoga with a screen of escorts sailed from Trincomalee to carry out a bombing raid on the harbour of Sourabaya in Java, but fuel and water were needed nearer than Ceylon. An embryo fleet train consisting of six tankers and Bacchus with two cruisers as escort sailed from Trincomalee on 30 April 1944 and arrived at Exmouth Gulf on the North West Cape of Australia on 14 May. The fleet arrived, fuelled, stored and watered and sailed for the operation which took the Japanese completely by surprise as they assumed that a strike force could not mount an attack at that distance from the nearest base in Ceylon. (Indeed there was a rumour that they would come to the conclusion that there were support ships in the Indian Ocean and come out from Singapore looking for us during our two weeks' sail back to Trincomalee.) On 19 May the fleet returned to Exmouth Gulf after the raid, replenished once again with fuel, stores and water and left for return to Ceylon. The support ships were to follow at their slower speed with their two cruisers as escort. Water boat Am amusing incident, but with a moral to it, occured as they were leaving. One cruiser and

the six tankers had left the anchorage and Bacchus, tied alongside the second cruiser, had finished giving her water and was due to leave next with the cruiser following as rear escort. A voice from the cruiser's bridge high above Bacchus hailed: 'Water boat, you can push orf now'. Nothing happened, and, when questioned, our captain explained sotto voce that the side wind was holding the ship with her high forepeak on to the side of the cruiser, and if he let go and went ahead the life boats would be damaged by the cruiser's gun sponsons; the answer was for the cruiser to use her twin propellers one ahead and one astern to swing the two ships together on the anchor cable into the wind. After a few further minutes the cruiser's captain leaned over the wing of his bridge and called down, 'Captain what is the matter?'. Bacchus's captain called back simply, 'The wind is on my starboard bow.' The cruiser captain waved a hand and withdrew into his bridge. Soon there was a thrashing of water astern and both ships swung head to wind. Bacchus let go forward and aft, the wind separated the two bows and she went slowly ahead at an angle to the cruiser. As we left the captain said, 'I will not be called a water boat like a dockyard barge, I am a Master Mariner'. LIONELHALL

Defence Policy 1945-1982 - I11 1979-1983: The election of the Conservative Government to the aftermath of the Falklands campaign HE domestic situation worsened during the period of the Callaghan Government until, following the 'winter of discontent' in 1978179, a General Election returned the Conservative party under Margaret Thatcher to power in 1979. Francis Pym was appointed Secretary of State for Defence, but was replaced by John Nott in 1981. The Conservative party whilst in opposition had vigorously opposed the defence economics of the Labour Government, and one of its first acts on coming to power was to approve a large pay rise to the armed forces with the aims of restoring parity and improving retention, recruitment and morale. This pay rise put an increased load on the defence budget, and to an administration dedicated to reducing public expenditure compensating reductions had to be found elsewhere. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had forcibly reminded the world of the Soviet Union's expansionist policies and its willingness to use military force to achieve its ends, particularly when it considered it could do so safely without the risk of international escalation. The situation was not therefore propitious for any major alterations on defence policy in the early years of the Thatcher premiership. The 1979 and 1980 Annual Statements on the Defence Estimates said little new although making the point that expenditure on defence was not an alternative to more direct benefits such as housing, education and health, but an essential pre-condition to being able to enjoy them in peace. Numbers in the surface fleet, however, were progressively reduced from 1978 onwards, principally by the disposal of older units, the first generation of post war ships such as the Type 12s, 41s and 61s being close to the end of their useful lives. The major decision to maintain the British nuclear deterrent by ordering Trident to replace Polaris was announced in 1980, but otherwise there were no significant changes in the direction of defence policy in the first years of the new government. There was a substantial over-spend of the defence budget, leading to

T

unsatisfactory short term palliatives resulting in serious reductions in activity and in ordering of new equipment. For the Royal Navy drastic cuts in fuel allowances for ships and aircraft and in provision of spares and support in 1980181 led to a reduction in the operational effectiveness of the Fleet. Severe economic pressures continued to cause problems and the costs of the armed forces as constituted could not be met within the defence budget. In January 1981 the newly appointed Secretary of State, John Nott, set out to conduct a radical and far reaching review of defence, starting with a re-assessment of the country's strategic priorities, followed by plans to restructure the armed forces to what he saw as the best shape and size to meet the revised priorities within the allocated budget. A former merchant banker and junior Treasury Minister, he subjected the whole defence scenario to a close financial scrutiny. In the words of the subsequent Defence White Paper ' 'Defence, like other programmes, must be managed in cash terms' and 'We cannot go on as we are. The Government has therefore taken a fresh and radical look at the defence programme'. The process was to be extremely painful for the Royal Navy, and in some measure recalled the problems faced during the 1957 'Sandys' review. However, in 1957 the Royal Navy had successfully demonstrated the need for a substantial east of Suez navy. This time there was no such fall back position. One of the principal reasons underlying the 1981 Defence Review was the steadily escalating cost of equipment. This was no new phenomenon but it had become more marked since the end of the Second World War with both NATO and the Warsaw Pact striving to gain the utmost military benefit from a rapidly advancing technology. A considerable volume of paper was generated on this subject, which became known as the 'Road to Absurdity', the ultimate reducrio ad absurdurn being mathematical projections of escalating costs within a limited budget resulting in a one 'supership' navy. As one senior civil servant trenchantly stated 'no-one would be stupid enough to let it happen', but nonetheless, the

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DEFENCE POLIC

cost escalation factor had led to major reductions in the size of the armed services since the war. There were many facets to the problem, not least the establishment of an average cost escalation factor, where estimates differed between 3 and 8 per cent a year, and whereas the costs of some items rose rapidly, others remained reasonably steady, the real cost of SSNs being an example of the latter. An overall average of 6 per cent in real terms was accepted as a reasonable compromise figure, but the equation was further complicated by attempts to relate the costs and capabilities of older ships with their more sophisticated successors. SDE8l 's comparison of 'like with unlike', (the Leander v. the Type 22), gave an unfair, but influential, picture. There was considerable discussion over whether British equipment was too elaborate but nothing suggested that this was in fact so when the criterion for assessing our own needs must be the efficacy of the potential enemy's equipment. The problem was faced by all countries with modem armed forces, but the smaller arms producing countries, such as Great Britain, found it more acute. As numbers of ships and weapons systems decreased the costs rose out of proportion on the basis of 'the smaller the production run the greater the unit cost'. In particular, research and development amounted at times to almost one half of the total production costs and the desire to achieve technical perfection led to soaring expenses and long delays out of proportion to the benefits accruing from the last few ounces of performance gained. In the past the gravity of the effects of the steady increase in unit costs and the consequent reduction in the size and shape of the armed forces had been partially concealed by the reduction in commitments, although for the Navy the 1966 decision to abandon the fixed wing carrier had been a prime example of escalating unit costs pricing an item out of the market. The 1974175 Defence Review had reduced non-NATO commitments to an irreducible minimum, and by 1981 the only area remaining for change was in NATO. The Secretary of State therefore concentrated on what he perceived as the best means of reshaping the armed forces to meet NATO requirements within the allocated budget, which was set to reflect annual growth of 3 per cent,

possibly involving an increase in the share of the GNP absorbed by defence. Before considering the details of the review it would be as well to look at some of the proposals put forward to ease the cost escalation problem. There was universal agreement on the need to reduce cost escalation, but major difficulties in deciding the measures to be taken. There were no easy solutions in either the short or the long term, the simpler options of reduction of commitments, cutting the tail to benefit the teeth and abandoning over expensive projects (for example Blue Streak and CVAOI), having been almost exhausted. Further options included avoidance of over elaboration in requirements, maximum use of commercial and industrial facilities, collaboration with allies, greater attention to sales potential and spending more on project definition to ensure the best end result. In the longer term, further reductions in ranges of equipments and military specialisation by different countries in different areas of equipment were postulated. The latter solution had the potential disadvantages of a situation of almost total dependence on the USA as the primary arms supplier, and reliance on other nations' opinions as to what Great Britain needed. However, it was seen as the most logical solution if the NATO nations were not to be overwhelmed by the unavoidable increases in costs of advanced technology. The stated Government policy was not to cut defence efforts, but to exploit a substantial increase in budget to enhance front line capability in as many areas as possible, but the current force levels were seen as unsustainable. The defence priorities were assessed as:' a. the independent element of strategic and tactical nuclear forces. The decision to purchase Trident was confirmed, and the operation of the strategic nuclear deterrent was seen as the Royal Navy's first and most vital task. b. The direct defence of the United Kingdom homeland. This had been a low priority for some years, but the importance of the United Kingdom in Alliance support, in the reinforcement of Europe and in maritime tasks was emphasised. More resources were to be devoted to this area.

DEFENCE POLICY 1945-1982 - 111

c. A major land and air contribution on the European mainland, specifically the Central Region. The forward defence of the Federal Republic of Germany was seen as the forward defence of Britain itself. d. A major maritime effort in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel. This relegation to fourth place, which is covered in more detail below, brought forcibly to mind the similar problems in the 50s, when the 'Global Strategy' studies on future nuclear wars saw a relatively less important role for maritime forces. e. Activities beyond the NATO area, so far as resources permitted, both to meet specific British responsibilities and to contribute to world stability. The importance of the defence of the United Kingdom was reflected in increased air defence capability in both manned aircraft, SAM and air defence radar and communications systems, and the intention to expand the Territorial Army. On the naval side, the threat of mining operations was recognised by a commitment to continue the MCMV building programme, and to provide additional hulls for the RNR. Plans for defensive mining, a somewhat neglected aspect of naval warfare, were to continue to exploit the best ways of using this capability. The British contribution in Europe was considered of such importance that it was to continue, despite all financial pressure on the defence budget. BAOR was to stay at the same size, but was to undergo some structural reorganisation. There was to be a considerable reequipment programme, and an enhancement of air defence, and air strike capabilities. It was in the maritime area that the principal changes were to occur in the effort to reduce costs. The Secretary of State stated3 that 'major platforms', such as aircraft and surface ships, were becoming increasingly vulnerable, and that the 'balance of over-investment between platforms and weapons needs to be altered so as to maximise real combat capability'. More resources were to be devoted to 'hitting power and staying power in combat' and less to 'large and costly platforms' a policy which would lead to 'substantial and uncomfortable change in some fields'. The principal victim of this policy was to be the surface fleet, although in terms

63

of maritime warfare it is not clear how the 'hitting power' was to be in the right place if adequate platforms to carry it were not available. The current force structure was too costly to be maintained 'within any resource allocation which our people can reasonably be asked to afford' and the surface fleet, like the carrier in 1966, was seen as the least critical area in which reductions could be made. In the Secretary of State's concept of operations, submarines and maritime air power provided the two most effective maritime weapons systems; in terms of cost effectiveness a surface fleet of the size and sophistication required to meet the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact could not be sustained. He did, however, accept that the surface ship would remain essential for a wide variety of tasks both in peace and war, but its numbers were to be reduced. Sir Henry Leach, who had succeeded Sir Terence Lewin in 1979, was CNS during the Nott Defence Review. The Royal Navy presented a strong case for the need for maritime power in general and the surface fleet in particular but it was not accepted. Sir John Nott publicly remarked some years after the Review that 'he made every effort to obtain rational, analytical and coherent answers from the Royal Navy but normally failed to do so'. Like Dennis Healey some 16 years earlier he found the Navy to have great difficulty in expressing itself and its cause in a format that he found convincing. The proposed cuts were viewed with the utmost dismay and concern by the Royal Navy and on 15 May 1981, Keith Speed, the US of S(RN) and a former naval officer, made a speech in which he publicly deplored the proposals, and called for the maintenance of existing naval strength. Shortly afterwards he was dismissed from his post by the Prime Minister and not replaced. His departure finally marked the end of single service representation at ministerial level, and two functional tri-service junior ministers subsequently replaced the former three single service posts. The results of this shift of emphasis away from the surface fleet were summarised in Cmnd 8288. The new construction programme was to proceed, but maintenance of the current fleet required a massive, costly and continuing programme of refit and modernisation backed

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DEFENCE POLIC

by an expensive support organisation. A smaller but more modern fleet with less expensive overheads would give better value for money. The SSN fleet was to be increased to 17, and new SSKs were to be built. The new Ark Royal was to be completed, but only two ships of the class would be retained and the Hermes was to be disposed of as soon as the second of the 'Invincible' class entered service. The number of destroyers and frigates declared to NATO was to be reduced from 59 to 50, the reduction being achieved by disposal of older and more manpower intensive ships such as the 'Leanders' and surviving Type 12s, timed to avoid the need for costly refits and modernisation. The emphasis was to be on the new, and cheaper, Type 23, whose capability would be cost-driven and no more Type 42s were to be built; the future of the Type 22 was left open. Mid-life modernisation would cease. The three Royal Marines Commandos would remain in being, but HM Ships Intrepid and Fearless would be phased out in 1982 and 1984 without replacement. Mairitime Patrol Aircraft were seen as a highly effective weapons system, and the Nimrod fleet was to be augmented and armed with Stingray. The maritime strike role would be carried out by Buccaneers and, possibly, Tornados. The planned reduction in support facilities included the closure of Chatham dockyard and naval base, a major reduction in dockyard work at Portsmouth and reduction to the status of a naval base, and the closure of a number of oil fuel and stores depots. The future of dockyard facilities at Gibraltar remained uncertain, and depended on the results of negotiations with the Gibraltar government. The growing world wide Soviet influence made it increasingly necessary for NATO countries to look at Western security concerns outside the NATO boundaries. The Royal Navy was seen as having an important role to play in this area, the presence of RN ships on Operation Armilla being quoted as an example. Group deployments world wide were to continue. The Royal Navy set about restructuring the Service in the light of the Secretary of State's decisions. The aim was to achieve maximum front line efficiency by absorbing the cuts

imposed by the Review as far as possible elsewhere, eg dockyard closures, manpower reductions, shift of training from shore to sea, no modernisations for surface ships. However, events moved swiftly in 1982 and the successful campaign in the South Atlantic was to lead to a number of changes to the decisions in Cmnd 8288. The Falklands Campaign began on 2 April 1982 when Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands, and ended when the Argentinian General Menendez surrendered at Port Stanley on 14 June. The lessons learned from the campaign were presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence in December 1982. The conduct of the campaign had been extremely successful, but there were, inevitably after so long a period of peace, a number of areas where improvements could be made, and gaps in capability filled. In the maritime sphere these included a lack of close range anti-aircraft weaons, AEW aircraft and shallow water sonar, and a need for measures to improve the survivability of ships and reduce the spread of smoke and fire. The SSN proved to be a most effective deterrent, and after the sinking of the General Belgrano by HMS Conquerer the Argentine surface fleet effectively took no further part in the campaign. A total of six ships was lost, all to air launched weapons, either bombs or air to surface missiles, and a number of others were damaged. Of the six ships lost four (HM Ships Shefield, Ardent, Antelope and Coventry) were warships, one (Sir Galahad) a RFA and one (Atlantic Conveyor) a merchant ship taken up from trade. Just as there was no declaration of war before the invasion, so there was no agreement that hostilities had ceased after the surrender of 14 June. Argentina was still perceived as posing a serious threat to the Falkland Islands and a naval task force in the surrounding seas had to be maintained to deter further Argentinian aggression. This involved, initially, a sizeable naval force, both surface ships and submarines, and included a carrier until improvements to Port Stanley airfield enabled it to operate Phantoms in October. Cmnd 8758, in reviewing the effects of the campaign, stressed that nothing learnt from the

DEFENCE POLICY 1945-1982 - I11

Falklands in any way invalidated the policy in the 1981 Defence Review that the Warsaw Pact continued to pose the main threat, and that the British response to this threat must be the first call on our defence resources. However, following the campaign, we would now be devoting substantially more of our resources to defence than previously planned. The direct and immediate results insofar as they affected the Royal Navy were: a. a reprieve for the two LPDs, HM Ships Fearless and Intrepid, which were to continue in service. They were noted as having 'emphatically proved their worth in the campaign3. b. Two carriers were to be available for deployment at short notice, necessitating a total force of three. HMS Invincible was not, therefore, to be sold, although HMS Hermes was to leave the service. c. The ice patrol ship, HMS Endurance, whose future had been very uncertain, was to be retained. d. New Type 22 Frigates were to be ordered to replace the two Type 42 and two Type 21 Frigates lost. Three of these were to be Batch 111s. e. The number of front line destroyers and frigates was to be increased from fifty to 'about fifty-five', to meet the Falklands commitments. Plans to reduce four ships to the stand-by squadron would not now be effected. f. Replacement of battle losses of aircraft and an additional purchase of Sea Harriers and Sea Kings would be made. Each operational carrier was to be given an AEW capability in Sea Kings. g. Various improvements to weapons systems were to be made including the fitting of point defence weapons in various classes of ship. Conclusion During the 37 years covered by the paper the status of the United Kingdom has changed from that of a victorious first class power with major world wide and imperial responsibilities to that of a European power within the EEC with limited resources and a reduced influence in world affairs. This major change was the result

65

of political, economic and human factors beyond our control. It is all too easy to look back with nostalgia on the size and world wide role of the fleet in the 1950s and 60s, and to compare it unfavourably with the smaller and more limited force of today, but when the magnitude of the reduction in Britain's role is considered it should be recognised that the Royal Navy has survived the change remarkably well. As stated in the introduction, defence policy in peace must be based on the provision of armed forces to meet political commitments at an affordable price, and this, in general, has been achieved. Although there have been a number of failures and gaps in capability, we have maintained a fleet to meet changing commitments which, when compared to the naval forces of our European allies, is out of proportion to our economic capabilities. We have the second largest navy in NATO, we continue to operate maritime aircraft from carriers, we are the only country in the alliance other than the USA to provide a strategic nuclear deterrent, we have a nuclear submarine fleet and our ships have largely kept pace with changing technology and are modern and well equipped. In the Falklands war we demonstrated the ~~ofessional capability to conduct successful maritime owrations in a region remote from base support. This is not to suggest that all is perfect; it is not, but a very great deal has been achieved in times of difficult circumstances. MEWSTONE References 'Cmnd 8288, The United Kingdom Defence Programme The Way Forward (HMSO, 1981). 'Ibid. 'Ibid. 'Cmnd 8758, The Falklands Campaign - The Lessons (HMSO, 1982).

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DEFENCE POLICY 1945- 1982 - I11

DEFENCE POLICY 1945-1982 - I11

ANNEX B ACTIVE UK ROYAL NAVY PERSONNEL IN THOUSANDS (Including Royal Marines) (as at 1st April each Year) Men 120.1 123.0 125.6 135.5 133.7 121.0 114.2 106.6 102.7 97.8 95.8 93.7 91.9 91.0 92.3 94.1 95 .O 94.1 93.2 91.3 86.7 82.7 79.2 78.9 77.6 74.7 72.5 72.2 72.2 71.3 68.6 68.1 70.2

Women 7.3 6.0 5.4 5.1 5.2 5 .O 4.7 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.0

Servicemen 17.1 11.0 7.2 4.6 6.7 7.8 9.5 11.6 9.6 5.3 2.2 0.6 0.1

Total 144.5 140.0 138.2 145.2 145.6 133.8 128.4 122.1 116.0 106.6 101.6 97.8 95.3 94.3 95.8 97.6 98.6 97.8 97.0 95.1 90.2 86.0 82.5 82.4 81.2 78.3 76.2 76.1 76.2 75.3 72.4 71.9 74.2

DEFENCE POLICY 1945-1982

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111

ANNEX C MAJOR EVENTS - 1945-1983 Labour Government elected to power under Mr Clement Attlee. Establishment of single Cabinet Defence of concerned Ministers and Chiefs of staff under a Minister of Defence Western European Defence Organisation established USSR produces its own nuclear weapon Formation of NATO Start of 1950 Re-Armament programme Korean War begins Conservative Government elected to power under Mr Winston Churchill Britain carries out successful nuclear tests at Monte Bello Islands Korean War ends USA, followed shortly by USSR, carries out successful trials of thermonuclear weapons Mr Anthony Eden becomes Prime Minister America and West Indies Command abolished. C.-in-C. AWI replaced by Senior Naval Officer West Indies Suez campaign Mr Harold MacMillan becomes Prime Minister and appoints Mr Duncan Sandys as Minister of Defence The 'Sandys' Defence Review Britain carries out successful trials of thermo-nuclear weapon East Indies Command abolished Unified Command established in Middle East Command Nore Command abolished. C.-in-C. Nore replaced by F. 0 . Medway Unified Command established in Far East Nassau agreement. USA agrees to provide UK with Polaris missile system Confrontation with Indonesia begins Creation of unified Ministry of Defence Labour Government elected to power under Mr Harold Wilson with Mr Dennis Healey as Secretary of State for Defence The 'Healey' Defence Review France withdraws from NATO military structure Confrontation with Indonesia ends Mediterranean command abolished. C.-in-C. Mediterranean replaced by

Flag Officer Malta. C.-in-C. Home Fleet becomes C.-in-C. Western Fleet with full command of ships west of Suez. NATO Ministers agree to formation of STANAVFORLANT NATO replaces 'tripwire strategy' with 'flexible response' Middle East command abolished on withdrawal from Aden. Flag Officer Middle East replaced by Commander Naval Forces Gulf in Bahrain South Atlantic and South America command abolished Prime Minister announces plans to withdraw from East of Suez by end of 1971 F l l l A purchase cancelled Posts of Cs-in-C. Portsmouth and Plymouth abolished and replaced by Area Flag officers. New post of C.-inC. Naval Home Command established RN Polaris force assumes responsibility for nuclear deterrent from RAF Conservative Government elected to power under Mr Edward Heath with Lord Carrington as Secretary of State for Defence Withdrawal from Far East and Persian Gulf. Posts of C.-in-C. Western Fleet and Commander Far East Fleet replaced by Commander-in-Chief Fleet with full command of seagoing fleet. Post of Commander Naval Forces Gulf abolished Labour Government under Mr Harold Wilson elected to power with Mr Roy Mason as Secretary of State for Defence The 'Mason' Defence Review Post of Senior Naval Officer West Indies abolished Mr James Callaghan becomes Prime Minister Closure of Malta Naval Base. Post of FO Malta abolished Conservative Government elected to power under Mrs Margaret Thatcher with Mr Francis Pyni as Secretary of State for Defence Decision announced to replace Polaris with Trident Mr John Nott replaces Mr Francis Pym as Secretary of State for Defence The 1981 'Nott' Defence Review The Falklands Conflict

The Peace Dividend RITISH spending on defence sharply B declined after World War I, and the world entered a long period of relative peace. When

dividend is needed to help restore it. However. reduced defence spending exaggerates the down turn of the economy in defence related industries. It was the Callaghan government which committed Britain to meet NATO's target of 3 % annual real growth in the defence budget. The Thatcher government took up this policy. The result was that between 1978 and 1985 the Defence budget grew by some 47% in real terms. Even after the Thatcher administration abandoned that policy, the Defence budget continued to grow. This is in sharp contrast to the problems facing British defence programmers and planners today The average growth in the Defence budget for the sixteen years from 1979 was about 9% annually in cash terms. This is largely as we might expect. since the general rate of inflation used by the Treasury for most of this period was about 5 % , and inflation in the defence industry is held to be above the general rate of inflation. As the graph (upper line, figure I ) shows, had

war clouds gathered once more over Europe, the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments resisted calls for rearmament in large part because they believed that such a programme would ruin the British economy. Even when the need for rearmament was accepted, the government of the day moderated that programme with a policy of appeasement. They feared that even if Britain were to emerge victorious from another world war, the effect on Britain's world position, and on the domestic economy, would be devastating. ' We might draw parallels with today's situation. Britain, allied in NATO with Europe and North America, has recently won a major war, the Cold War. But the victory is a Pyrrhic one. Spending on defence during the Cold War distorted the economy and has left Britain poorly placed to compete in civil markets. The economy is in desperate decline. and a peace

Defence spending in cash terms EB

Financial year beginning April

-

PESO2

-I-

*3W

I

++PESO1

1

Figure 1

69

70

THE PEACE DIVIDEND

Defence spending 1978 to 1995 Historical comparison - cash terms CB

Y

30

5

-.....

...............-- .-

"

"

.

"

....... . . "

GNP

.

6

1

o " " " l " l " l l l '

0 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 96

I

-

Year

Defence CB

+Defence

% QNP

I

Figure 2

the Defence budget continued to increase at even a modest 3% annually, it would have exceeded £30 billion by the end of the century. Options for Change enabled the government to agree much revised figures for the budget and these were announced in last year's Public Expenditure Settlement (PES91). After PES9 1, the Ministry of Defence assumed only a very small growth in its budget, some 0.75% and this is shown in the graph too (middle line). The latest revision of cash plans for the Defence budget contained in Public Expenditure Settlement 1992 (PES92) announced on 12 November 1992 are shown on the third, lowest line of figure 1. This line assumes no growth in the Defence budget at all. Together the lines show that, compared to expectations only a few years ago, the Defence budget will have some £8 billion per annum less available to it by the year 2000. Even compared to expectations of one year ago, within three years the planners must take some additional £2 billion p.a. out of their programmes. This is a very steep task indeed and one can only speculate what the consequences must be for the shape and size of British armed forces. The share of the Gross National Product

(GNP) must also be taken into account. The second graph (figure 2) shows the actual cash budget from 1979 up to the end of the PES92 period, in 1995. It shows the Defence budget both in billions of pounds sterling and as a percentage of the GNP. The cusp year was 1987. Until then the budget was more or less steady at about 5 % of GNP. Since then it has been in steady decline, and is likely to reach 3.2 % in 1995. That represents a peace dividend of nearly 40 % . The contrast between the 1980s and 1990s is very sharp indeed. For all of the previous decade the Defence budget was growing: for most of the 1990s it will be contracting under inflationary pressure and as a of GNP. A reducing budget gives rise to difficult enough circumstances. Considering the threats in the world to peace and stability, perhaps we should agree that the present peace dividend is a sufficient return on the nation's investment in defence. P. G. HORE CAPTAIN. RN Reference 'Chalmers. British Economic Drcline: the Contribution of Milircrr?. Spending.

Options for Change or just a case of M=f [KE-W'+st+hl? post battle, followed by slow decline until the cycle builds again. All we have to do is match these empirically derived trends with a mathematical function which follows 'the LINE' (see below) and before your very eyes, a Defence Strategy emerges at the twiddle of a cursor. (Figure below shows the relationship between the actual manpower numbers post WW1 and the prediction using the LINE formula). Having decided how many men you're going to have, all you then need to do is decide what to do with them. What could be simpler . . . and before you ask, yes, the formula holds good whatever the circumstances; the period post 1762 (the Spanish Wars), Waterloo (the RN remained at 'post Trafalgar' levels until 1814), and both World Wars. So, hats off to Pythagoras, Apollonius, Babbage, et al. It's high time we acknowledged that our Defence Strategy is built on sound, mathematical logic. Let's admit we're planning to 'the LINE' (Law of INEvitability). After all, it's high time we all saw the colour of the log tables in DN Plans! M=f[Ke-wt+st+h] where: M =Total Manpower (Trained & Untrained) f =Peak Manpower K =50,000 w =wane factor (-0.9) t =time (yrs) since conflict s =smaller but better factor (- 1.5) h =hayday factor (130,000) RUBBERDAGGER

HE news that there is to be closer T collaboration between the two great and learned journals, The Naval Review and The Journal of Naval Engineering, has presented an opportunity, perhaps for the first time, to lay a ghost. Many readers of the former may have developed the view that the eventual size of the Navy will be a function of defence policy, political expediency and some carefully crafted strategic thought. After all, there has been no shortage of cogent, persuasive articles in the NR over the last couple of years. Readers of the latter, of course, would be astonished by this naivety. They, as always in times of difficulty, will have reached for the trusty slide rule (maintained at extended readiness (case permitting) in a perfect state) and without a second's deliberation, calculated the size of the navy, year on year, for every year until the onset of the next major conflict. Having taken but minutes to reach their conclusions, these wizened grease monkeys will pass the rest of the time wondering what all the fuss is about and furthermore, just what the hundreds of staff with MB extensions think they are up to. But how can this be? Who is the guardian of the formula; is the Secretary of State a covert mathematician? Well, he may be, but as with all things, the answer lies in history. Since 1760 (but probably even earlier), the size of the Navy (in terms of number of ships and/or manpower) shows a simple and most understandable trend: rapid build up for a crisis, peak, sharp decline

Naval Manpower post conflict --

-

---

by LINE formula

0.7

\

Actual Manpower post WW1

0

Years from Conflict formula + Actual

71

1

Hurricanes to Egypt (A version of this article jirst appecwed in Aeroplane Monthly, to whom acknowledgements are due - Editor) HAVE had a soft spot for aircraft carriers Iboardever since I was taken as a schoolboy on Courageous in Portsmouth during Navy Week in the early 1930s. The Fairey IIIFs and Flycatchers ranged on deck were a source of wonder to someone already smitten, as I was, with the flying bug. Argus, Glorious and Eagle were familiar sights at Spithead in those golden days and I once had an extremely close view of furious faces in Furious as I took emergency action in a Wyllie class dinghy to get out of its way. This was also a time when the prototype Swordfish (TSR2) came to grief in a hedge at Gosport, when Lieutenant Horsley spread his Baffin over the foredeck of the French liner Nomandie and when the submarine M2 was lost tragically with all hands - together with her Parnall Peto seaplane. A former captain of M2 once told me that he was inclined to regard his boat as an aircraft carrier rather than a submarine. More formal association with the Royal Navy came for me in the late 1930s when I joined a general reconnaissance (GR) squadron of Coastal Command. The atmosphere during my time at Leuchars in Scotland still carried faint overtones of its earlier life as a Fleet Air Arm station. One or two old hands persisted in a run ashore when we went into St. Andrews to play golf, gin and onions flowed liberally in the mess at weekends and naval aviators flew in from nearby Donibristle and elsewhere knowing they would get a particularly good lunch. There was a rumour on the station that a ghostly IIIF could sometimes be seen being launched from the defunct catapult which sat rusting on the edge of the tarmac.

Early days of the war Then came the early days of the war in the North Sea and off Norway in our American-built Lockheed Hudsons. This period frequently gave rise to incidents which tested the close and amiable relationship between our two Services. 'Friendly fire' it would be called today; counsellors would pile in and families would

demand detailed enquiries. Not so then - it would be a matter of a hasty colour-of-the-day from the Very pistol, the undercarriage going up and down like a yoyo and the Aldis lamp flashing madly. Knowing the penchant of HM ships for ecclesiastical exchanges, one chap always carried a bible in his aircraft so that he could drive home his recognition signals with a well-chosen text. Had he known, as he closed the cruiser Suffolk under attack off Norway on 17 April, 1940, the one about: 'Knock, knock . . . a long way to China,' he might well have flashed that as well. A little later in that April three of us turned into Romsdal Fjord at low-level on our way to the evacuation port of Aandalsnes, only to be greeted in the customary 'friendly' manner by the AA cruiser Curacao lying alongside below the town. In the ensuing melee, joined by the Norwegian guns on the quay, I was thoroughly peppered and my Number 2 shot down. I eventually ran Curacao's Major of Marines to ground a year or two later in the Union Bar in klexandria and the counselling on that occasion was quite lively. In June four of us had a go at the battle-cruiser Scharnhorst with her screen of destroyers and torpedo-boats off the coast of Norway. Out came the Aldis lamp and we flashed a courteous 'Guten morgen'. However, they were not fooled and a German report of the action recorded that 900 rounds of 4.1 " and 1200 of 3.1 " were fired at us - and at Beauforts attacking below - by Scl~urnhorstalone. As the flak came up to our perch 10,000 feet above the ships, my co-pilot wondered if an ecclesiastical message might put a stop to it - or maybe something like: '. . . a long way to Wilhelmshafen'. Perhaps Captain Hoffman would have appreciated it and he might well have replied by lamp that it was a long way back to Scotland - especially on one engine for those of us who survived the attack.

To Victorious I make no excuse for this preamble to an article about Hurricanes to Egypt. Its purpose is to

HURRICANES TO EGYPT

demonstrate that it was not altogether surprising - after this early association with naval affairs - that my arrival on board the carrier Victorious in Scapa Flow in May, 1941, was not too much of a shock to the system. The task of Victorious was to ferry two squadrons of RAF Hurricanes to a point in the Western Mediterranean from where they would fly off to Malta and thence to Egypt. Before describing the chain of events, it might be helpful to touch on the background and run-up to the operation which - for those in my squadron whose knowledge of the sea and ships was confined to bucket-and-spade holidays gave rise to a feeling of mild apprehension. The development of the air war in the Middle East in 1940-41 has been recorded in detail by a number of eminent historians. In particular, Philip Guedalla - in his book Middle East, 1940-42, A Study of Air Power - gives a wideranging account of the part played by the fighter squadrons of the RAF and the urgent need for their reinforcement - notably in Malta, the Western Desert and up in Palestine and Iraq. At first, this reinforcement was with Hurricanes from the United Kingdom and it was carried out in two ways. They were either sailed through the Mediterranean in aircraft carriers or shipped to Takoradi on the West Coast of Africa before flying some 3,800 miles across the African continent to Khartoum and thence up the Nile to Egypt. Ferrying them the whole way by air was regarded as impracticable, although an experimental idea had been put forward earlier for a disposable top wing which would serve as a long-range fuel tank. The possibility of towing Hurricanes behind long-range aircraft had also been explored. Perhaps wisely, these curious proposals had been discarded and the eventual reinforcement plan was based on the methods outlined above. These arrangements were expanded later for the Spitfires, Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and Martlets which would follow from America, the UK and elsewhere as the build-up and re-equipment of the fighter squadrons proceeded. I had the opportunity to fly a Hurricane over both routes, secure in the knowledge that I could not possibly be let down - over the sea, the rain forests of Nigeria or the inhospitable terrain of Chad and the Sudan - by the Rolls-Royce

73

machinery purring away in front. This is an account of one of the two methods of delivery which, as I mentioned above, was by courtesy of the Royal Navy to a point at the western end of the Mediterranean. We were a Hurricane squadron (No.238) on the small Fighter Command airfield of Chilbolton in Hampshire, far from the events unfolded by Philip Guedalla in his book. The squadron had been in the thick of the Battle of Britain, under the inspired leadership of Squadron Leader H. A. Fenton, and it was destined for a spell in the Middle East. It was now April, 1941, and I had joined from another Hurricane squadron which had welcomed me earlier - albeit with mild astonishment - as a renegade from Coastal Command. My previous experiences over the fleet - ours and theirs - had persuaded me that it was time to do a little shooting myself. The normal sounds in the crew-room of people at 'readiness' - snoozing after the activities of the previous evening, the shuffle of cards, the click of Monopoly and so forth - were disturbed one morning by the arrival of a small Group Captain from Air Ministry. He was to reveal details of our impending departure for Egypt. In simple terms, the squadron air party would embark in an aircraft carrier at Rosyth and sail off for the Mediterranean. Then, at a prearranged point of departure, we would fly off the carrier, join up with an escort and bowl along in formation to Malta and Egypt. Meanwhile, the squadron ground party would go by sea to South Africa and then make its way by train and air to Egypt. A couple of 'scrambles' later, we stood down from readiness and stumbled to the mess in a state of considerable shock. As a start, it was agreed that naval routine should be instituted forthwith, so horse's necks and gins were set up. Flying Ofticer Morgan, our tame soldier seconded from 3rd Hussars, began to think of returning immediately to the Army but we persuaded him of the folly of such a move. The married officers looked a bit glum at first, although they brightened up when the implications of a trip to the hypnotic East began to sink in. The squadron adjutant was detailed to take the ground party round by the Cape, while the rest of us would form the air party to join the carrier.

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It was one of those Hampshire mornings in May with fine-weather cumulus moving softly across an expanse of blue and not a vapour-trail to be seen. The fat trout in the Test were chasing the first of the mayfly and one or two lucky people were taking time off from the war to fill their baskets. A few wives and girl friends had formed up on Andover station to see us off on the slow journey to Scotland. A second Hurricane squadron (No.260), commanded by Squadron Leader C. J . Mount, joined us in Edinburgh, where we were surprised to be told that our carrier had sailed from Rosyth for Scapa Flow. So we all puffed our way by train on up to 'the spacious melancholy of Caithness', as Eric Linklater put it, before coming to rest in the port of Scrabster; casting off from there, as generations of the Royal Navy had done before us, we bore down on our temporary home for the next few weeks - the aircraft carrier Victorious, lying silent and grey in the Flow with the other ships of the Home Fleet. We must have seemed a pretty curious lot to those of the ship's company who had assembled to welcome us. Victorious was a new ship and was still working up, so our arrival on board must have been a headache for Captain Bovell and his executive officers. The embarked Fleet Air Arm Swordfish squadron and a flight of Fulmars were also new to the ship, having only just arrived themselves from Hatston. There were plenty of singular characters amongst them, including the gallant Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde - later to receive a posthumous VC for his action against Scharnhorst in The Channel - and Lieutenant Frank Furlong who won the Grand National on Reynoldstown in 1935. The aircraft lifts in the ship were too small to accommodate an assembled Hurricane, so our aircraft had already been taken apart and stowed in the hangar with engines 'inhibited' while not in use. Flight Lieutenant E. J. Morris and I shared a cabin aft over the thundering screws and its number - 109, as with the German fighter - was a gentle reminder that we were on our way to some serious business and not in the ship for a luxury cruise. The ship sailed to continue its work-up in the Pentland Firth and we were allotted a viewing position on the goofers' platform in the island.

That was our vantage point for most of the voyage and it was from there that we watched the bows go round as the ship turned into wind for flying-on, leaving a curving wake of cream and green shimmering into the hulls of the escorting destroyers. The sparkling waters of the firth, against a backcloth of the mountains and crags of Sutherland, were a breathtaking sight on those pale blue days of gunnery shoots and flying. The prototype of that remarkable naval aeroplane the Barracuda made its debut on the flight deck and all were astonished when it demonstrated its prowess with some low-level slow rolls with torpedo attached. My wife, who was a Wren officer at Macrihanish and secretary to the Commander Flying, occasionally flew in the back of a Barracuda. She has a disgraceful song about the aircraft and can produce a passable rendering to this day.

Bismarck Meanwhile, matters of supreme importance were shaping up in the Home Fleet at anchor in Scapa Flow. Air reconnaissance had revealed that the battleship Bismarck, and her cruiser escort Prinz Eugen, had left their Norwegian replenishment base and were at sea. Accordingly, as soon as Victorious returned to Scapa Flow from her exercises in the Pentland Firth, she found herself preparing to sail with Admiral Sir John Tovey and the Home Fleet in pursuit of the German ships. This action against Bismarck - and the part played in it by Victoriousand her embarked Fleet Air Arm units - has been recorded comprehensively elsewhere. We, in the two Hurricane squadrons, took no operational part in the affair because, as I have already pointed out, our aeroplanes were stowed in pieces in the hangar. At one point there was a move to assemble some and range them on deck but fortunately that wheeze was swiftly discarded. It is impossible to imagine how we could have contributed to the action other than in a doubtful reconnaissance role and we should in any case have been thoroughly in the way of the Fleet Air Arm operations. In any event, none of us had flown from a carrier before and the Hurricanes had no hooks for landing back on - although Hurricanes without hooks had landed on in emergency from Norway on the ill-fated carrier Glorious.

HURRICANE:S TO EGYPT

Victorious sailed in pursuit of the German ships on 23 May, 1941, in company with the other ships of the Home Fleet. In the carrier were 48 petrified RAF pilots, wearing their Mae Wests most of the time and resigned to the likelihood of a salvo of 15" shells carving their way through the toast and marmalade at breakfast. We did our best to keep out of the way of everyone else and shared with the ship's company shock at the damage to Prince of Wales and horror and sadness at the loss of Hood. At the same time, we gave moral support to the Fleet Air Arm crews who operated in filthy weather and whose professional skill and courage in the action were quite unbelievable. There were few who were not stirred by the sight of Esmonde and his observer Lieutenant Ennever quietly slipping away in the first Swordfish - from a rolling and pitching flight deck and in conditions of fading light, drizzle and low cloud - to strike at Bismarck at midnight some 100 miles from us. The subsequent recovery of the striking force seemed little short of a miracle. Our stowed aircraft survived the tremendous seas as we pounded along south of Iceland at 28 knots, giving a rise and fall to the flight deck of some 60 feet. This was really only appreciated by Morgan and Furlong, the two steeplechasing horse-copers, who were inclined to go on a bit about Becher's Brook. It certainly was not appreciated by one Swordfish pilot returning from an AS patrol with depth-charges hanging from his wings. Misjudging the moment to engage the arrester-wire, he swept off his undercarriage and the aircraft slid across the deck with sparks flying from the depth-charges. There were a few white RAF faces on the goofers' platform at that moment. Victorious eventually sailed into the Clyde after her part in the chase. The bows needed to be inspected - twisted in the heavy seas - and she had to re-victual and replenish with fuel. She then sailed as part of a convoy before breaking away to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean.

To Gibraltar After the excitement of the Bismarck affair, the voyage to Gibraltar was pleasant and uneventful, although there must have been a good scattering of U-boats in the area. In fact, a dream target

75

for any U-boat captain was set up as we drew south of Cape St. Vincent and shaped a course for the Straits of Gibraltar. We were joined by the carriers Argus and Furious, empty from an earlier delivery of fighters, together with Ark Royal which was due to join us at Gibraltar and take off 260 Squadron. The four ships sailed together for a while and formed a picture which must have been quite rare in naval circles. Argus and Furious then broke away to sail home while we carried on to Gibraltar with Ark Royal. As we secured at the detached mole in Gibraltar, it was clear that our holiday cruise and was now over and life would begin again for us in earnest. The ship moved later astern of Ark Royal and a wooden ramp was laid fore-and-aft between the flight decks of the two carriers. 24 Hurricanes of 260 Squadron were brought up on deck, assembled and wheeled across to Ark Royal under the watchful gaze of the two Commanders Flying - Ranald and Sholto Douglas. Our own aircraft were also brought up and ranged on deck and, during the ensuing two days, hoisted down to the jetty for compassswinging. While the aircraft were being prepared, some fairly hard talking was going on between the two RAF Squadron Commanders and the naval authorities. Everyone was pretty jumpy about capital ships penetrating the Mediterranean especially two carriers, each of which, so to speak, had one arm behind its back because of transit aircraft ranged on deck. It was no place for them to be in 1941 without adequate air cover. Moreover, a daily visitor to Gibraltar was a Vichy French Maryland which flew across from North Africa to take pictures of the ships in the harbour. The original intention was that our Hurricanes would be led to Malta by the embarked Fulmars but the moderate range of the Fulmars meant that Force H -of which we were now part - would need to sail well eastwards into the Mediterranean. Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville, Flag Officer Force H, was not at all happy with this and said so vigorously. As a result, it was proposed that we should sail at night and fly off in the dark. Having only just recovered, thanks to liberal quantities of duty-free gin, from the shock of chasing Bismarck, we reeled again; this time at the idea of being cast into the night sky to join

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HURRICANES TO EGYPT

up in formation, to fly some 700 miles and arrive - if we ever got that far - on the island of Malta in the middle of one of her nightly air raids. When the Squadron Commanders argued against this plan as being quite impracticable - although they themselves were quite prepared to go there were some pointed remarks about lack of courage and discipline. One or two people suggested that the Fleet Air Arm would have been quite happy to fall in with the idea. As a result the two Squadron Commanders were summoned to see the Admiral and they too spoke up vigorously. They felt bound to advise him that this nocturnal scheme had the makings of a shambles of the first water - particularly as none of us had flown from a carrier before and, in any event, a number of our pilots were fresh from training units. They emphasised that, in their opinion, the whole operation to deliver 48 badly-needed Hurricanes to the Middle East could be seriously prejudiced if the plan were to go ahead. The Admiral took account of their views and was big enough to concede the point with good humour over a glass of gin, although others less senior were not so happy. It was finally agreed that the ships would sail in daylight to a point about halfway between Majorca and Algiers. A Hudson squadron, which was passing through Gibraltar en route to West Africa, was directed to provide navigational escorts for the two squadrons. When the escorts had made rendezvous, the Hurricanes would fly off and point eastwards to Malta. It was made abundantly clear to us that, the moment the last pair of wheels had left the deck, the ships would alter 180 degrees and hurry back to Gibraltar. We were briefed that we would have about a quarter of an hour to get back on the carrier - probably downwind in the event of a technical malfunction. One likely failure, apart from the usual things which happen to aeroplanes and their electronics when they sit on the ground in pieces for any length of time, would be in the fixed long-range tanks under the wing. Fuel was fed from these tanks by integral electric pumps which could only be properly tested in the air. Failure of a pump meant that there would be insufficient fuel to get to Malta. The first half hour or so of the flight was the period in which to find this out. If it was too late to land back on a carrier, pilots were

instructed to make for the North African coast and fall into the arms of the Vichy French. This was not an attractive prospect as Commander Charles Lamb was to discover, in different circumstances, when he cast up there in a Swordfish.

Flying off to Malta 14 June 1941 was a typical early summer Mediterranean day - bright and clear with a slight chop on the water. We had sailed from Gibraltar with a battleship and destroyer escort and were now almost ready to fly off. The ship's Navigating Officer had given us a wind for the flight and we had been fully briefed about landing back on, falling into the sea, diversion to North Africa, the appearance of enemy fighters and so on. Unlike Spitfires - which were also ferried through the Mediterranean by carrier and could jettison their long-range tanks in emergency - our Hurricanes were fitted with two large fixed tanks under the wing. The unexpected arrival of grinning enemy fighter pilots would therefore not have been at all welcome. Our gear had been crammed into all available spaces in the aircraft and the time had come to say goodbye to our naval hosts who would now be taking their turn up on the island to watch the fun and cheer us on our way. Walking across the flight deck to my aeroplane, bending against the stiff breeze and getting a familiar whiff of sulphurous fumes from the funnel, reminded me that I had not flown for a month. Neither had I flown a Hurricane at all with full long-range tanks. There would be no quick familiarisation flight. In off the deep-end was the cry, although not, one hoped, in the full sense of the expression. I cocked a baleful eye at our Fleet Air Arm friends - Shaw, McEwen, Harrington and others - who were jeering and gesticulating from the goofers' platform with mock signs of entering the water. The deck was heeling over and the screws thumping as the ship came round into wind. The Flight Deck Officer waved his little flag like the guard on Andover station a few weeks before, propellers started to turn and 23 Merlin engines coughed and spluttered into life. The 24th remained silent and unserviceable below in the hangar. Our Squadron Commander lined up and was away. 'Keep straight down

HURRICANES TO EGYPT

77

the middle,' they had said, 'and all will be well'. I joined the queue as, one after another, our aircraft cleared the flight deck. We all circled for a few minutes in strict radio silence, gaining height like ducks put up from their feeding, before setting off in a loose gaggle behind our Hudson escort. As had been predicted, the ships turned about during our climb and, as we set course, our comfortable home was high-tailing back to port. It had really all been quite straightforward, although most of us felt a little strange at suddenly being thrust into the air over a large expanse of sea after a month of relative idleness. No doubt the two carrier Captains and their Commanders Flying heaved an enormous sigh of relief. Malta lay some 650 miles ahead and there was no trouble during this first leg of the flight to Egypt, except that one of our sergeant pilots had the dreaded long-range tank trouble and diverted smartly to North Africa and internment. For the remainder, the Hudson led us south of Sardinia and, with the North African coast beginning to emerge from the haze, we dived to sea-level abreast of Bizerta and Cape Bon before entering the Sicilian Narrows. The enemy islands of Lampedusa and Pantellaria were close on either side of our track and we had been warned to be prepared for enemy fighters from these islands. In any event, we had no wish to be picked up by the French radar on Cape Bon. All was strangely quiet, although the Hudson made a pretty fair attempt to lead us smack over Pantellaria. A last-minute swerve enabled us to negotiate the island at wave-top height until a welcome brown fudge on the horizon shaped up into the rocky coasts of Gozo and Malta. Willing hands appeared as we taxied in at Luqa and the aircraft were quickly stowed into bombprotected pens for immediate preparation for the next stage of the flight. 260 Squadron, flying from Ark Royal, were not so lucky. Their Hudson escort missed Malta altogether and, by the time they turned back to find the island, the Hurricanes were short of fuel. Two fell into the sea and a third crashed during its approach to land.

defence of Malta but there was no move to do this. The aircraft were therefore made ready as planned for departure the following day. The second stage of the flight to Egypt was not entirely without incident. My squadron split into two parties, one setting off from Malta shortly before the other. I was in the first formation and we were given a Wellington navigational escort which happened to be passing through Malta and was fresh from a training unit. This aircraft rose steeply up from Luqa like a lift and we all had the greatest difficulty in keeping station. It then took us straight to Crete which had just fallen into the hands of General Student and his airborne forces. Realising their blunder at the last minute, the Wellington crew chose to make a steep climbing turn into cloud and this introduced a further note of chaos into the Hurricane formation. My aeroplane had clearly had enough of it all. The laws of aerodynamics took charge and we tumbled out of the cloud into the haze below. Nobody else was in sight, so I put on my Coastal Command hat and set course alone for North Africa. My fuel ran out after 6% hours in the air and I carried out an exciting forced-landing in the desert some ten miles short of our destination staging-post. The remainder of the squadron arrived at the stagingpost at about the same time, having crossed the coast in enemy-held territory and flown over several enemy fighter airfields. The Wellington was not seen again after Crete which was probably just as well. The second half of the squadron was ordered back to Malta after a false start and it set off again the next day. They were led by a Wellington fitted with an enormous anti-mine degaussing ring driven by a Ford engine in the fuselage. In addition, the pilot was an extremely portly officer. Halfway across the Mediterranean an engine of the Wellington failed and the whole contraption fell into the sea. Flight Lieutenant Morris, leading the Hurricanes, decided to press on the whole 1,000 miles to the Nile Delta in Egypt and the formation arrived there in good order - as did 260 Squadron from Ark Royal.

Second stage to Egypt AOC Malta must have been sorely tempted to cream off some of the Hurricanes for the

Conclusion The aircraft carrier operations, ferrying Hurricanes and Spitfires through the

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HURRICANES TO EGYPT

Mediterranean in 1941, were a vital factor in the survival of Malta and in countering the buildup of Luftwaffe aircraft in North Africa which started in earnest in February, 1941. For our part in Victorious and Ark Royal, the majority of Hurricanes were delivered as planned although luck was very much on our side. There was no time to offload the Hurricanes at Scapa Flow before the Bismarck chase, so it was a great relief to arrive in the Mediterranean unscathed by major surface forces and U-boats. Thereafter, our flight to Egypt could well have been seriously prejudiced if enemy fighters had reacted in the Sicilian Narrows, off Crete or over the Western Desert and it was quite astonishing that they did not appear. It must also be said in retrospect that planning and staff work - particularly over the escort arrangements were surprisingly haphazard in view of the importance of the operation. We made good friends in Victorious and were to continue to rub shoulders with the Royal Navy when my squadron took up its operational role in the Western Desert. The Royal Naval Fighter Squadron (RNFS) flew its Martlets with us-and many hours were spent sitting over the destroyers on the exposed western sector of the Alexandria-Tobruk run. By this time I was commanding my Hurricane squadron and I established a happy relationship with the destroyer Farndale each time she secured in Tobruk. Her Captain, Commander Stephen

Carlill, was always delighted to see us on board for gin and hot baths and this was a most welcome relief from the rigours of our spartan existence in the desert. He was equally kind later in Malta, where he was Captain (D) in Quilliam, to those of us who by then were swooping about in Spitfires. I began this article on a nostalgic note, so I shall end with a little light relief. Who, amongst the readers of The Naval Review, has flown twoup in a Sea Gladiator? I keep this episode up my sleeve as a counter to my wife if she is tempted to go on about the rear seat of Barracudas and Swordfishes at Macrihanish and St. Merryn. While a gallant lieutenant commander (A) - the owner of the Sea Gladiator - sat on the fully-lowered seat and operated the rudder-bar, I perched on his knee and manipulated the throttle and stick. We thus bowled alone in fine style on leave from Palestine up to Lebanon. It was a perfect example of the kind of inter-Service cooperation we enjoyed in Victorious. They were great days and, as my naval neighbour in Yorkshire distributes gin on Sunday mornings, one occasionally remembers them and wonders if the present Service generation has as much fun as we did - mildly startled though we were from time to time. H. F. O'NEILL GROUPCAPTAIN, RAF

Boarding Officer was September 1939. I was Sub in the ITFleet Destroyer Javelin. We were carrying out an offensive sweep in the Southern North Sea with C.S.2 in HMS Southampton. Admiral Collins was a tough egg and a stickler for good station-keeping and correct behaviour of ships on the screen. We had heard the rather tremulous voice of Neville Chamberlain announcing that, 'a state of war now exists as a result of Herr Hitler's invasion of Poland'. Hitler was a bad thineu and having heard his ravings at the Jews on the radio we all realised he was a mad thing. Extraordinary it was the way the Hitler youth allowed themselves to be led to destruction by this little moustachioed madman. The German race must have a screw loose to be so taken in by such a little freak. Anyway, here we were steaming along on a calm September afternoon. Searching the seas for U-boats or German ships up to no good. 'Ship bearing red 45' the port lookout sang out from the Crow's nest. We were nothing if not keen in these very early days of war. Binoculars were trained on the stranger and a sighting report was flashed to C.S.2 who was centre ship of the screen. '~nvestigate and report'. Our Captain, Commander Anthony Pugsley, altered course towards the stranger, increased speed to 30 knots and ordered 'Action Stations'. The Captain turned to me and said, 'Sub, take a boarding party in the whaler; you will find an automatic in the top drawer of my desk in my sea-cabin with a few rounds. You can borrow it, but for god's sake keep the lanyard round your neck - all the time and don't be too trigger-happy !' 'Your job is to search the ship and question the Captain so that we can tell C.S.2 what the ship is doing, where she is bound etc.' Steaming at 30 knots towards the lumbering merchantman had closed the gap between us and we could make her out to be wearing a Finnish flag, light grey hull high out of the water as though in ballast. One funnel painted black. Her name was rusted and barely legible; it looked like Olfin. Pugsley ordered her to heave-to and await a

boarding party, which she meekly did. Our whaler was already manned by our boarding party of steel-hatted seamen with a signalman and an acting Petty Officer Coxswain. I climbed aboard the whaler, trying to look aggressive and competent. Neither of which I felt. Pugsley had bought Javelin to about a cable from the Finn where he stopped and told the First Lieutenant who was in charge of lowering the sea-boat, to slip the boat. 'Get on with it, Sub, good luck'. The whaler was slipped and swung out from the ship's side as the weight came on the bow rope. The Finnish Freighter towered above us as we pulled over towards her. Two seamen appeared at the guard rails as they lowered a chain ladder down to us. The whaler rose and fell about 15 feet in the sea running which made boarding up the chain ladder no easy task. 'Follow me, chaps!' I croaked to my gallant boarding party as I leapt across the yawning gap and seized the ladder with desperate determination. The climb was not an easy one and seemed to take half an hour or more. When finally I clutched my way over the ship's side trying to maintain an air of determined aggression all I wanted was a few minutes to regain breath and strength. But it was not to be. Rest was out of the question. This was serious business. A war was on. I was conducted to the bridge and was received by the Captain who spoke a little broken English. I asked him his destination and was told it was the Baltic but he had been blown south off course in a recent gale. I said that I wished to search the ship before allowing him to proceed. An inspection of her gaping empty holds revealed nothing. I told my signalman to report to Javelin that:'Ship Elfin bound in ballast, for Helsinki, off course due to recent gale. Released ship to proceed on intended course. ' Having made my own tour of inspection, including the Chart Room pinups, I initialled the ship's log, instructed the boarding party

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to man the whaler and followed them thankfully down the precarious chain ladder into the whaler forty feet below. 'Shove-off and pull back under our davits', I called out to the Coxswain. We were soon hoisted to the davit heads and I made my way up to the bridge and reported to the Captain. My air of modest smugness was soon removed smartly from my face when I heard the Yeoman calling out C.S.2's cold comment on my report. 'Your 081218. Ships do not usually drift to windward. Report rank and name of Boarding Officer'.

My heart sank into my boots. What a fool I was. The recent gale had been southerly which should have driven our stranger a great deal further North of her present position. Pugsley looking at me thoughtfully. 'We live and learn, Sub, but she was only in ballast. Anyway you have got my pistol and had better return it to my cabin before you blow out your brains!' I saluted sheepishly and tottered below. A. G. VANRENEN LIEUT.CDR.RN

The Chief GI circa 43 HE North Battery was cold. HMS Excellent T felt cold to recruits at any time of year but this was 1943, the coldest winter of the war. The seven trainees, seventeen or eighteen year olds, standing in a straight line facing the breech of 'their' gun, were cold - apprehensive too. They were hoping, soon, to put Seaman Gunners' badges on their, as yet, embarrassinglybare right uniform sleeves. They should have been warm, sweating as they worked training on the type of gun that they would use, in action, on board one of His Majesty's ships. For the moment though, they were standing motionless - waiting. Authority, it had been rumoured, was concerned that a high proportion of trainees were losing the tops of their thumbs when they were loading shells into guns like the one they faced. For once, rumour was correct and they were waiting for the representative of that Authority to appear. Quite what this emissary was to tell them they did not know; they had trained until they could serve their gun in the dark - as, who knew, they might have so to do. The accepted way of loading a shell into the breech of a gun was to lift it, cradling it in the left hand, taking its weight and the weight of the attached cartridge with that arm. The right hand, making a fist, was held at the end of the cartridge case ready, when the nose of the shell was inserted into the breech, to push shell and cartridge into the barrel of the gun. This was when the Breech Worker, the Captain of the Gun, pulled the handle that allowed the breech block to spring up from its open position to close tightly against the breech ring, throwing the loader's right arm into the air with some considerable force but taking his hand away from any potential danger. The loader had, of course, taken his left hand away as he pushed the projectile on to the breech block and into the breech. Every trainee was told to make a fist like a boxer but not every new recruit to the Gunnery School had boxed. The trick of curling one's thumb down outside the middle phalanges of the fingers was not easily remembered. More often than not, the thumb stuck out over the top of the fist like - well, like a sore thumb.

Boxing, this would probably mean a sprained thumb but the scissors action of a closing breech block could amputate stuck out sore thumbs. The seven trainees waited, almost looking forward to running back and to, from ammunition locker, to gun, to ammunition locker to get warmer. They were waiting for the spokesman of Authority - a Chief GI. Here in the Whale Island Temple of Gunnery he would tell them how things were done, giving them the benefit of some fifteen or twenty years' experience gained from joining the Navy as a boy of thirteen, through each of four promotions in rank and from seeing service in every far flung corner of the world. He appeared. To call it anything less than an appearance would be to do this - to them awesome personage less than justice. A square shape of a man, not tall, his broad shoulders were emphasised by the short neck set well back on them and on which sat a close cropped head surmounted by a squared-off, laurel badged cap. He stood in front of them in the position of attention. The six buttons on his jacket front and the three on each sleeve gleamed with that deep burnished shine that comes from a regular daily - polish. The badges of crossed gun barrels over a star with a crown above them, worn on each of his lapels were of gold wire. Gold wire! and they were hoping for a badge showing a single gun barrel, no crowns, no stars and made of red embroidery thread. His webbing belt, buckle shining to match his buttons, and his gaiters were balanced - Khaki Green No. 97 - to that smooth, matt finish that tyros like them emulated but, generally, failed to achieve. It was fortunate that bell bottomed trousers did not, in the Royal Navy of that time, have creases down the front of the legs. Comparison with the sharp creases in his trousers was, fortunately, not possible - his were perfection. His boots appeared to be made of black glass so deep was the spit shine that had been worked into them. He spoke in a voice, not loud but carrying, a voice developed through making himself heard from one end of parade grounds as large as two football pitches, to the other,

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'Gun's Crew': they pulled themselves into something approaching the position of standing at ease. He ignored their amateurish attempt. 'Gun's Crew, shun': they moved to the position of attention, seven very apprehensive trainees. 'Gun's Crew, Number', ordered the Chief GI. 'One, Layer. ' 'Two, Trainer.' 'Three, Fuse Setter. ' 'Four, Breech Worker, Captain of the Gun.' 'Five, Loading Number.' 'Six, Loading Number. ' 'Seven, Loading Number.' 'Gun's Crew, stand at ease, stand easy: I am

now about to show you the correct way to load a projectile into the breech of this gun in such a way that you and your thumb comes to no harm: What you does is' . . . and they were regaled with a lurid, adjectival description of what they were sure they knew and could do. He demonstrated, picking up what he called a 'projy' as easily as if it had been a pencil, and continued: 'The breech block closes throwing your hand and arm up into the air and' - he stopped with his arm held above his head, looked up, saw blood trickling from his right thumb at the neatly amputated top knuckle joint - 'that's how you lose the top of your bleeding thumb'.

Operation Gambit 6 June 1944 An Eye witness Report was the successful attack by Italian ITfrogmen on HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant in Alexandria Harbour on 19 December 1941 that first pointed me in the direction of the D-Day Beaches. At that time in 1941142 I was serving in the Western Desert and in March 1942 a signal (instigated by Winston Churchill) was sent by Flag Officer Submarines asking for volunteers for 'hazardous and secret operations involving vigorous underwater training'. I submitted my name and in July 1942 was ordered to return to the UK by air sea route. On arrival in England, I spent some days at HMS Dolphin undergoing underwater tests, and having passed these successfully was sent to HMS Varbel at Rothesay, the Headquarters of the 12th submarine flotilla. After a concentrated course, covering electrics, diesel engines, navigation and not to forget diving (very cold in the Scottish lochs) we were all frogmen trained to leave the X craft to cut nets and attach limpet mines. Following this course I was lucky enough to get command of X4, one of the two prototype X craft, and as her sister ship X3 had sunk and was now under refit, X4 took the brunt of the training programme. In early 1944 I was appointed in Command of X23, a new craft under construction at Markhams in Chesterfield. By this time it had been decided that two X craft, X20 and X23, were to be detached from the 12th Sub-Flotilla, to act as navigational beacons off the D-Day beaches, and to be based at HMS Dolphin, and Gosport to train and make ready for the day. These craft were 12ft. long and 6ft. in circumference with a a range of 1,000 miles, surface speed of 7 knots, submerged 3-3% knots, normally carrying a crew of four, but for this special operation this was increased to five: three X craft crew and two members of the C.O. P. P. party (Combined Operation Pilotage Party). Our task was to cross the Channel submerged and undetected to our marking position approximately 1 mile off Ouistreham

surface before dawn on D-Day and erect an 18ft. telescopic mast showing a green light to seaward together with other navigational aids. We sailed from HMS Dolphin on the evening of Friday, 2 June, escorted by trawlers to beyond the Isle of Wight. From then on we carried on alone running submerged across the Channel for the 90 odd miles to the French coast. We passed through the mine barrier in the Baye de la Seine reaching the French coast by dawn on Sunday, 4 June. We were able to fix our position by periscope; this was made easy by the low level aerial photographs supplied by the RAF clearly showing the churches and other prominent buildings. A light was still showing at the mouth of the Orne Canal. Having fixed our position we bottomed and waited until darkness to surface again and set up our wireless, receiving a message that the landings had been postponed, not surprising as the weather was very rough. We took the opportunity to drop our anchor, to ensure we kept our marking position and returned to the bottom to wait for darkness the next night (Monday). During all this time submerged we had been on oxygen. This was fed to us from air bottles taken from German Luftwaffe bombers, being the lightest bottles available at the time. We had no idea how long the postponement was to be and our oxygen supply was therefore limited. On the Monday night we once again surfaced at darkness and received the signal that the invasion would start at first light on Tuesday, 6 June. Once again, we bottomed until just before dawn on the Tuesday. At 044516 we surfaced; it was still rough which made entry and exit through the hatch difficult, but we set up our 18ft. mast and commenced flashing at 050616. At sunrise a D-Flag was substituted for the lamp. One of the main objects of our operation was to mark the limited beaches when the D-D swimming tanks could emerge from the sea, after they had been launched from the landing

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craft and had proceeded to the beaches under their own power. As dawi broke there were ships of all sizes approaching the shore, from battleships to the smallest landing craft, and the shore installations were under bombardment from sea and air. Once the tanks and commandos had landed, our job was done; we cut the anchor rope (we were too exhausted to put it up) and reported to the Headquarters Ship HMS Largs at 0935. We then proceeded back across the Channel to our base at Gosport to be greeted in the

traditional way after a successful operation. The operation had covered a period of 72 hours, during which we had been submerged for 64 hours. We were especially relieved to return safely, as we had looked up the definition of our Code word Gambit in the dictionary and it was defined as 'the pawn you throw away before a big move in chess'. G. B. HONOUR LIEUT.CDR.RNVR

Steam Pic:ket Boats sailor has no knowledge of THEthesemodem beautiful boats, one of which, HMS Iron Duke's First picket boat, was my first command: and was I proud of her even to the extent of having blue silk curtains made for the after cabin in Gibraltar. They were 50 feet long driven by a triple expansion steam engine and a Yarrow water tube boiler giving them a speed which seemed very fast but which I never actually timed; about twelve knots perhaps. My crew consisted of Petty Officer Pook, a charming old skate who knew all the tricks of the trade, a bowman who was a first class seaman having been disrated from Chief Petty Officer for some peccadillo, a sternsheetsman, stoker petty officer and a stoker. We burnt coal of course, as did Iron Duke. It was whilst running this boat that I had my first glass of gin. I had to go over to the Submarine Depot Ship at Portland to collect an officer at about noon. When I got there the OOW said 'come on up Snottie, so and so isn't ready yet'. Down in the Wardroom I found myself with a glass of gin thrust into my hand. When I staggered down to the boat in due course P.O. Pook summed up the situation at once. 'I know just how you feel sir, may I suggest that you go through the motions and I will guide the boat and when we get back to the ship I wouldn't risk going over the boom, just nip up the gangway when the OOW isn't looking.'

Another time we had to go into the Camber at Portland for the night owing to a gale. Once we had secured the crew disappeared into the forepeak and I retired in solemn isolation into the after cabin, but not for long. A face appeared round the the door of the cabin. 'With the coxswain's compliments sir but he thinks you may be a bit lonely and would you like to come and warm up in the forepeak'. There was a lovely fug and a bottle of rum on the table, and I was regaled with all the lower deck scandal! Another time we were carrying out a landing exercise off the Culbin Sands in the Moray Firth. My job was to tow two cutters each with a platoon of soldiers embarked under the command of a subaltern. Approaching the shore we were told to wait. To my horror as we stopped I heard a cry of 'Follow me men' and a loud splash. One of the subalterns had assumed that we had arrived. I need not have worried; although there must have been at least three fathoms at this point, the old three badge able seaman bowman of the cutter was equal to the emergency, he just hooked his boathook into the officer's equipment and hauled him dripping back on board. I feel this was a case of that well known Whale Island Gunner's Mates' saying: 'Thems whats keen gets fell in previous'.

More 'Man Overboard' Overboard' in the October issue 'MANprompted me to recall an odd incident which happened some years before World War 11. HMS Resolution was detached from the Home Fleet spring cruise to proceed independently to Devonport for D2 refit. On Sunday afternoon in a very rough Bay of Biscay 'No-one to go on the upper deck' had been piped and evening quarters were fallen in on the messdecks. One young Ordinary Seaman - call him Snooks - was adrift. He couldn't be found in his mess or the heads, and a messmate then reported that some half-hour earlier Snooks had said that he must get some fresh air and was going on the upper. It was quite likely that he had done so as he was often in trouble for disobeying orders, so the possibility of his having been washed overboard was reported to the Bridge. The ship was turned round and swept with searchlights on the reverse course and 'All hands search ship' was piped. A very thorough search organised by divisional officers found no Snooks on board and the sea search was equally fruitless; his presumed loss overboard was reported by signal, the Captain wrote a letter of sympathy to Snooks' mother and the Padre held a short committal service. Shortly before arriving at Devonport an officer passing through a little-used passageway on the lower deck was mystified when a halfeaten bar of nutty fell at his feet. Search overhead revealed a very cramped Snooks squeezed into the narrow gap between the deckhead and a large ventilating trunk. The signal was cancelled and the Captain's letter was retrieved from postie's mail bag. The whole story came out later at the defaulters' table. The messmate who had reported Snooks' intention to go on the upper was an accomplice in an ingenious plot to desert. He had helped Snooks climb into his hiding place with provisions for a couple of days; when

the ship was alongside in the dockyard he would sneak on deck and fall in, hopefully unrecognised in the dark, with libertymen. But for the errant bar of nutty the plan might well have succeeded. Some years later in the cuddy of the Home Fleet flagship the talk after dinner turned to 'man overboard' and I told this story. The Flag Captain - that great man Philip Mack - capped it with an even more bizarre story told him by an uncle of his who had been Flag Lieutenant to the Rear Admiral of a battle squadron in the Mediterranean towards the end of Queen Victoria's reign. The Admiral, an unremarkable looking man with a greying beard, had only very recently hoisted his flag and was not yet well known in the squadron. One summer day on passage back to Malta after an exhausting week of exercises the Admiral told Flags after lunch that he didn't wish to be disturbed for a couple of hours. During the afternoon watch the rear ship of the line was observed from the flagship's bridge to be stopping and lowering a seaboat. A few minutes later she semaphored 'have picked up an elderly bearded seaman in his underpants who refuses to reveal his identity. Who claims?' Nobody in the squadron had been seen to fall overboard; all ships were ordered to muster ships' companies and all in due course reported no-one missing. The Flag Captain went aft to report the mystery to the Admiral. The keyboard sentry confirmed that the Admiral had not left his cabin, but he wasn't in his day cabin or sleeping cabin through his uniform was on a chair by his bunk. The Captain went through the open door to the sternwalk: he found there a deck-chair and a book - but no Admiral. R. W. PAFFARD REARADMIRAL

Correspondence RESERVES Sir,-Lieut. Cdr Collins (NR, Oct. '92) has touched a raw nerve in his letter concerning the present treatment of our volunteer Reserves. I too have been puzzled, disappointed but not entirely surprised by the lack of comment on the subject in recent issues of the Review. I believe that the problem stems from a complete lack of understanding of, and interest in, the purpose of the Reserves in peacetime throughout the Royal Navy: 'Oh aren't those the chaps who come and help us in wartime? Can't see there would be any place for them in the modern Navy - far too complicated for a civilian. ' Junior and middle rank officers rarely meet a member of the RNR, though the Reserves might be mentioned briefly during a Staff Course lecture on Preparations for War. It is only senior officers in shore command and staff appointments, and passed-over Lieutenant Commanders, who ever have face-to-face contact with the Reserves. I know this from personal experience. The end of the Cold War and the cessation of the WINTEX series of exercises will reduce such opportunities still further. There is nobody to fight the RNR comer on the Naval Staff, and with the extreme pressure on the Naval Budget, 'equal pain for all' means 'but a bit more for the RNR - they can't answer back'. It is my belief that this void in the general education of Naval officers, and the failure of the RN to recognise the long-term importance of its Reserves, will lead to a rapid run-down of the RNR far beyond that envisaged as a result of 'Options for Change', and there is no-one who will care enough to prevent it. Compare this with the attitude of the Army, which continues to regard the TA as an integral and vital part of its core structure, with clearly defined tasks in many contingency plans. Why should any civilian, faced with a 50% cut in his routine naval training (to one evening per week), a mandatory limit on his sea training of 14 days (though he may be ready and willing to do much more), and the sudden withdrawal of his Division's ship (on which he has expended much voluntary overtime, money and affection) to a distant sea training 'pool', continue to give

his time to the Navy? He is obviously not wanted. I predict that this insensitive, arbitary and vindictive treatment will so alienate the individual volunteer Reservist that he will vote with his feet, and once gone he will never come back. JEREMYSTEWART CAP~AIN RN Sir,-May I endorse Lieut. Cdr. Collins's letter in the October 1992 Number. My last job in the RN was on the Central Staffs of the Ministry of Defence in the '60's when there were a series of 'Defence Reviews'. The Politicians and Civil Servants then adopted a policy of 'Divide and Rule' and the Services fought each other: I like to think we have since learnt that lesson and present a more united front under the Chief of the Defence Staff. However then, after the Navy had 'lost' its new carrier and the spotlight fell on the army they elected, as I remember, for the TA to bear the brunt of the cuts. I think it is true to say that the TA was decimated and its morale sank to an all-time low which it has taken many years to restore. Under the current 'Options for change' the cuts have fallen in very general terms equally on the Regular and Territorial Army. However 'the RNR seems to be treated in a cavalier fashion and MOD (Navy) has yet to reveal a strong commitment to its parttime volunteers' - not my words, although I strongly endorse them, but an extract from an official report by a well-informed and objective writer. HONESTJOHN

PRINCIPLES OF WAR Sir,-I read Commodore Craig's article on the Principles of War (PW) with great interest; correspondence in October's NR provides further stimulating thought. One area that has not been addressed is INTELLIGENCE; both military and intellectual. Without military intelligence, other PW become difficult to sustain. Knowing where the enemy is, how he operates, his strengths and weaknesses are essential ingredients that support every other PW.

CORRESPONDENCE

87

Cerebal intelligence permeates all other PW, knitting needles!' in the Wardroom etc) has but at the same time stands alone. Its importance largely been solved by the hard work of should be recognised by inclusion in both the Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. The old and new PW lists. Our antipodean greatest obstacle, as with any industrial pollution colleagues in the Australian Navy have for many problem, is money, and the only way round that years added Intelligence as number 11 to our is legislation, with the teeth to back it up. If we traditional list; I believe Intelligence has a place are to be really serious, we need something like in Commodore Craig's new list. a UN sponsored monitoring body, with the And finally, why do PW not receive wider power to fine and ban offenders. Only then promulgation? Their application through every would the poor publicity, and risk of being walk of naval life can clearly be seen by those refused entry to ports, generate action. who know them. PW provide excellent headers AIDANTALBOTT SUB-LIEUTENANT. RN in planning virtually every evolution, and they also have an application in leadership training. LOGISTICS - THE RNSTS PW should be widely promulgated in every ship and establishment. and their use encouraged; Sir,-As a member of the Royal Naval Supply PW is not the sole province of the Warfare and Transport Service (RNSTS) I am heartened Officer. to note the recognition of the importance of E. F. K. SEATHERTONlogistics in recent issues of The Naval Review. Logistics were central to success in both 1982 LIEUT.CDR.RN and the Gulf, and few I imagine will disagree with Commodore Craig (NR April '92 p. 107) THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE MILITARY 'that it is a Principle of War in its own right, Sir,-I found Cdr McClement's piece on I have not the slightest doubt'. That the uniformed service has hitherto by and ecology and the military interesting and valuable, and think that it is long overdue that large taken logistics for granted I take as a we put more effort into this critical area. backhanded compliment to the RNSTS and However, I have a couple of points to raise other support agencies. Although in the Spring of 1982 particularly we all improvised, it simply about the article. Not much was made of the contribution, both would not have been possible to have stored the military and BAS, made by Endurance to Fleet, in some cases literally 'overnight', and ecological research. Her regular visits must to have maintained it in the South Atlantic so surely provide a valuable sequence of results successfully, without building on a sound and in an especially critical area; the RN is already efficient pre-existing logistics infrastructure. doing good work, though I accept that that is The civilian manned RNSTS (and its no reason to be complacent. predecessors which stretch back four centuries Secondly, I thought the article too idealistic. to the reign of Henry VIII) has been in the I have been in two warships that almost had to forefront of this role, serving with the RN in leave ports early due to greywater restrictions, the UK, overseas, and afloat in the RFA. The and I have only been serving for a dogwatch. RNSTS is in a great many ways closer to the The sheer impracticality of trying to store gash Navy than to our civil service colleagues in a Type 42 on an operational deployment elsewhere in MOD. The strong corporate defeats even the most virtuous First Lieutenant, identity and spirit - the sense of 'belonging' and our gash compactor is, to all intents and - has been the secret of success, and has enabled the RNSTS to weather many a storm. purposes, useless. Resulting however from the PROSPECT The pollution free ship talked about would, of course, be wonderful, but the harsh realities exercise to reduce HQ manpower by 20%, the of the defence budget create the biggest RNSTS is destined to lose its separate identity difficulty, not the will to be green. The when the support community is re-organised perception problem that for so long dogged the under the new Naval Support Command. green movement (cries of 'Pass the man his Planning is not yet complete, but it seems likely

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CORRESPONDENCE

that the management of the specialist stores ranges and the staff concerned will be transferred to in-service technical directorates, leaving what remains of the RNSTS to manage the less sophisticated stores ranges and the storage depots themselves. The emphasis therefore will change, so that in future the support of a weapon or platform equipment will be undertaken by the technical department, rather than as now by a centralised logistics organisation, as part of the overall support task. Clearly savings have to be found, but we could pay a heavy price for the dismantlement of the RNSTS if in a future conflict the supply organisation cannot 'deliver the goods' as it did in 1982 and 1991. There appears to have been remarkably little consideration given to the wider effects of such a radical change in support philosophy, but it seems that we are about to dismantle an organisation that has a proven track record and to replace it with a complete unknown. Even if in a narrow sense the concept is better, there is a real danger that the corporate spirit and sense of belonging so carefully nurtured will simply not survive the transition into the NSC. I sincerely hope that I am worrying unnecessarily. BJM

THE JUST WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Sir,-As a Christian and a supporter of nuclear deterrence I very much enjoyed reading Captain Malbon's detailed and comprehensive article in the October edition of the Naval Review. Whilst in broad terms I accept what he says I would like to make a few points. 1. Is non-combatant immunity as important as the Just War theory makes out? If it is a county that is going to war and not just its armed forces surely one might argue that the principle of non-combatant immunity is not always sacred. There might be circumstances where the principle might be overruled. 2. James Turner Johnson argues an interesting case in his book Can Modern War Be Just? He asks us to picture an area in West Germany which has been invaded by the Warsaw Pact armies. (The book was written before recent events in Eastern Europe). The inhabitants have all fled from the area. The

question of non-combatant immunity does not therefore arise: there are no non-combatants around. Johnson proposes that in such a situation it might be morally right to use a neutron bomb. A neutron bomb is a nuclear weapon but one which is significantly different from the traditional atomic weapon like that used at Hiroshima. The neutron weapon attempts to exploit the radiation effect as compared with blast and heat. In a neutron bomb the proportion of energy released as blast and heat is considerably smaller than in traditional atomic warheads. The amount of damage done by blast and heat is therefore small in comparison. The neutron radiation, however, is not longenduring so that the lingering radioactive contamination in the affected area is diminished. In practice this would mean that a neutron weapon would kill the invading army but because of the lack of the effects of blast and heat the buildings in the area would be largely left intact, ready for use again shortly after the explosion. Turner believes that the use of the traditional nuclear weapon in this situation would be unjust. The damage done to property, and particularly the long term effects on the environment, would force us to classify its use as unjust according to the Just War theory on account of the damage that would be done by blast, heat and radiation. More importantly, however, Turner maintains that the use of traditional weapons in this situation would also be unjust according to the Just War theory. It would be unjust because in order to stop advancing Warsaw Pact tanks, the collateral damage to property would be enormous were the advance to be stopped with traditional weapons which rely on blast and fire alone. He therefore concluded that 'In cases like the one sketched here the possibility does seem to exist that in some conditions the neutron weapon can be used with greater moral discrimination than tactical fission weapons and even conventional high explosives. '(p. 1 17) I would want therefore to disagree with Captain Malbon and say that the Just War principles may in fact permit the offensive use of (certain) nuclear weapons in some situations. Bearing in mind the question of possible retaliation and escalation these situations will

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have to be weighed very carefully. 3. I believe that the Just War principles cannot be used in abstraction from 'real life' considerations. The facts of a particular wariproposed warlscenario will need to be taken into account, for example, before one can decide whether any form of damage is 'proportionate' and this will involve estimating possible retaliation or escalation. Applying the principles in a vacuum is impossible: the 'real life' situation of the potential conflict will need careful consideration. To that extent, therefore, it is not simply the application of the principles of the Just War which determine whether to wage a war is right or wrong: it is also the consideration of various facts about the particular case. In this way Christian ethics is not 'clean' and easy but somewhat 'messy' and difficult and open to debate. In that sense it mirrors the incarnation - as one might expect it should. DAVIDG. KIBBLE LIEUT.CDR,RNR

A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS Sir,-I much enjoyed the short article about Frank Trickey. What a book it would have made had he recounted his life story before he died and others' recollections had been added to give it spice. One small amendment if I may: The Royal Hospital School moved to Holbrook in 1935 so Frank was at school there rather than at Greenwich. C. M. J. CARSON RN CAPTAIN. A WOODEN BOW Sir,-In 1941(?) HMS Liverpool had 100 ft of her bow blown off in the Eastern Med. Alexandria Dockyard fitted her with a wooden bow, with which she sailed to the USA via the Cape. Could any member with information on this epic make contact with me, please? J. R. POUND Oak House, Wrenbury Nantwich CW5 8EW PORTLAND INCIDENT Sir,-The sad news of Portland reminded me of my childhood days early in WWI when my

mother and I were in nearby digs while my father was serving in a ship based there. My mother got to know the Matron of the Portland Naval Hospital well, who one day asked her to tea to meet a lady who had come to live somewhere high up on the Bill, and who had befriended the patients. The Matron, a splendid Miss Keays, asked my mother if she had noticed anything odd about the lady, and mother said 'No' - she seemed very pleasant - but it was perhaps odd she kept her gloves on the whole time! A little later on the lady kindly presented a large box of chocolates (rare in the days of rationing), for the sailors, whom she talked to in the wards. Strangely the recipients all seemed to get unnaturally sick - so Matron thought it prudent to report it to the police. Suspicion was aroused - and no wonder! The visitot was a man, who was eventually shot as a German spy! I. G. AYLEN

...

OTHER TIMES Sir,-I recently came across a volume in an American second-hand bookstore called Britannia at Dartmouth by Captain S. W. C. Pack, C.B.E. It was published in 1966 by Alvin Redman Limited, 17 Fleet Street, London E.C.4, and details the course of RN cadet training through the first Britannia at Portsmouth (1859) through the second. Osborne, and Dartmouth up to the time of writing, a year or two before 1966, presumably. I thoroughly recommend it. For me, it brings to mind much that I had forgotten during my two stints at the College and, indeed, much that I had never known. The winds of change, at least for those of us long-in-the-tooth enough to have entered at the age of thirteen, that have blown through the system are delightfully illustrated by the following. Miss Bulla, who took over the catering early in the war and was still in office, apparently, when the book was written, was exhorting a cadet of the time not to leave his milk unfinished. .'It's good for you,' she said. 'That's what I tell my children,' said the cadet. BADHAM MICHAEL

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FIVE MINUTES OF TIME Sir,-Reference 'Five Minutes of Time' by Captain Rotherham (NR, Oct. '92), is it possible that the small freighter he refers to was built of wood? I have a good reason for asking. I was once persuaded, reluctantly, that the Mickey Mouse radar in the yacht I was driving in Maine's notoriously foggy Penobscot ~ a y , really was reliable. Echoes regularly materialised out of the fog where and when the screen said they would. So I pressed on full of confidence until, quite suddenly, out of the murk, a vessel incarnated herself within handshaking distance on the starboard bow. The subsequent and vociferous verbal exchange revealed that she was built entirely of, yes, wood. MICHAELBADHAM

Book Reviews -11 FOR THOSE IN PERIL 50 Years of Royal Navy Search and Rescue by JOHNWINTON (Robert Hale-£ 25) 'SAR is bloody dangerous!. . ..' I have never forgotten the first words of my instructor in the dingy classroom of the Observer School at Lossiemouth during my introduction to the techniques of Helicopter Search and Rescue. John Winton in For Those in Peril has chronicled a history of rescue operations which only serves to reinforce the theory. This is a prodigious work which embodies the result of painstaking research. Commissioned by the FONAC, Rear Admiral Roger Dimmock, in 1988, virtually every one of 3 13 pages describes an act of skill, bravery or even heroism which make up the story of Royal Naval airborne SAR. The first appendix adds weight to this opinion by listing the 217 servicemen who have won honours and awards in recognition of their efforts on behalf of SAR from the early 1940s to the present day. Repetitive one might think? perhaps; rather too professional for the laymen? maybe; pricey at £25 for most of us? certainly; but no, it is an excellent and enthralling read. Thanks to the ever changing twists of the drama and the simple but highly illustrative nature of the text the reader is led from incident to incident in a way that makes it hard to put the book down. Starting with the early rescues of the air-sea rescue launches in the Second World War it quickly moves on to the daring exploits of the Vickers Walrus or 'Shagbat' as it was familiarly known. One of the vital spin-offs to military aircrew involved with SAR is that the type of demanding flying that they experience in peacetime is the best possible training for war. Men and machines fly close to and sometimes beyond their limits. But then in war itself SAR is even more relevant and, of course, even more demanding. Thus it is not surprising that many of the most vivid accounts in this action packed book are those which took place in war. During the Malay emergency in the fifties, the Whirlwinds of 848 Squadron transformed the art ofjungle warfare. One minute they were

lifting casualties out of clearings in the 100 foot trees which were not much wider than the span of their rotor blades, and the next they were inserting troops to cope with operational trouble spots in a fraction of the time it would have taken them to march. Similarly in Korea, Suez and Borneo the helicopter proved itself as much a lifesaver as a weapon of war. Off Cyprus in 1974 following the Turkish invasion, Winton tells us of the considerable feat of flying by Lt McKechnie in HMS Andromeda's Wasp where after 4 hours 20 minutes of non stop flying and 55 night deck landings he had transferred 72 Turkish survivors. This was just one of many occasions that the Boyd Trophy, the Fleet Air Arm's premier award for the finest feat of Aviation in a particular year, has been awarded in recognition of SAR operations. Perhaps the most graphic of all the wartime accounts is the description of the Falklands War. The story of Lt Cdr Ian Stanley and HMS Antrim flight's heroic rescue of SAS soldiers from South Georgia makes the tales of Rider Haggard seem mundane. Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly plucking the Ardent hero, AB Dillon, from the water using only his own physical strength is again the stuff of the most exciting of novels. The intrigue of the 846 Squadron Sea King's one way trip to Chile and the gallant rescue in Fitzroy of the men from the stricken RFA Sir Galahad all add spice to this extraordinary tale of adventure and professionalism. But most telling of all the author sums up the role of the helicopter in the South Atlantic with the words: 'Every single Falklands casualty who entered in the evacuation chain - 778 injured is the official total - spent some part of his life in a helicopter. ' But it would be wrong to concentrate solely upon the wartime accounts, because it has been during the every day, humdrum moments of peace that some of the finest rescues have been achieved. Indeed the first ever major operation resulted in the 407 hours 55 minutes flown by the Dragonflies of 705 Squadron when they rescued over 800 people during the Dutch flooding disaster of 1953. Other classic rescues

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include the Orion oil rig in 1978, the Fastnet Race disaster of 1979 and the loss of Penlee lifeboat later that year. More recently, the horrific sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise and, in the final incident of the book, in 1989 when the Pakistani vessel Murree foundered in the English Channel provide yet more testament to the continuing challenge of SAR. There the story stops abruptly, and the reader is left sated but wondering what happened next. But of course life and its adventures continue. As I write, a gale is lashing the sea around Portland into a frenzy and the SAR crew of 772 Squadron do yet another check of their equipment and their procedures. This is SAR weather. As Winton says on the first page of his book, 'they smoke, they chat, they brew cups of tea, they watch TV or a video. But most of all they wait.' And yes, it is bloody dangerous. A. B. Ross RN CAPTAIN.

NODAYTOOLONG An Hydrographer's tale by REARADMIRAL G. S. RITCHIEc.B., D.s.c., F . R . I . c . ~ (The Pentland Press Ltd - f 15.50) How times have changed! In 1953 Commander Ritchie was given advance royalties to produce the story of a RN surveying ship whose activities had caught the public imagination (Challenger - The Life of a Survey Ship, 1957). In 1962 his publishers invited him to write another book, which emerged as a classic account of the great nineteenth century hydrographic exploration of the UK coast and the wider world into which British trade was expanding (The Admiralty Chart, 1967). In 1992, Admiral Ritchie, retired Hydrographer of the Navy and former President of the Directing Committee of the International Hydrographic Organisation, had to search hard before he found an outlet for this autobiography. Thank goodness that there are still some small publishers who recognise that this genre is as important as the sweeping works of Roskill, Barnett and Grove, or the specialist monographs which emerge from beneath the curtain of the 30-year rule. To the chagrin of a Charge Surveyor of the

old school one conspicuous type-correcting solecism - a misspelling of the name of the current Hydrographer of the Navy - slipped through. Otherwise the publishers have served Admiral Ritchie well with his text. At the snip of a price it would be uncharitable to expect sufficient maps and chartlets to cover this voyager's tale, and for full enjoyment a good atlas should be ready to hand. The author has perhaps been allowed to be slightly overindulgent with fancy dress photographs, although they certainly reflect a colourful character whose leadership style became legendary during his service career. However, inclusion of a marvellous sketch by war artist John Worsley more than compensates. The writing is delightful, which will be no surprise to those who are lucky enough to possess copies of Admiral Ritchie's earlier works. The narrative flows logically and effortlessly, with unforgettable characters passing across the stage, many of whom have the perennial traits of naval types. There is the Australian bibliophile transferring from ship to ship with his precious collection, including The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci, and the MO (ex Combined Ops) who arrived onboard with a pickled, truncated corpse which, in the style of the less successful brand of ships' doctors, he stowed under a table in the smallest messdeck. There is much classic humour, including an account of a train journey across Sicily during the Allied invasion which is straight from 'Private Angelo '. But while the whole account of the WW2 Port Survey Teams is often reminiscent of Evelyn Waugh, the stark ingenuity and professional determination which contributed to the logistic chain upon which victory ultimately depended is made plain. The Arromanches survey of Lieutenant (later Commander) Nesbit Glen, the clearance of the Scheldt by Captain (later Rear Admiral Sir) 'Egg' Irving, and the backroom work of Harvey Schwartz, creator of the DECCA Navigator system, all receive just tribute. Overall, the account of the clearance of the ports and wreckstrewn seaways of Western Europe conveys the atmosphere of the period most compellingly. An inevitable theme of the book is the impetus to technological development which resulted from WW2, but this is well-balanced by

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treatment of eternal themes which run through the life of a hydrographic surveyor. Indeed this book should be required reading, not only for the present-day 'droggies' who wish to know how the RN Surveying Service evolved in the Twentieth Century, but also for those who must determine whether this Service is to continue into a new millenium. I will not be alone in noting with wry appreciation that Admiral Ritchie was recruited by a retired surveyor with a rich repertoire of foreign voyages and explorations, that he could discover nothing about hydrography from the staff at the Naval College, that he gained fleeting glimpses of odd ships, painted in different colours and engaged in peculiar activities remote from the rest of the Fleet, and that he was positively discouraged from volunteering for H by his Commanding Officer in a capital ship. The career profile which followed for the author is neither available, nor recommended, for today's surveyor. Admiral Ritchie's story reveals the extraordinary variety of activities which come the way of an X(H). Yet now 'broadening appointments' are the order of the day, and there is little appreciation of the catholic grasp of maritime and scientific affairs which a surveyor acquires. With the hard-won exception of the Ice Patrol Ship, it is increasingly difficult to give the field experience in remote areas which pays dividends in a crisis. Having read this book I can see how WW2 experience was fostered in ingenious improvisation and seamanship in surveys throughout the Commonwealth. The SubLieutenants in Captain Ritchie's ships turned into heroes of our own generation, men like Commander Chris Gobey who led with such flair in the South Atlantic in the wake of the conflict of 1982. 1982 was perhaps a turning point for the RN Surveying Service. It is the moment at which this book closes, with Admiral Ritchie in his final days at Monaco, and the UK Hydrographer presiding over the 12th International Conference as war clouds gathered. Sir David Haslam's conduct of this difficult forum won him international acclaim. However, back in UK the Surveying Service, with its deep knowledge of the South Atlantic theatre, became marginalised in the unseemly scramble to jump on the

operational band-wagon. In the succeeding decade it has searched somewhat desperately for a 'warfare' role, while the fine new flotilla which Admiral Ritchie helped his predecessor to secure has been eroded and replaced with ships taken up from trade and commercial contracting. Admiral Ritchie remarks that, in his first Whitehall appointment, 'I learnt . . . that every Hydrographer has to fight for his continued existence in the corridors of power. ' This book contains a clear account of a plucky battle which secured most of the assets with which I and my contemporaries have pursued our productive careers. It also makes plain the crucial importance of men of vision such as Lord Carrington, who told the RGS in 1963, as the Polaris programme progressed: 'In order to promote naval knowledge of marine exploration we have some thousand men and eleven ships under the command of the Hydrographer of the Navy, and the job he is doing is of the utmost importance - not only to the Navy but to all of us.' The young X(H) officers who are today's counterparts to Admiral Ritchie remain desperately proud of their skills and qualifications, and convinced of their relevance to Fleet operations and national prosperity. They badly need the loyal support of influential men of insight. I hope that some of the latter will read this book. M. K. BARRITT COMMANDER, RN

MARINE MANAGEMENT IN DISPUTED AREAS: THE CASE OF THE BARENTS SEA by ROBINCHURCHILL and GEIRULFSTEIN (Routledge - f 37 .SO) One reason for concentrating academic research on the Barents Sea region has been its importance in maritime security terms. It is where the Russian Northern Fleet feels at home and, since the development of genuinely intercontinental SLBMs it has been an increasingly important operating area for that fleet's SSBNs. The USN's Forward Maritime Strategy, and Gorbachev's Northern Waters speech in Murmansk in October 1987, further contributed to the raising of the region's profile.

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Academics have also been attracted by the region because it is relatively easy to define and it lends itself to inter-disciplinary approaches. Some of the more useful and informative contributions to the literature on 'Northern Waters' have been produced under the auspices of Chatham House's Northern Waters Study Group (NWSG). Although this book is not Chatham House sponsored, Robin Churchill is a member of the NWSG, so one can at least regard it as an honorary occupant of the NWSG stable. It is certainly of a similar quality and can be recommended, despite its price. It deals with four main issue areas: The Svalbard Treaty; boundary delimitation; fisheries management; and offshore hydrocarbon exploration. The problem with the Svalbard Treaty is its age. It grants Norway sovereignty over the archipelago but endows signatory states (including the UK and Russia) with rights to exploit its economic resources. Drawn up well before continental shelves, extended fisheries zones and EEZs, the Treaty does not answer some important questions. Can resource rights enshrined in the Treaty now be exercised in Svalbard's extended maritime zones? Or are those rights restricted to the area originally covered by the Treaty, giving Norway exclusive rights to the resources of the shelf? This book provides a description of the dispute and the arguments deployed; it is as clear a summary as any this reviewer has read. It concludes that legally the Treaty probably does extend to maritime zones but that politically it would be preferable for Norwegian sovereignty to prevail. To the east of Svalbard lies Russia's Franz Joseph Land archipelago. Between the two and south to the land boundary between Norway and Russia is an area of sea subject to a long running maritime boundary dispute. The Norwegians would like to agree a median line. The Russians prefer a sector line running north from the land boundary on the coast. Negotiations have been in train for twenty years, with little movement from either party. However, the dispute is well managed, as the agreement in force since 1978, to create a 'Grey Zone' for fisheries exploitation, well illustrates. Fish stocks in the Barents Sea are prone to

large natural fluctuations and thus require careful management. Despite the establishment of 200 mile zones. cod stocks have declined due to over fishing. Both states have demonstrated a willingness to co-operate and have even agreed to set Total Allowable Catches at levels below those recommended by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). However, there is still dispute over the best measures for protecting immature cod and enforcement arrangements need to be more effective. Finally, the book discusses oil and gas exploration in the region. Gas has been found in recoverable quantities in the Russian sector and may be present on Norway's shelf. Both sectors may contain commercially viable oil reserves. One question for the future: will the existence of oil on Svalbard's shelf lead to a resolution of the dispute over resource rights ol: will the dispute deter oil companies from investing in the region? I enjoyed reading this book and learned a good deal from it. My only criticism is levelled at its cost, which I imagine will ensure not a single member will buy it. STEVENHAINES LIEUT.CDR.RN

HISTORY OF THE US NAVY, Vol. I 1775-1941 by ROBERTW. LOVEJunior (Stackpole Books - $39.95) This review will begin with the conclusion: this is an excellent, highly recommended survey of the history of the US Navy in the period up to the start of the Second World War. It is easy to read, evidently well researched, full of photographs nicely integrated with the text, and at 73 1 pages very good value for money. It has recently been followed by the second volume (which will be reviewed in the next edition of 7ke Naval Review) a sequel which adds another 904 pages to the collection and takes the story up to 1991. Both volumes together give'you the page equivalent of about six normal British naval books for only a little more than the price of one; this tells us something about the economics of British publishing, and reinforces your reviewer's conclusion that you should go out and buy both volumes. They will make a very effective sledge (not a stocking - they're

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much too large for that!) filler for a late Christmas present. In some ways, the even more extraordinary thing is that this is the third (and the biggest!) blockbuster on the US Navy to have come out in the last year. The other two were Kenneth Hagan's This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power [a mere 434 pages1 and Stephen Haworth's To Shining Sea: A History of the US Navy 1775-1 991 (whose 620 pages were well reviewed in the last edition of this journal). It all sounds as though the academic community has concluded that the US Navy could well be at a major turning point in its long development, and that this is a good time to reflect on the lessons of the past before plunging off into an uncertain future. With the recent American Presidential election, such a view could well be right. But of course, this isn't the real explanation for the simultaneous appearance of such an inundation of historical analysis on the US Navy. After all, all three are major works of scholarship, thoroughly researched, well written and evidently not thrown together over the past year or so. Haworth is a British historian who has moved onto the US Navy having done the Japanese (and one or two other projects on the way), and the appearance of his very good book at this time is mere coincidence. The other two authors, Hagan and Love, are both American, both members of the History Department of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis (obviously don't have enough teaching to do if they have time to write books like this -joke) and to judge by the contents of their books do not see eye to eye. To some extent at least, their books are the product of academic rivalry and as such are a classic example of the way in which the concept of critical mass works in the academic community. Putting two historians together provides the output equivalent of three, and so on. The result is seen in terms of coverage, alternative insights and an enhanced ability to compare and contrast ideas and interpretations; all this helps the enhanced ability for readers to approach The Truth and is wholly good. (Complement reviewers, please note.) All three authors provide us with examples of the large concept of naval history, not so much in length as in the breadth of the topics

they cover. This is 'holistic' history in which the authors seek the explanation of naval development within the broad political, economic and international environment in which the US Navy operates. Hagan's book, frankly is a polemic. Love's is the solid, reliable, dependable counter. Both are indispensable. To illustrate the point, and to focus on the particular relevance of such studies of US Naval history at this time of change, let us look at just one of the countless themes that Love explores. We have all got used to the global dominance of the US Navy, to the Mahanian image of a major Battle Fleet-dominated blue-water fleet, determined to be second to none. We may have slid unwittingly into the view that it has always been like that and will always be like that. Both Love and Hagan remind us that this in fact has not been the case. A major US deepwater fleet is a relatively novel development, much newer in fact than the existence of a major Russian fleet (so much for the idea that the US is by nature a much more 'maritime' power than the old Soviet Union!) In fact, for the major part of Love's book we are provided with graphic illustrations of the difficulty that Admirals and others have had in persuading their people and government that it was necessary to be strong at sea. Their ability to do so was dependent on the particular thrust of US foreign policy at the time. For most of the 19th Century, US concepts of maritime strategy were determined by the need to maintain and defend access to the high seas, largely for purposes of trade, and to extend and defend the territory of the continental United States. In their two wars against Britain, the Americans found even these limited aspirations dangerously difficult. Love shows how their ideas evolved. Individual US warships could be used almost symbolically in distant raiding deployments which would irritate the British, reminding them of the continuous cost of their American policy, inflicting harm on their war economy and stimulating neutral opinion into support for the United States. In the 1812 war, the only question was whether their super frigates should pursue these aims by operating singly or in combination. The issue boiled down

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to the question of which method would more effectively force the British to disperse their forces to defend their trade, thereby reducing the density of the British blockade of American ports and the likelihood of large scale assaults on the American coast. In neither case would it have made strategic sense for the US Navy to embrace the large scale fleet concepts of the British. In those wars, the policy worked, at least to an extent because Americans could rely on the direct or indirect support provided by French naval activity. Afterwards, and in the same way, America's maritime aspirations could be kept at a relatively modest level because Americans could rely, most of the time at any rate, on the beneficial consequences of British naval power. This informal alliance meant that the focus of the US Navy could continue to be on the defence of the commercial interests of American traders, against Barbary pirates, against exclusion from the markets of the Asia-Pacific and against disorder and local rivals around the western and southern parts of the American continent. Above all that, there was the sense that 'We may regret the necessity of a navy . . . but we must have a navy, or we are not an independent nation.' On the one hand, American leaders were increasingly keen to use the Navy as a means of extending the principle of continentalism to more distant places. On the other, they were unwilling to pick up the bill. Their readiness to do so grew slowly through the last half of the 19th Century, and was often stimulated by differences of opinion with the British. This was not through any real fear of conflict between the two nations, but because it pointed up the diplomatic disadvantages of relying on British naval power. By the end of the Century, the Americans were plainly moving into a new phase of maritime independence, and it was then that the Mahanian model of sea power came into its own, replacing earlier alternatives. For the first 40 years of this century, the Mahanian theory and aspiration became practice. These are huge, vital themes but Love takes us slowly, clearly, meticulously and enjoyably through them. One may not agree with everything that is said, and even in a book as long as this it is possible to see topics that have been skimped [naval

personnel policy for one] but on the basis of this 700 page appetiser, I can hardly wait to see how, in Volume 11, the story will end. The best tribute I can make to the book is that I mean exactly what I say. PROFESSOR GEOFFREY TILL RNC, GREENWICH

NOT A NINE TO FIVE JOB by REARADMIRAL P. G. LA NIECECB, CBE (Charltons Publishers, Yalding, Kent ME18 6DF, 1922 - £12.50) 'When I joined Lydd early that morning the first comment by a sailor helping with my baggage was "Blimey, the French navy has arrived"! Winston Churchill had recently offered British nationality to French expatriates; the sailor had seen the name on my baggage.' The Lydd was a coal-burning fleet minesweeper of World War .One vintage. It was 24 September 1940and SubLieutenant La Niece, fresh from commanding a single decked Portsmouth Corporation bus deployed on Portsdown Hill, in a counterparachutist role, was to be her Navigator. He had joined HMS Erebus as a cadet in 1937 and, since the outbreak of war, had taken charge of a cutter picking up survivors from the Duchess, which his ship the Barham had run down; been torpedoed in that ship; transferred from her to the Hood and then to the Warspite; his Sub's courses had been interrupted by service with the beach party which was just too late, sadly, to evacuate the 51st Highland division from St Valery-en-Caux; and he had Served with an antiinvasion coastal battery on the Isle of Wight. Just about par for that particular course. 'Duty', said Nelson, 'is the great business of a sea officer'. As we follow Peter La Niece's modestly-given account of his naval career, we get the sense, not only of duty happily and well carried out, both in war and peace, but of a fullydischarged obligation to record events with accuracy unadorned by heroics or hyperbole. From December 1940 until July 1942 Lieutenant La Niece was a watch-keeper in HMS Birmingham, experiencing thereby the wide-ranging and diverse operations of our cruisers, with a spell of 203 days at sea out of 222 - not untypical; it was not lack of seatime that impelled La Niece to put in a formal request to serve in a destroyer, but the feeling that it

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was time he caught up with some of those junior to him who were already First Lieutenants. War being what it is - or at any rate was - a year passed before Peter La N. found himself, after service as Liaison Officer in Dutch cruisers and a 28-knot passage back to UK in the Queen Mary, joining the sadly teased-out old Viscount as Number One. In due course: Useless as an escort we limped into Freetown . . . At this juncture a letter arrived from our erstwhile operational authority, Captain (D) Liverpool, declaring that . . . Viscount was not in a fit condition to continue operating without an immediate major refit! Since the despatch of this report, which had taken three months to reach us, we had steamed over 12,000 miles. The first post-war Long (G) Course saw Whale Island back to pre-war form, and P. G. La Niece emerged from it not only qualified but duly blooded as a result of the inevitable 'Whaley' horse-play; he had indeed been lucky not to lose an eye. In the event, he was made Gunnery Officer of the Ajax, of Battle of the Plate fame, and enjoyed a spirited Mediterranean commission in her. But it was his next job that, fortuitously, prepared him for the key Cold War appointment which he would hold in the rank of Captain; for in March 1948, just married to the 210 WRNS whom he had met in Malta, Peter joined HMS Dolphin 'and as Staff Gunnery Officer to Captain SIM 5 and FOSM' . It is salutary to be reminded that in October 1956, at the time of 'Suez', Anglo-US relations were so bad that Commander La Niece, then a member of the British Naval Staff in Washington, was unceremoniously bundled ashore from the US cruiser flagship in which he was observing an exercise. Happily, by 1963, when Captain La Niece returned to Washington, this time as the representative of Rear-Admiral Hugh ('Rufus') Mackenzie, the newly appointed Chief Polaris Executive, President and Prime Minister were on good terms; and this was reflected by the uniquely close cooperation between the USN and the RN and all concerned with giving effect to the Polaris Sales Agreement. Naval historians (even if not now required reading for naval officers) of the Cold

War are here provided with valuable source material. It was fitting that La Niece's next appointment should be in command of HMS Triumph, the light fleet carrier converted to be a heavy repair ship, for she was the finest command that an officer on the dreaded 'dry list' could have, and he managed to take her to sea quite often. Thereafter, command of the Clyde Submarine Base was a 'natural', with Flag Officer Spithead to follow, thus rounding o u t a naval career of which the admiral's family, for whom the book was written, have every right to be proud. An adequate index, and photographs, enhance the narrative. Only the title, perhaps, might be a bit more catchy - I should have preferred, for example, From Parade Ground to Polaris: the Memoirs of a Gunnery Jack - but then I wasn't one. IANMCGEOCH

THUNDER IN THE MORNING CALM: The Royal Canadian Navy in Korea 1950-1955 by EDWARD C. MEYERS (Vanvell Publishing Ltd., distributed by Airlife Ltd - £16.95) This is a valuable addition to the Korean War literature, covering the RCN destroyers' war in detail, and at the same time describing the operations and conditions experienced by all the small ships at the sharp end of this conflict. When the war started on 25 June 1950 the three operational destroyers - Athabaskan, Cayuga and Sioux - were all in dockyard refit at Esquimalt. By cancelling most of the outstanding work and by rapid resupply and rearming, they sailed for Pearl Harbour and Guam. General MacArthur wanted soldiers not sailors so they did not reach Sasebo (and warm British beer in the canteen) until 30 July. Their first duties were as convoy escorts and neutralisation of the islands on the west coast prior to the Inchon landings. Difficulties in communications were resolved by having interpreters who understood both American and British English. They acted as escorts to the supply ships and troop carriers for the Inchon landings, after which they were involved with clearing the islands south of Haeju. Here the young sailors

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had their initiation into war when they saw the misery and tragedy experienced by the islanders. Good coverage is given to the excellent work done by Captain J. B. Brock RCN with Cayuga, Athabaskan and Sioux together with HMASs Bataan and Warramunga and USS Forrest B. Royal when they were operating in support of the US 8th Army at Chinnampo during the withdrawal from the north after the Chinese and North Korean offensives in November and December 1950; they assisted with demolitions to dock installations and with the evacuation of Chinnampo. It was UN policy to retain the islands off the west coast as a threat to North Korea. The chapter on liaison with the guerrilla forces operating from these islands describes the problems encountered to achieve this aim. The northern Chorusans, close to the Chinese border, were lost in December 1951, but the southern islands of Paengnyong-do, Chodo and Sok-to were to be held at all costs. Invasion forces could be launched from them; guerrilla raids were regularly mounted from them; Paengnyong-do was the emergency landing strip (on the beach) for damaged aircraft from the carriers. The Train Busters Club on the east coast the preserve of the USN - is given a chapter, Crusader finally holding the record for the largest number of trains destroyed. A thread running through the book deals with problems of low morale, apparently triggered initially by the poor mail arrangements. Later causes of trouble were long, boring patrols; dress regulations; and continuing problems with mail from home. Details are given of steps taken by Commanding Officers to overcome these problems, and mention is particularly made of Iroquois as being probably the happiest ship. Though morale may at times have been very low, discipline never broke down. Apart from recording the patrols carried out by all eight destroyers during the three years, the other side of naval life is well covered in the chapter 'Happy Days' - rest and recreation, crime and punishment, non-naval money making schemes and pedi-cab racing. Similarly a number of stories relieve the patrol reports, Alice the dog in Cayuga (and other mascots);

Ferdinand Demara who passed himself off (successfully) as Dr J. Cyr in Athabaskan. A series of appendices completes the book with details of the ships, their battle honours, Commanding officers. Korean service and final disposal; a list of awards to RCN personnel; command organisation charts; and excerpts from the enquiry into the grounding of Huron on 13 July 1953. This is a book that should be read by anyone with an interest in post- 1945 conflicts and should be bought by those who served in Korea. It presents, too, a view of the Royal Canadian Navy that we in Britain may not have seen and highlights the dangers of a single Unified Defence Force. JOHN R. P. LANSDOWN